The role of tribal authorities in a democratic KwaZulu-Natal. by Amtaika, Alexius Lambat.
THE ROLE OF TRIBAL AUTHORITlES IN A DEMOCRATIC
KWAZULU-NATAL.
ALEXIUS LAMBAT AMTAIKA
Submi tted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Social science in the Department of Poli tical




This thesis attempts to define the role of tribal
authorities in the structures of the democratic government in the
South African province of KwaZulu-Natal. However, the major
difficulty lies in the nature of the institution of tribal
authorities itself. In African tradition, leadership is,.
hereditary. It is not sUbject to any electoral process. Besides
this, the hereditary process is fundamentally male primogeniture
and by nature excludes women. This contradicts the principles of
democracy and the bill of rights which the democratic government
of South Africa has adopted.
Nevertheless, the institution of tribal authorities is not
new in South Africa. It has existed and worked hand in hand with
previous governments in South Africa since the period of the
British colonial rule in the early 19th century. During the
apartheid era, tribal authorities served as the local government
in the rural areas of the KwaZulu Bantustan. Chiefs only lost
this status after the formation of the Government of National
Unity in 1994. However, most chiefs still have great influence
and respect among the traditional people who live in rural areas.
Besides this, among the Zulus, the institution of tribal
authorities.symbolizes Zulu nationalism and culture. Because of
their closeness to the people at the grassroots, chiefs have good.
relationships with different political parties, particularly the
Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress. Probably
they are seen by these political parties as potential allies and
agents for political mobilization and recruitment in rural tribal
·areas.
Consequently, abandoning the institution of tribal
authorities in the democratic dispensation is unrealistic and
\
irresponsible. To meet the political realities of KwaZulu-Natal,
a certain form of representation in the structures of democratic
I
I . government at both the provincial and local levels needs to be
I .given to the institution of tribal authorities as part of the
democratization process, and also as a means of expanding the
I .
scope of democracy in rural areas. This also fulfils one of the
precepts of democracy which entails including all the concerned
groups of people in a society, irrespective of colour, creed,
sex, race, tradition and culture. Nevertheless, to achieve this,
some adjustment is necessary to make possible the incorporation
of the institution of tribal authorities in the structures of the
democratic government.
How can this institution be accommodated? What will the
status and position of chiefs be in these structures? What will
be their new role? How well can democratically elected structures
work with non-elected ones? Is the inclusion of tribal
authorities in the democratic government not going to
conceptualize ethnicity? In other words, does ethnicity have any
room in South Africa's democratic dispensation?
To address these questions, this thesis assesses a number of
aspects, which include examining the role chiefs played in the
previous government, their relationships with the people, the
Bantustan government and Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, and other
political parties especially in the democratic dispensation. The
thesis also examines legislation passed by the Government o~
National Unity, as well as the constitutional proposals of the
Inkatha Freedom Party, the African National Congress and other
political parties in the provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal
concerning the role of tribal a~thorities.
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This thesis investigates whether the institution of tribal
authorities should be incorporated in the structures of
democratic government in the South African province of KwaZulu-
)
Natal. It also examines legislation which deals with the role of
tribal authorities in the democratic era. The n~ed for such an
analysis has arisen as a result of the demise of apartheid
government and policies, and the formation in April, 1994 of the
Government of National Unity in South Africa. This was followed
by the reincorporation of the former ethnic homelands and the
self-governing states into a unified South Africa. The question,
then, was what to do with the institution of tribal autho~ities
which was the basis of the legislative assemblies and part of the
rUling mechanisms in the Bantustans.
The institution of a tribal authority is not a newly created
one in KwaZulu-Natal, or in South Africa as a whole. It has
existed and worked hand in hand with former governments in South
Africa for almost a century. In the former British colonial
government and the Union Government of South Africa, this
institution served as part of the managerial mechanism in rural
areas, in the administrative system commonly known as indirect
rule. During the era of apartheid, from the late 1940s onwards,
the institution of tribal authorities served as the local
government in various homelands, including the KwaZulu Bantustan.
Tribal authorities exercised governmental functions which ranged
from the provision of services to the preservation of law and
order, and the settling of minor disputes, to the allocation of
tribal land held in trust. Essentially, though sUbject to the
Bantustan government, tribal authorities provided a system of
localized government to rural communities. In contemporary
KwaZulu-Natal, a significant sector of rural societies still
cherish the institution, and it is still regarded as a symbol of
Zulu nationalism. Some progressive tribal leaders also still
maintain the loyalty and respect of their communities. In
KwaZulu-Natal, chiefs also have strong relationships with
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political parties, specifically with the Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC). Because of the
influence chiefs have in rural and tribal communities, these
political parties regard them as allies in the process of
political mobilization and recruitment in KwaZulu-Natal. All this
suggests that any proposal to phase out the institution of tribal
authorities in the democratic dispensation will not only be
resisted by those who cherish traditionalism, but it is also
unrealistic and irresponsible, especially when South Africa is
now in the process of nation-building.
Nevertheless, the major problem with the institution of
tribal authorities is that, in African tradition, leadership is
hereditary. It is not sUbject to any electoral process.
Significantly, the hereditary process is fundamentally male
primogeniture and by nature excludes women. Only in exceptional
circumstances would women qualify to assume traditional
leadership. But the hereditary character of the institution does
accommodate elected functionaries, although not women. All these
aspects contradict the principles of democracy and the Bill of
Rights which the Government of National Unity adopted at its
inception in April, 1994.
-I .
1'<'.(; (: ~ ~''''' .~....
While one can see the dilemma of incorporating the L/'
institution of tribal authorities in the democratic dispensation,
the thesis argues that, for the sake of n~tion-building, the
tribal authorities should be given a certain form of
representation in the structures of the democratic government,
both at provincial and local level. The reason for this is to
fulfil the precepts of democracy which necessitate including all
groups, irrespective of colour, race, tradition or culture. This
suggests that to exclude tribal authorities from the structures
of the democratic government of South Africa would negate the
very same principles of democracy. By contrast, including tribal
authorities would expand the scope of democracy itself and
promote it in rural areas, by embracing the customary
institutions of the indigenous people. In so doing the structures
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of the democratic government would reflect the political
realities in the "province of KwaZulu-Natal.
However, the question is, if chiefs are incorporated, what
role will they play in these democratically elected structures
of government? What will be their position and status? Is their
inclusion not going to contradict the very same principles of
democracy by mixing the democratically elected with non-elected
and hereditary structures? Is their inclusion not going to
emphasize ethnicity in the democratic dispensation? If so, what
would the consequences be?
While these questions remain to be explored, the thesis
concludes that some of the duties which the tribal authorities
performed in the former governments, particularly those ones
which do not fall in the spheres of local government, should be
retained. The thesis also suggests that tribal authorities should
be remunerated for performing public duties in rural areas on
behalf of the government. But the duties which they should
perform in the democratic dispensation need to be defined, a
matter this thesis will explore.
In order to examine, define and determine how to incorporate
tribal authorities in the structures of the democratic government
of KwaZulu-Natal, the role that they should play, their status,
and the duties they will perform, the thesis evaluates a number. .
of aspects. These include reviewing the role which tribal leaders
played in the former KwaZulu Bantustan; the relationship between
chiefs and their subjects in rural areas; and their relationship
with the Bantustan government and Inkatha. The constitutional
debates which took place in former KwaZulu government in the
1980s, as well as in South Africa as a whole in the 1990s, will
also be evaluated. The relationship of the traditional
authorities with the major political parties, namely the African
National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party, specifically in
contemporary KwaZulu-Natal, and the reasons why these parties are
concerned about their plight, will also be examined. Most
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importantly, legislation which was passed by successive South
African governments between 1993 and -1995, concerning the future
role of tribal authorities, will also be scrutinized. An analysis
will also be extended to the 1995 constitutional proposals of the
Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress in the
province of KwaZulu-Natal.
I have adopted several research methodologies. First, I
evaluate the historical developments. The aim of this method is
to attempt to describe and to learn from the past. I believe that
a proper solution for problems concerning the institution of
chieftaincy can be found by assessing this institution in
relation to its historical development. This will actually help
to put some of the problems of the past and the present in their
proper context.
secondly, I rely greatly on reports and literature, and to
some extent on fieldwork research, namely, interviews. The
interviews involved prominent and influential people who are well
versed in the problems that surround the institution of
chieftaincy in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. These include
government officials, political party leaders, academics, local
people and the chiefs themselves. The aim of conducting such
interviews was to obtain updated and qualified answers, which
would offer some perspective on ~he fate of the instituti~n of
tribal authorities in the democratic dispens~tion.
Thirdly, to a limited extent I used comparative studies. The
aim of this method is to look at the ways other countries or
people tackled similar problems. However, one has to be very
cautious because comparisons with specific cases in other
countries are only helpful up to a certain point. The explanation
for this is that the realities of the South African politics are
unlike the rest of the continent. South Africa is a rainbow
nation, that is, it has a variety of races and ethnic groups
which have different traditions and customs. Yet, every ethnic
group desires to see its traditions and customs being
4
accommodated in the democratic dispensation. Another reason which
makes South Africa different from the rest of the continent is
that South Africa has had experience of other than traditional
rule for over a century. Western rule in other parts of Africa
was relatively short-lived, on average less than seventy years.
My thesis has been divided into three parts. Tpe first part
comprises a single chapter. This examines the historical context
in which the institution of chieftaincy and tribal authorities
operated in the KwaZulu Bantustan. It analyses the role of this
institution in the structures of KwaZulu self-governing state
since 1970. It provides the reader with a better understanding
of the roots of the political developments which took place in
the province of KwaZulu-Natal after the April 1994 general
elections. In brief, it analyses the relationship between tribal
authorities on the one hand, and the KwaZulu Bantustan government
and Inkatha on the other, which is the key to understanding
contemporary politics concerning the status of tribal
authorities.
Part Two of this thesis is composed of two chapters. This
focuses on the constitutional debates which took place in South
Africa in the period between 1980 and April 1994. Chapter Two
examines the transition from apartheid to the advent of
democratic government in South Africa. It takes a closer look,
first, at the Lombard Commission in the 1970s, and then the
Buthelezi Commission of 1980, which were set up to investigate
a possible future constitution for the province of KwaZulu-Natal;
and then later on the KwaNatal Indaba of 1986, which was created
by the joint governments of KwaZulu and Natal to investigate
proposals for a federal system, with the assumption that such a
solution would be adopted for the whole of South Africa in a
democratic dispensation. Of significance is the failure of both
the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaNatal Indaba to come up with
constructive and concrete proposals concerning the future role
of tribal chiefs and authorities in an envisaged democratic
government. This was so despite the fact that tribal authorities
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were the KwaZulu Bantustan government's powerful mechanism in the
administration of rural and tribal communities.
Furthermore, the chapter takes a close look at the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I and 11). These
were the constitutional talks which laid the foundation for the
preparation of mUlti-party talks in this country. CODESA
concentrated only on issues which were considered to be of great
importance for clearing out obstacles for the beginning of
negotiations for democracy. Nevertheless, the most important
feature at CODESA was the change of mind by the IFP to emphasize
the inclusion of the King of the Zulus and chiefs at the
negotiation table, a matter which Inkatha ignored during the
Buthelezi Commission and the KwaNatal Indaba.
The Multi-Party talks at Kempton Park, which came as a
consequence of the deliberations of CODESA, concentrated on
deciding a new constitution for South Africa. While a number of
issues, such as the incorporation of the former homelands, were
addressed sUfficiently, and provisional solutions found, the
institution of tribal authorities did not figure prominently as
a constitutional focus. Debate centred on the undemocratic
character of the institution, which met fierce opposition from
the Women's National Coalition, which argued that tribal
authorities are oppressive to women and therefore should not be
prot7cted by the interim constitution. However, the delegates to
the mUlti-party talks agreed that continued recognition of the
institution of tribal authorities should be entrenched in the
interim constitution. But how this should be achieved was never
decided. Instead, much attention was given to finding a solution
for urban local government.
Chapter Three traverses the old and new political
dispensations. It explores events which took place in South
Africa, specifically in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, prior to
and after the April 1994 general election. It examines issues
which led to the withdrawal of the IFP from the mUlti-party talks
6
at Kempton Park. The analysis centres mainly on the status and
the role of the King in Zulu ethnic politics. The significance
of the part played by the King is crucial for understanding the
nature of tribal authorities. The relationship between the King
and the IFP, notably its leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi,
after the formation of the Government of National Unity in South
Africa is also evaluated.
The chapter also discusses The Ingonyama Trust Act of 1994
which makes the King of the Zulus sole trustee over ninety-three
percent of land in the former KwaZulu homeland. Land under the
control of the King is defined in the Act as the l~nd over which
the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly had jurisdiction in terms of The
Self-Governing Territorial Act of 1971. Land has for a long time
been a principal source of the authority of the tribal
authorities. The problem with this Ingonyama Trust Act in the
democratic dispensation is that it has created a twin power
system in this province. The one is hereditary and feudal and
rests on patronage. The other is modern and· democratic and
depends on regular elections. How well can these two systems work
together?
Part Three consists of two chapters, Four and Five. This is
the heart of the thesis. It examines the legislation which deals
with incorporating of the tribal authorities in the structures
of the democratic government in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.
Chapter Four takes a close look at the methods and procedures for
bringing this about. It assesses the role of tribal leaders at
the provincial level. Such legislation includes: The Interim
Constitut-ion of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Act No. 200
1993; and The KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act, Act No.9
of 1990. The chapter also assesses the provincial constitutional
proposals made by the major political parties, such as the ANC
and the IFP, regarding the future role of the King of the Zulus
and tribal authorities in KwaZulu-Natal. Attention is given to
the disagreements between the constitutional proposals of the ANC
and the IFP concerning the role of chiefs and the King in the
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provincial government. What is significant in these disagreements
are the attempts by each party to woo the King and tribal leaders
to its own camp.
Chapter Four also focuses on a complex and controversial
issue, namely, the remuneration of the tribal authorities, as
provided by The Remuneration of Traditional Leaders Act of 1995.
The Act leaves the responsibility for the payment of tribal
chiefs in the hands of central government, yet the new
constitution specifies that all matters pertaining to the
institution of tribal authorities are the responsibility of the
premiers and their provincial councils in their respective
provinces. Another problem with this Act is that it was passed
in national parliament before the House of Chiefs was created at
central level. This House, in theory, has to approve any Bill
passed concerning the institution of chieftaincy.
Chapter Five discusses the role of tribal authorities at the
local government level. It investigates the legal situation of
the new system of local government. This includes the provisions
made in the New Constitution of the Republic, and The Local
Government Transition Act No.209, 1993, which came about as the
result of the deliberations of the Local Government Negotiation
Forum (LGNF) that took place against the backdrop of the
negotiations for an interim Government of National Unity by the
MUlti-party negotiation Council (NPNC) . The principies underlying
the Act are entrenched in the constitution of this country. The
most important thing concerning this Act is that it does not make
any specific distinction between urban and rural areas.
This chapter also examines the methods and procequres in
which the tribal chiefs and authorities can be incorporated in
the first and second tiers of rural local government; their
status in local government in general; and the role they can play
in the development programmes and. in the administration of rural
communities.
8
The last part addresses questions concerning the future role
of tribal authorities in the democratic era. It also draws
lessons from the experiences of the British parliamentary system,
which arrived at a synthesis between traditional and modern
values. The conclusion also suggests that some of the current
powers of tribal leaders in South Africa need to be taken away




THE INSTITUTION OF TRIBAL AUTHORITIES IN KWAZULU AND NATAL
SINCE 1970.
This chapter examines the role of tribal authorities in the
former KwaZulu self-governing state. It traces and evaluates the
factors that led the tribal authorities in KwaZulu to acquire the
powers and the status they had in the administrative structures
of the Bantustan government. It also assesses the relationships
which existed between the tribal authorities, the KwaZulu
Bantustan government and Inkatha. These relationships are the key
to understanding contemporary politics concerning the status of
tribal authorities in KwaZulu-Natal 1 in the post-apartheid era.
The chapter argues that the transfer of some subordinate
power from the South Africa government to KwaZulu's conservative
politicians and traditionalists, such as Chief Mangosuthu
Buthelezi, provided them with a vehicle to consolidate their own
powers within the Bantustan government through the structures of
tribal authorities and traditions. In KwaZulu for instance,
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a chief of the Buthelezi tribe and the
Chief Minister of KwaZulu Bantustan, achieved this by creating
Inkatha. While the main objective for creating Inkatha was to
consolidate Zulu nationalism in the 1970s, through it Buthelezi
manipulated the elements of Zulu tradition in order to establish
himself as a Zulu ethnic leader. And through Inkatha Buthelezi
acquired a regional base as a platform to launch into national
politics. He achieved this by using tribal and traditional
structures as agents of Inkatha, which became central to the
ideology of the Zulu nation. Furthermore, through the
The naming of KwaZulu-Natal reflects the outcome of
concessions offered to the Inkatha Freedom Party during the
negotiation process in the early 1990s. The integration of
Kwazulu and Natal, however, started in the late 1980s as a result
of the agreement reached by KwaNatal Indaba, just before the
beginning of the negotiations for a democratic South Africa.
During the era of apartheid, Kwazulu was administered by Blacks,
whereas Natal was administered by Whites.
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authoritarian character which Buthelezi vested in Inkatha, he
managed the power struggle for the leadership and control of Zulu
ethnic politics, between himself and the Zulu monarchy. He did so
by achieving dominance over the Zulu King, King Goodwill
Zwelithini, by relegating him to a mere figurehead in the KwaZulu
Bantustan in the period between 1970 and late 1980s.
Historical Background
originally, the involvement of the institution of tribal «/
authorities in the administration of rural areas of African
communities started in Natal in the 1830s. According to Vosloo,
when Natal became a British colony after annexation in 1843, the
native2 policy designed by Theophilus Shepstone3 in respect of
Zulu people was based on the distinction between tribal and
detribalised groups.4 Tribal groups were confined to segregated
communally owned reserves under the trusteeship of the
government, indirectly ruled by means of traditional tribal
institutions. Thereby Shepstone made the tribal system and
customary law an integral part of his administrative machinery.
Through this system the tribal authorities mediated between the
government and the people. certain administrative~
responsibilities, such as settling minor disputes, land
allocation, maintaining law and order, providing labourers for
pUblic works, were assigned to chiefs and their tribal
2 Native was a term which the former White governments of
South Africa used to refer to the Black indigenous people.
Another term synonymous with native is African.
3 Theophilus Shepstone was a British Diplomatic Agent to
Native Tribes and Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal. He was
the first British administrator to introduce the system of
administration known as indirect rule in which tribal leaders
were given power to rule their tribal communities under the
supervision of the British magistrates who were stationed at
different magisterial districts (centres) in the colony.
4 W.B. Vosloo, "South Africa: Local Government in White
A ". 1reas, ln W.B. Vos 00, D.A. Kotze, and W.J.O. Jeppe, (eds) ,
Local Government in Southern Africa, Pretoria: Academica, 1974,
p.32.
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authorities, who operated under the control of a native
commissioner for a demarcated region. 5
When the four former provinces of South Africa, namely, the,r./
Cape Colony, Orange Free state, Natal and the Transvaal united
to form the Union Government of South Africa in 1910, the use of
the institution of tribal authorities in the administration of
rural areas was inherited from two former British colonies (Cape
colony and Natal) and applied to the whole country, especially
in all rural areas where this institution existed. 6 The
determination of the Union government in utilizing this system
was seen when the most important legislation (The Native
Administration Act, Act 38) concerning the chiefs was passed in
1927. This legislation gave recognition to chiefs and headmen as
the rulers of their tribal communities on behalf of the Union
government of South Africa. 7
./
:::j / The role of tribal chiefs and authorities was later extended .f"
in 1951 under the apartheid government which came to power in
1948. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 provided for the creation
of Tribal, Regional and Territorial Authorities. 8 These tribal
and ethnic units formed the cornerstone of what the apartheid
regime termed 'national states', which were later given partial
independence in the form of homelands and self-governing states.
Through The Bantu Authorities Act, the apartheid regime
5 See D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in
Natal 1845-1910, London: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp.111-
116. See also S. Debroey, South Africa to the Source of
Apartheid, Boston: University Press of America, Inc, 1989,
pp.278-279.
6 See R.M. De Villiers, "Politics" In E. Hellmann and L.
Abrahams (eds) , Race Relations in South Africa, London: Oxford
University Press, 1949, p.512.
7 See N. Cope, To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu and
Zulu Nationalism 1913-1933, Pietermaritzburg': University of Natal
Press, 1993, p.100. Also see W. Hammond-Tooke, Command or
Consensus, Cape Town: John Philip, 1975, p.102.
8 Union Government Gazette, No. 4658, The Bantu Authorities
Act, No. 68 of 1951, 17/7/1951, p.44.
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revitalized old tribal authorities and new ones were created in
all the places where this institution was absent so as to make
the apartheid system work. 9
~ ~ Of great significance is the change of the role of tribal
authorities in the apartheid era. During the period of British
colonial and the segregationist government~ the primary role of
tribal authorities only emphasized supplying labour, collecting
tax, settling minor disputes in the communities and land
distribution. In the era of apartheid, the policies of separate
development according to ethnic groups saw a shift in the role
of the chiefs as increasingly they became appendages of the state
bureaucracy. Chiefs became administrators in their various
/
territories. In them chiefs were allowed to create their own
the passing of The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951,
three tiers of government were installed in an attempt to remove
from the White parliament the moral obligation to deal with Black
affairs. These three tiers involved the creation of tribal,
regional. and territorial authorities lO and together with The
Promotion of Black Self-Government Act of 1959, provided the
basis for the creation of ethnically-defined homelands. It was
felt that the homelands would thereafter serve as areas where
legislative assemblies where they were able to pass their own
laws according to their customs and traditions. This suggests
that although the institution of tribal authorities derived its
political form from pre-colonial society, it acquired its quasi-
feudal nature and its prestige as a result of the imposition of
Pretoria's Bantustan policy. The apartheid regime also increased
the dignity,of chiefs by remunerating them as civil servants.
This recognition helped chiefs to widen their scope in their




9 G. Mbeki, The Peasant Revolt, London: Penguin Books, 1963,
p.17.
10 The Bantu Authorities Act, No 68 of 1951, 17/7/1951.
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organization which aimed at
Inkatha operated through the
tribal authorities and their
Black South Africans could exercise their political rights
according to a strategy which involved the regeneration of Black
ethnic nationalism. l1 The creation of the homelands was also an
attempt to ward off international opposition to apartheid and
satisfy the demands which formed the basis of the internal Black
resistance of the 1950s and 1960. These arrangements led to a
transfer of some subordinate powers from the South African
government to conservative politicians who had strong links with
tribal authority structures. The consolidation of power by the
ruling elite in the homelands allowed it to suppress any
opposition to its rule. Streek states that the rise of the
homelands had led to the elite groups making use of a process of
ethnic mobilization in an attempt to generate support for local
leaders and the governments they headed. 12 As we shall see later
in this chapter, it was within these structures that Chief
Buthelezi formed Inkatha in the Kwazulu Bantustan. As an
consolidating Zulu nationalism,
manipulation of the institution of
traditions.
The Formation of the KwaZulu Bantustan.
~)
The actual process which led to the creation of the KwaZulu
Bantustan in the 1970s started in 1955. On 6 December 1955, H.F.
Verwo~rd, the Minister of Native Affairs, addressed an assembly
of over 300 Zulu chiefs at Nongoma, where he urged them to
implement the Bantu Authorities Act which had been passed in
parliament that year. t3 The Act was to be implemented under the
11 W.J.O Jeppe and D.A Kotze, "Local Government in the
African Areas of South Africa," in W.B. Vosloo, W.J.O. J~ppe, and
D.A. Kotze (eds) , Local Government in Southern Africa, Pretoria:
Academica Press, 1974, p.6l.
12 B. Streek, "Disunity Through the Bantustans" in South
African Research Service (ed). South African Review« Vol. 2.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984, p.262.
13 Union Government 14/1959« Report of the Department of




~eadership of a Paramount Chief. The reason behind this move was
to establish a subordinate African government in Zululand based
on the structures of tribal authorities. Cyprian, the then Zulu
King, nominated four people to reply to Verwoerd's speech. Among
these was Chief Buthelezi, who according to Temkin, welcomed the
government decision to entrench the institution of chieftaincy
under the Bantu Authorities Act. 14 However, Buthelezi also wanted
the government to clarify the relationship between the Zulu King
and the chiefs. According to him,
Unlike most South African tribes, we had a King in Natal
before the advent of the White man. Most people resent the
fact that the King is only used whenever there is trouble
and they want to have more of a say in our affairs. 15
Buthelezi's response had two implications. Firstly, it showed to
Verwoerd that Buthelezi was a genuine Zulu traditionalist who had
an interest in shoring up the structure of traditional Zulu
society just as was envisaged by the Bantu Authorities Act.
Secondly, Buthelezi's reference to the political manipulation of
the Kingship reflected his awareness of the political uses that
the institution had been put to.
The fact that Buthelezi was selected by the King to speak
at the meeting indicated that Buthelezi enjoyed favour with King
Cyprian, and that he had achieved some recognition as a leader
within Zulu politics. In order to gain political credibility
amongst the loyalists, Buthelezi set abo~t portraying himself as
a zealdlUs supporter of the King and as a~'t-raditionalist.
~J
~ The foundations of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority were
laid down by the passing of two Acts, namely, The Native Affairs
Act, and Promotion of Bantu Self-governing Act. The Native
14 B. Temkin, Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu Statesman: A Biography,
Cape Town: Purnell, 1976, pp. 50-53.
15 Ib· d 51 , p. 1.
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~ffairs Act aimed to "consolidate the laws providing for the
~ establishment of a Commission and of Native Councils with a view
,/
to facilitating the administration of Native Affairs. 16 This
provided the basis for the establishment of Tribal Councils. Each
Tribal Council was headed by the local chief and included local
~-
headmen and tribal elders nominated by him. I? .//
The Promotion of Bantu Self-Governing Act provided "for the
gradual development of self-governing Bantu national units~ ,,18
It provided for the transfer of land to the jurisdiction of the
planned Territorial Authorities. It defined powers and duties,
which included bolstering the powers of the tribal chiefs and
establishing a hierarchy of tribal regional and territorial
authorities within each proposed Bantustan. 19
Eight territories (including Zululand) were designated for
the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in terms of the
government's proclaimed separate development. This culminated on
31 July 1959, when 'Zululand'w was finally proclaimed a Bantu
Regional Authority. 21 KwaZulu like any other territorial
authority, had no executive power. The authorities only served
primarily as representatives for the Africans (Blacks) to be
consulted by the central South African government on legislative,
16 union Government Gazette No 6253, The Native Affairs Act,
No. 55 of 1955.
17 Ibid.
18 union Government Gazette No. 6241, The Promotion of Bantu
Self-Government Act, No 46 of 1959.
19 Ibid.
W When Zulu land was proclaimed and recognized as one of the
Bantu authorities in 1959, it then came to be known as KwaZulu.
21 Union Government Gazette, No 6266, G. N. 1188, "The
Establishment of Inkanyezi Regional Authority in Eshowe
District," Under Chief Ephraim Obedia Ndwandwe, 31/7/1959.
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and administrative and development aspects affecting the
homelands. 22
As part of the continuation of the government's policy of
implementing separate development, the apartheid government put
forward a proposal for the creation of a Zulu self-governing
state. This culminated in the negotiations which took place in
1960 between Chief Gatsha Buthelezi,23 head of the Buthelezi
tribe in the Mahlabathini District, and the Department of Bantu
Administration and Development over the envisaged self-government
of KwaZulu. M Temkin writes that this plan was supported by the
Paramount Chief of the Zulus, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, whose view was
that without such a government the Zulus could achieve nothing.
cyprian's suggestions were opposed by Buthelezi at a meeting of
two hundred Zulu chiefs called in the early 1960s on the advice
of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development
to discuss a territorial authority in Zululand. 25 Using his
status as an administrator of KwaZulu, Buthelezi's argument was
that "this plan was based on the principle of divide and rule and
that chiefs alone were not competent enough to take decisions
which affected urban dwellers without consulting them. ,,26 This
suggests that Buthelezi's intention was not only to consolidate
his position and status among the tribal authorities, but also
among the Black entrepreneurial class and bureaucracy by
involving them in decision-making concerning the future of
Zululand.
22 Jeppe and Kotze, "Local Government in African Areas,"
1974, p.59.
23 Buthelezi took the role of the negotiator on behalf of the
Zulus, because he had a unique position in Zulu ethnic politics.
He was the tribal leader of the Buthelezi tribe, he was the
cousin of the King, and he was also an official in the Department
of Bantu Affairs. These made him qualify as the mediator between
the Zulus and the government.
24 B. Temkin, Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu statesman, 1976, p.86.
25 Ibid.
26 I bid, P . 89 .
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However, Buthelezi' s rejection of the government's plan
appeared to embody a deliberate ambiguity, in the sense that the
government's policies entailed a stress on ethnicity and
retribalization, which seemed to be favoured by Buthelezi, who
wanted to establish a Zulu state. A Zulu territorial authority,
therefore, would provide him with a stimulus to pursue his own
political moves in Zulu ethnic politics. Buthelezi's favouritism
towards the policies of separate development was seen on 17
september 1965 with the establishment of the Buthelezi tribe, in
terms of the Bantu Authority Act of 1951. 27 Buthelezi became
chairman of a council of 67 members. This meant that he was now
able to serve as a government appointee implementing the
compulsory Bantu Authorities Act and its attendant legislation.
~ While the issue of establishing the KwaZulu Territorial
~ Authority was still in progress, King Cyprian Bhekuzulu died in
1969. This incident brought about uncertainty in Zulu ethnic
politics, which went on for a period until a successor was
chosen. However, the power vacuum left by Cypr ian saw the
emergence of Buthelezi in the early 1970s as an influential
figure in Zulu politics. The explanation for this lies in the
fact that, until the death of King Cyprian, Buthelezi had been
associated with the King, so much so that he was the King's chief
councillor for about sixteen years. 28 In addition, Buthelezi was
recognized by the government as the Chief Executive Officer of
KwaZulu, and so he felt that he ~ould challenge other members of
the Royal family for the leadership of Zulu ethnic politics.
These reasons provided him with a vehicle to establish himself
as a credible leader within Zulu politics, as well as in the eyes
of the South African government.
27 See The Republic of South Africa Government Gazette, No
1643, G, N. 1413, The Establishment of the Buthelezi Tribal
Authority in the Mahlabathini District, 17/9/1965.
28 D.A. Kotze, African Politics In South Africa, 1964-1974:
Parties and Issues, Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik Limited, 1975,
p.56.
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According to Temkin, Buthelezi's biographer, the election
of the executive of the Zulu Territorial Authority took place on
10 June 1970. 29 Five members were elected from each of the
twenty-three Regional Authorities. These members would in turn
elect a chief executive officer and a five-man executive. 30
Because the entire hierarchy of political power was to be based
on the institution of tribal authorities in terms of the Bantu
Authority Act and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Governing Act, it
therefore turned out to be an electoral college of predominantly
rurally-based chiefs which elected the Zulu Territorial Authority
and its executive.
In that election, Buthelezi emerged as Chief Executive
Councillor of the Zulu Territorial Authority. This suggests that
Buthelezi was certainly able to command a significant level of
support from the chiefs of Zululand and Natal, which boosted his
status and ambition as an important figure in Zulu ethnic
politics. This election was followed by the "the inauguration of·
the Zulu Territorial Authority on 11 June 1970.,,31
The government's next step was to assign some powers to the
Zulu territorial state. This was done by passing The National
states Constitutional Act No. 21 of 1971. "This Act provided for
the establishment of legislative assemblies and executive
councils and defined their powers I functions and duties. "32 This
was done in accordance with the policies of separate d~velopment
in order to allow the members of the legislative assemblies in
the newly created Territorial Authority to have certain powers
of deciding some of the policies regarding their traditions and
customs ..
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The composition of the Legislative Assembly.
The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was created in 1972 to
replace the existing Terr i torial Author i ties. 33 Its membership
consisted of the chiefs who were serving in the Territorial
Authority. The legislative assembly was granted "first stage"
powers as provided for in the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act.
The personal representative of the Paramount Chiefs was to remain
a member of the Assembly, but the Paramount Chief himself, it was
decided, should hold himself aloof from party politics. 34 The
Paramount Chief was to personify the unity of the Zulu nation. 35
He was to be kept informed of business pending in the Executive
Council and could meet with Councillors for discussion if he so
desired. He could, too, address the House on request.~
During this period Regional Authorities were empowered to
make by-laws in terms of section 5 (2) of The Black Authorities
Act No. 68 of 1951, which provided that these had to be approved
by the state President and made known by notice in the Government
Gazette. 37 Such Regional Authorities could make by-laws
prescribing fees for services they rendered. 38
The status of the Zulu King in the Legislative Assembly
became a contentious issue between Buthelezi and the Department
of Bantu Administration. At the coronation of King Goodwill,
which took place on 3rd December ~971, M.C. Botha, the Minister
B M. Horrell, The African Homelands of South Africa,
Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1973,
p.53.
34 See Horrell, The African Homelands of South Africa, pp.
54-61. See also Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (1974),
pp.189-205 and (1975) pp.126-140.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 The National States Constitutional Act No. 21 of 1972.
38 Ibid.
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of Bantu Administration and Development, sided with King Goodwill
over the issue of the King's constitutional role in politics. He
said that precautions would have to be taken in order to ensure
that the Paramount Chief was not relegated to a position of a
mere figurehead. He went on to say that " certain safeguards in
this connection can be taken by way of provisions in a draft
constitution which is now being drawn up for the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly."H
with the constitution for the future KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly pending, Botha's intention of granting executive power
to the King would have effectively deprived Buthelezi of his
leadership position. Nevertheless, Buthelezi was aware that any
proposed constitution would have to be ratified by the KwaZulu
Territorial Authority before passing into law. This was so in
terms of The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, No 46 of
1959, which made provision for this sort of consultation between
the government and the Terr i tor ial Authorities. 40 In December
1971, Buthelezi called a meeting of the KwaZulu Territorial
Authority executive at which amendments specifically stating that
the King be obliged to refrain from politics was made to the
proposed constitution for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. 41
Buthelezi made it clear that the KwaZulu Territorial Authority
executive would not ratify a constitution without such a
provision.
The constitution of the KwaZulu self-governing state was
finally approved by the South African government, and was
gazetted as Proclamation R.68 of March 1972. 42 It created a
legislative assembly composed of members of the existing
H Temkin, Gatsha Buthelezi, 1976, p.144.
40 S . 'ee Unl0n Government Gazette, No. 6241, The Promotion of
Bantu Self-Government Act, No. 46 of 1959.
41 Temkin, Gatsha Buthelezi, 1976, p.145.
42 South African Government Gazette, No R.69, G.G. 3436,
March 1972.
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Territorial Authority with Chief Buthelezi remaining as Chief
Executive Officer. The Assembly comprised the personal
representative of the Paramount Chief, three chiefs (or chairmen
of Community Authorities) appointed from amongst its members by
every Regional Authority (there were 22 Regional Authorities at
the date of Proclamation), the chief of each tribal authority or
chairman of each community authority deemed a Regional Authority
(three such bodies then existed) and 55 members to be elected by
the voters of KwaZulu. 43 The intention behind this composition
was to insist that the form of government in KwaZulu was
primarily based on the institution of tribal authorities. This
was in accordance with the policies of separate development
advocated by the apartheid regime.
Buthelezi succeeded in obtaining the position of Chief
Executive Councillor in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in May
1972. Nonetheless, without majority support within the newly-
formed body, he would be doomed to failure within Zulu ethnic
politics. He faced opposition from the King and from the members
of the Royal Family, as well as from organized royalist
opposition parties which sprang up in and around the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly during the early 1970s. Such opposition
posed a threat to Buthelezi' s newly-acquired position as an
ethnic leader.
The Significance of Tribal Authorities in the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly.
The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 committed the apartheid
state to basing its policy towards Africans on remnants from the
past. The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act confirmed
that commitment and established the principle of ethnic
fragmentation of the African people. It was under these two Acts
that Buthelezi became a chief and then chief minister of KwaZulu.
43 Horrell, The African Homelands in South Africa, p.55.
22
While the institution of chiefs was resuscitated by the
apartheid regime in its policy of separate development, the
institution became an essential element in the masculine and
hierarchically-ordered view of the Zulu nation in the KwaZulu
Bantustan. This was evident in one of Buthelezi's speeches. He
spoke of chiefs as having a depth of commitment to each other as
Zulu brothers born out of Zulu warrior stock, a commitment that
cannot be understood by those who called for the disbanding of
KwaZulu. 44 Elsewhere he referred to chiefs as the pillars on
which the Zulu nation stands.~ "The chiefs are also sanctioned
by history: < You the Zulu Amakhosi (chiefs) know that history
lives on through you. ,,46 While he was committed to using the
institution of chieftaincy in the administration of the KwaZulu
government, it can be argued that his commitment was also aimed
at utilizing them in mobilizing Zulus in KwaZulu for his own
political ambitions so as to consolidate his power in Zulu ethnic
politics. But this never conflicted with the policy of the
central state. Buthelezi kept in mind that when the Zulu
Territorial Authority was established in 1970 its constitution,
as in the case of the other Bantustans, provided for chiefs or
their representatives to predominate. This remained so, even
after the first elections to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
were held in 1978, as we shall see later in the chapter. The
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was made up solely of regional
authority representatives, namely, chiefs or their alternatives.
Buthelezi's commitment to deploy the institution of
chieftaincy in KwaZulu Bantustan is also seen in what he wrote
in 1974:
We will preserve the traditional system of chieftaincy in
KwaZulu and re-affirm our constitutional relationship with
44 G. Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, London:




the Paramount Chief and will build our future state with
utterance suggests that Buthelezi regarded chiefs and
tribal authorities as the foundation of government in KwaZulu.
In the process of fulfilling his determination to keep this
institution in the structures of the Bantustan government, he
called for chiefs to be paid adequately." In 1976 salary
increases were demanded as "substantial salaries" would "prevent
chiefs from falling into temptation as the political situation
was full of intrigue. ,,49 Dictated by Buthelezi, The KwaZulu
Chiefs and Headmen Act, which was passed in 1974, made it clear
that maintenance of control over the ethnically defined regional
population remained an important function of chiefs.
. due regard to our cultural heritage and traditions adapted
/
/ and fructified by the ideas of Western civilization and
J_\.. democracy and modern science. 47
----\J.
,~ -7 This
Nevertheless, Buthelezi did not always find it smooth
sailing with the chiefs, many of whom were suspicious of his
motives in the early 1970s. This being the case, in 1975,
Buthelezi attempted to shift the formal centre of power in
KwaZulu from the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to the Inkatha
movement. 50 This would have taken power away from the chiefs, who
dominated the Legislative Assembly. Buthelezi did not fully trust
the chiefs at the time, as they owed a considerable amount of
allegiance to the King of the Zulus. 51 As we shall see later in
~ G.Mari and G. Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's
Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal Resistance, Johannesburg: Ravan
Press, 1987, p.89. See also G. Mari, Ethnicity and Politics in
South Africa, London: Zed Books, 1993, p~69.
" G. Mari, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993,
p.69.
49 Ibid.
~ See G. Mari and G. Hamilton, An Appetite for Power, 1987,




this chapter, within Inkatha, chiefs became necessary
functionaries, having important organizational and symb?lic
roles. But Inkatha' s leadership was firmly controlled by the
small, but ambitious, trading class and some professionals. In
the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, on the other hand, chiefs had
the potential to exercise political power indirectly over
Buthelez i . 52
Although tribal authorities constituted the main artery of
the KwaZulu Bantustan, functions of government were carried out
by the Cabinet Ministers, each with a specific mandate and with
responsibility to the Legislative Assembly. Each was assisted by
White officials seconded by the South African government. These
officials had the responsibility of ensuring that bantustans were
run in accordance with the policies of the central government in
Pretoria. This meant that the KwaZulu authority was thus subject
to limitations in law, and restrained in the exercise of those
powers delegated to it.
The responsibilities of the KwaZulu government included
spheres such as: finance, community affairs, pUblic works,
agriculture, education and culture, and justice. This form of
administration is what McIntosh call a functional system. smith
writes that in this,
senior representatives of the state bureaucracy in the
provinces are in charg~ of functionally specific state
services, such as education, health, industrial
development, or agricul tural extension work. Administration
in the field falls into almost watertight compartments. 53
52 Ibid.
53 B. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of
State, London, 1985, p.152, quoted in McIntosh, Options for Rural
Local Government and Administration in South Africa with
Particular Reference to KwaZulu, unpublished Ph.D Thesis
University of Birmingham, 1992, p.72. '
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According to McIntosh, functional systems are usually found
where the political system depends on well-developed local
political institutions which have acquired devolved powers and
enter direct partnerships with specialized central/regional
government agencies.~ The Bantu authority system resembled this,
since it had its own legislative assemblies in which the tribal
authorities were dominant members. These assemblies operated
under the guidance of the central government in Pretoria.
~ EE) The Role of Chiefs in Tribal Areas.
J .-
The powers of the tribal authorities in the KwaZulu
Bantustan were defined according to the provisions made by The
Bantu Authorities Act No. 68 of 1951. In terms of Section 4 of
this Act, their powers included: land allocation, the
responsibility for countering soil erosion, providing services
such as sanitation and education, and formulating local laws and
regulation. However, this was subject to the approval of the
Native Commissioner. Tribal authorities could also raise taxes
on animals and local beer making.~
Nonetheless, in terms of The KwaZulu Chiefs and Headman's
Act, Act 8 of 1974, the powers of tribal and community
authorities referred primarily to jUdicial and control
functions.~ These were mainly aimed at enabling chiefs to
promote the interests of their tribes and regions, so as to
initiate measures for the advancement of their people. Other
important tasks of the tribal authorities include land
allocation. Probably land allocation and judicial duties were the
most important and practical tasks bestowed upon chiefs, because
tribal authorities govern people and do not themselves provide
services. Moreover, these were the duties through which the
powers of chiefs were maintained in rural areas.
~ Ibid.
~ See Bantu Authorities Act, Act 68 of 1951.
56 See KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen's Act, Act 8 of 1974.
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The Formation of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe.
The idea that there had always been a Zulu nation, which was
confirmed through the restoration of the past under the
leade:r:s·lrit>Or---gu"tb~e·re.z.i.,_"initially centred on the existence of
the~Territorial Autho;it._y·-lnrom 1972-75) and subsequently
the KwaZuTuLegi-sl'ative Ass'embly . Although these were implemented
as a result of the policies of the a.arthe~~ government, they
provided the foundations for the acknowledgement of the Zulu
nation'~ re-awakening.
From 1975 the idea of a pre-existing nation was given
additional organized form in the Inkatha movement. Initially,
Inkatha ka Zulu was founded in 1928 by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's
uncle, King Solomon kaDinuzulu. 57 The p,Eimary aim of this
~V~nL~n~-lia§..."t~o_as~.i';;;'"t"",,:!.!Lthe preservation of the ~ritage,
. ~~'~I'tllf ',. *' --~~-'·~I'''',,,,;J;;.'-'''''
but it became defunct a few years later as a result of the funds
I'
being embezzled, allegedly by King Solomon, due to his drinking
~/
habits. 58
The initiative to revive Inkatha was taken by Buthelezi back
in the 1960s. According to Tessendorf, in the period 1959-60 King
Cyprian, the reigning Zulu King, supported the idea of reviving
Inkatha by encouraging a young chief, Mangosuthu Gatsha
Buthelezi, to restore the movement. H The idea was squashed by
C.B. Young, Secretary for, Bantu Administration, who placed
pressure on the King to withdraw his support from the venture and
order the shelving of the project:w The reason was that the
organizational framework and political autonomy provided by the
57 G. Hayes, Inkatha: An Analysis. Paper Given at the
Southern African Studies Seminar, Pietermaritzburg, Thursday 10
May, 1979, P . 1 .
58 Ibid.
~ H.R. Tessendorf and B.E. Boult, Inkatha Yenkululeko
Yesizwe: An Analysis, Summerstrand: University of Port Elizabeth
Publications Series, 1991, p.6.
60 Ibid.
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homeland policy for the purpose of such organizational
- mobilization was not yet available. 61
According to Tessendorf, the next stage in the efforts to
revive Inkatha was initiated by a power struggle involving
Buthelezi and the Zulu Royal Family. In 1969, after the death of
King cyprian Bhekuzulu, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni became Zulu
regent until Prince Goodwill reached the stage necessary to
assume the duties of his office. 62 A rift developed between
Buthelezi and the Zulu Royal Family over the idea of the
introduction of a territorial authority for Zulus.~ Mar~ and ~
, "-
Hamilton argue that although the Zululand Territorial Authority, .\
which was eventually established in 1970, would enhance -0-
.-- .... ~-' 1.:.1
Buthelezi's position with the Zulu homeland, he did not want it c" ~




Buthelezi's initiative to revive Inkatha in 1972 came in an~{~~
attempt to achieve certain objectives~ Principally, he assumed~~:
.1 - ._.
that Inkatha would be a Zulu rather than a national Black~~:"§;\
... ~ ", j ••
movement; that it w.Q..uld aim t.,g achieve the s09i,.o-ecoJ)omic1-~'t~
. - "'v ...-·! tl;
upliftment of the Zulu people rather than liberation· and that
, - . .'
it would not be a political party.~ Buthelezi connected these
-< (:, ":;0
ideas~with the analogy of the organizational structures created
by the Afrikaners to facilitate their economic upliftment in the
61 Ibid.
62 Tessendorf and Boult, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe: An
Analysis, 1991, p.6.
63 Ibid.
M See Mar~ and Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's
Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal resistance, 1987, pp.37-38. See
also Tessendorf and Boult, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe: An
Analysis, 1991, p.7.
~ See Tessendorf and Boult, Inkatha YenkululekoY~sizwe:An
Analysis, 1991, p.7.
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1930s and the 1940s, a move which eventually strengthened their
political base.~
However, Buthelezi's proposed revival of Inkatha was
challenged at the end of October 1973 when Chief Charles Hlengwa
launched his Umkhonto KaShaka (Shaka's spear) party.~ This
revealed that there were other ideologies at work in Zulu
politics which were laying claim to the symbol of Shaka.
Hlengwa's party was aVZealously royalist one which regarded the
'King as the ultimate authority in KwaZulu, and not Buthelezi. 68
Buthelezi apparently perceived this as a threat. As a
result, in November 1973, he invoked the constitutional clause
forbidding the King from political activities in order to extract
a statement from Zwelithini forbidding the use of the name Shaka
in any political party.69 Similarly, the use of the word Usuthu
was forbidden. This was because of the sensitive and explosive
nature of the issue. 7o Probably Buthelezi objected to the use of
Shaka's name and the royal rallying cry of Usuthu because these
symbols could have been used against his own reliance on the
former Zulu political figures, as well as against his use of
Inkatha as the royal symbol of Zulu unity captured in the person
of the king. Therefore, to consolidate his status in Zulu ethnic
politics, not only did Buthelezi seek to secure the allegiance
of the King and of Hlengwa, but he also denied them the right to
use traditional Zulu ethnic symbols as a way of attracting
support. This suggests that Buthelez i was working towards setting
himself up as the sole custodian of the Zulu nation.
66 Ibid.
67 The Natal Witness, 27/10/1973.
68 Ibid.
69 The Natal Mercury, 17/11/1973.
70 Ibid.
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In March 1975 a new constitution was drawn up at the
inaugural cohference held at the KwaNzimela Diocesan centre near
Melmoth. 71 This constitution was accepted by the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly in April 1975. 72 On 14 June the same year
Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe was launched as a('N'ati;:]{~ult~rai
" <:::=:======:>Liberation( Movement. In his inauguration speech, Buthelezi
declared that "No 9ne escapes being a member as long as he/she
is a member of the Zulu nation. "73 The problem with this
declaration, is that Buthelezi did not specify any criteria for
defining what constituted a Zulu or a member of the Zulu nation.
It appears that ethnic affiliation was not a matter of personal
or political choice or allegiance, but rather a matter to be
decided by Buthelezi. This led Mare to conclude that Inkatha was
first and foremost an example of politicised ethnicity.~ This
was because its constituency was primarily formed through
Zuluness and its symbols served to mobilize a "constituency"
which found expression through branches and regional structures
of tribal authorities, women's and youth organizations, events,
a variety of media, museums, styles of dress, and education.~
/'
These symbols, in turn, helped to define the Zulu ethnic identity
that they at the same time reflected. n
According to Mare and Hamilton, the composition of the
\
Central Committee of Inkatha in 1980 included the following:
eight chiefs, thirteen others including six women from outside
Natal, with fewer than half the members being members of KwaZulu
71 G. Hayes, Inkatha: An Analysis, 1979, pp.1-2.
72 Ibid.
73 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol.5, 9-18 April
1975, p.134.





Legislative Assembly.77 The Central Committee held wide-ranging
powers with its influence extending throughout Inkatha and
KwaZulu politics. Mare and Hamilton state that one of these
powers involved control over the selection of candidates to
contest the elections held periodically in KwaZulu. 78 What this
meant is that this committee served as a training ground for
members in organizational matters. Besides this, the inclusion
of chiefs in the Cental Committee suggests that they were seen
as crucial in recruiting for Inkatha. At the same time, chiefs
were incorporated in leadership roles within the movement, in
order to prevent a conservative backlash against the Inkatha
leadership.79
The Relationship Between the Chiefs and Inkatha.
In the early and mid-1970s, some disaffected chiefs rallied
around the Zulu King in an attempt to oppose Buthelezi and the
rise of Inkatha. During the formation of the organization, chiefs
were seen as important in boosting Inkatha's membership, even if
they were not given the same constitutional weight that they had
in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Mo~eover, the chiefs had been
reprimanded in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly for their initial
lack of enthusiasm for the new movement. w
Faced by the opposition and unwillingness of some chiefs to
promote inkatha, Buthelezi consequently used his powers of
patronage to create new chieftainships. He achieved this by
rooting the organization in traditional symbols. He drew chiefs
77 See Mare and Hamilton, An Appetite for Power, 1987, pp.62-
63.
78 Ibid, p.63. Worth noting also is the fact that elections
fro the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly were few and far between.
79 Tessendorf and Boult, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe: An
Analysis, 1991, p.57.
W G. Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993,
p.74.
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in to the extent of using fairly direct threats to their fate as
traditional leaders, as Mare writes:
The. chief's 'tradi tional ' role confirms his own
'traditional' role: "I was the traditional Prime Minister
to my first cousin, King cyprian for sixteen years, long
before there was any KwaZulu Legislative AssemblYi 81 and
I. do not owe any political power to the KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly or to Pretoria. King Shaka never owed his
political eminence to any colonial power. The solidarity of
the Zulu people was not dependent on white-created
institutions when they defeated the might of the British
Army. 82
From expressions such as these, Mare concluded that the regular
gatherings of chiefs, under the leadership of Buthelezi as
minister in charge of 'authority affairs' in the KwaZulu cabinet,
served to confirm a Zulu past and an ethnic tradition,
safeguarded only within Inkatha and under the leadership of
Buthelezi. 83
Through the influence of Buthelezi, the importance of the
chiefs to Inkatha was in the initial mobilization of rural
constituencies, and pressure was placed on the chiefs to continue
this. M However, a perception derived from the works of Mare and
Hamilton . is that the internal dynamics of the movement soon
displaced the need to rely on the effort of the chiefs. Contrary
to this view, Tessendorf argues that these authors ignore that
81 Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993,· pp. 74-
75.
82 Ibid.
~ Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993, p.75.
M See L. Schlemmer, "Squatter communities: Safety Valves in
the Rural-Urban Nexus" in H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (eds), !ill
Against the Fences: Poverty, Passes and Privileges in south
Africa, Cape Town, David Philip, 1980, p.111.
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the chiefs were incorporated in leadership roles within the
movement in order to prevent a conservative backlash against the
Inkatha leadership. 85 Tessendorf points out that chiefs continued
to enjoy the extensive power of patronage, but the misuse of
these powers might have generated a substantial amount of
internal friction between the masses and the relatively affluent
chiefs. u This could have had a dramatic influence on Inkatha
itself. 87
As part of undertaking development projects aimed at
facilitating self-help and self-upliftment amongst its members,
Inkatha's centre of control remained located in KwaZulu, where
a high proportion of the male population was absent as migrant
labour throughout the year. In this environment, the tribal
chiefs' task was to facilitate the mobilization of the rural
population by creating Inkatha branches in their areas, while
rural women had to be organized into accepting responsibility for
the daily operations of the movement.~ This led to the rise of
the Women's and Youth Brigades which, together with Inkatha's
development office, had set up their own co-operative bUlk-buying
schemes and credit unions. Beall et al. claim that the Women's
Brigade was a manifestation of Inkatha's emphasis on patriarchal
values in that it symbolised the traditional relegation of the
Zulu womenfolk to a social position subordinate to that of the
male.~ This led to the brigade acting to legitimize the
hierarchial structure of the organizatio~ and providing a basis
for social control. What this implies is that the Women's Brigade
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was responsible for the initiation and operation of community
projects, particularly in agriculture and education. 90
The absence of male migrant workers in rural areas of
KwaZulu forced the structures of Inkatha to work with tribal
chiefs, schoolchildren, women and the aged. This resulted in
support for Inkatha being particularly strong among the
economically inactive sectors. Support from the economically
active came from public servants who worked for the KwaZulu
government. This suggests that rural support was strongest among
those who lived below the poverty line, and that peasants could
be tied into a system by the benefits which trickle down to them.
Consequently, Inkatha successfully captured the imagination and
support of KwaZulu's rural poor and economically inactive with
the creation of self-help schemes.
The Relationship Between Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government.
Inkatha had strong links with the KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly, so much so that they became two sides of the same coin.
Basically the explanation is that Chief Buthelezi was both the
Chief Minister of KwaZulu and also the leader of Inkatha. Because
of his involvement with both, these two bodies united in him.
This made it difficult in practical terms to distinguish between
Inkatha and the KwaZulu government.
Of great interest is how these two organizations came to
coexist in KwaZulu. The rise of Inkatha hinged on Buthelezi's
charismatic personality as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, and on the
need to overcome opposition from both the South African
government as well as from within tribal structures. According
to Sitas, Inkatha was formed to consolidate Buthelezi's power-
base within the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and to generate
90 b' dI 1 , p.97.
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Black unity by refusing independence for KwaZulu. 91 Through its
insistence on Black unity and solidarity, Inkatha was able to
maintain complete control of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.92
This was emphasized in some of the terms of its constitution.
Firstly, no person could be selected as a candidate for any
parliamentary or local government election or by-election in
KwaZulu unless he or she was a member of the movement. 93
Secondly, as from the 1979 constitution only Inkatha members
of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly were included in the National
council.~ All the tribal leaders who were members of the
Legislative Assembly were assumed to be members of the Council.
Furthermore, the constitution of Inkatha stipulated that only the
chairman of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly could be the
President or leader of Inkatha.
Thirdly , although the Inkatha Central Committee did not have
the power to overrule decisions taken by the KwaZulu Cabinet, in
the event of a clash on pOlicy matters the Cabinet "should
seriously consider" the views of the Central Committee." This
indicates that the view of Inkatha were likely to prevail over
those of the KwaZulu Bantustan government.
Finally, Inkatha's whole control of the KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly was finally achieved in 1978, after its victory in the
F~bruary elections. Of the 55 seats contested in the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly, all were won by the ruling party, which
91 A. Sitas, "Inanda, August 1985- 'Where Wealth and Power
and Blood Reign Worshipped Gods" South African Labour BUlletin,
Vol.11, 1986, p.74.
92 G. Hayes, Inkatha: An Analysis, 1979, p.7.




thus turned the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly into an Inkatha
monopoly.96
consequently, the formal centre of power shifted from the
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to the Inkatha movement. In effect
this took power away from the chief-do~inatedAssembly, a social
grouping that Buthelezt did not fUlly trust, as they owed a
considerable amount of allegiance to the King. 97 In Inkatha,
chiefs became necessary functionaries. 98 In the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly, on the other hand, chiefs had potential
power (even if they had never wielded it independently of
Buthelezi) and could possibly have taken a position in line that
would have better suited the South African government. 99




opposition from some prominent chiefs against
was more evident. The period between 1972-6
between Buthelezi and the South African
government and members of the Royal family. The government was
concerned with Buthelezi's attacks on apartheid and they tried
to oust him from his position of prime minister to the Zulu Royal
Family by promoting rural political interests under the
leadership of King Goodwill Zwelithini. loo Three political
parties were organized in opposition to Buthelezi. The Zulu
National Party was launched by Lloyd Ndaba. 101 Chief Hlengwa
96 Ibid, p. 7.
97 See Mare, "Tradition and Control: The Presence of the Past
in Natal," in Workshop on Regionalism and Restructur ing in Natal,
Durban: University of Natal, January 1988, p.6.
n See Mare and Hamilton, An Appetite for Power, 1987, pp. 59-
60.
~ Mare, "Tradition and Control:The Presence of the Past in
Natal," 1988, p.6.




formed Shaka' s Spear, a party allegedly funded by the South
African Bureau of State Security, while the Inala party was
created by King Goodwill, but supported by KwaZulu businessmen
to signal their opposition to the government's scheme known as
tripos whereby White business was allowed to invest in
KwaZulu. 102 other prominent figures who supported the King in
this were the late Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, Chairman of the
Mpum~langa Regional Authority; Chief King Mbele of the Hlanganani
Regional Authority; Chief Phumowakhe Cele of Umzumbe; Mr. S.J.
Gogo of Mpumalanga Regional Authority; as well as Prince Clement
ZUIU. lll The Inala Party aimed to promote the restoration of the
monarchy to a position of administrative authority over the
KwaZulu Executive Council. 104
Clearly threatened by these proposed attempts to undermine
his political position, Buthelezi responded by banning all the
opposition political parties in 1975. He accused Maphumulo of
masterminding a contravention of the KwaZulu constitution by
involving the King in a political tI intrigue" which aimed at
deposing Buthelez i as Chief Executive Councillor. 105 A special
Inkatha conference was called to discuss this. Buthelezi called
upon the Zulu people to choose between himself and the King as
the Zulu nation's political leader. 106 The King then expressed
support for Buthelezi and disassociated himself from the new
party and promised to refrain from taking part in politics. IQ?
Maphumulo was removed from his seat in the KwaZulu Assembly,
suspended as chief for two years and removed from the
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guilty of trying to involve
Consequently, low polls (that
intimidation of candidates and
King Goodwill in politics. 108
is 5 to 10 per cent) and the
voters which had characterized
elections for the Legislative Assembly meant that opposition
parties ceased to exist in KwaZulu after 1970.1~
By forbidding the King's involvement in politics, Buthelezi
achieved dominance over the Zulu King, Zwelithini. He achieved
this by introducing amendments to the KwaZulu Constitution,
especially those dealing with the powers and status of the King.
One amendment, for instance, involved restrictions being placed
on the King so as to confine him to the performance of largely
ceremonial duties .110 Buthelezi then succeeded in mobilizing
enough support around himself to ensure that his version of what
the King's role and duties should entail was accepted by all. lll
Introducing these arrangements, Buthelezi argued that,
Zulus love their king, and it is unthinkable that he should
be given executive functions, which would mean inevitable
involvement in poli tics . ..which would tarnish the royal
image. 112
One means by which loyaltyto Inkatha was achieved was
through the salaries chiefs obtained by becoming KwaZulu
Legislative members. Where chiefs or headmen were not members of
the KwaZulu Legislature, remuneration consisted, for instance,
108 Ibid.
1~ See Mare and Hamilton, An Appetite for Power, 1987,
pp.84-87.
p.9.
110 Tessendorf and Boult, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, 1991,
111 Ibid. Se,e also G. Mare, "Inkatha: By the Grace of the
Nationalist Government?" South African Labour Bulletin. 1988a,
Vol, 13. No.2, p.65.
p.9.
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of a R269 monthly stipend in August 1989,113 whereas the average
minimum wage then of government employees was no~ less than R500
per month. By contrast, the salaries of members of the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly started off at relatively high levels,
exceeding the stipend of ordinary chiefs by eight times. 114
Therefore, chiefs were able to obtain a livelihood through
official work if they become KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
members, either as elected representatives of their
constituencies, or through election by the regional authority.
This was one way of attracting chiefs to become KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly members.
other fields where Inkatha managed to use state structures
for its own benefit included the KwaZulu education system and the
police. Inkatha introduced its own sUbject entitled "Inkatha
Studies" in KwaZulu schools in order to expose the youth to its
ideology and control. Mare and Hamilton observe that Inkatha
also sought to control the schools by promoting the formation of
Youth Brigade branches .115
The KwaZulu administration also relied on the support of the
South African Police in dealing with anti-Inkatha demonstrations.
The formation of the KwaZulu police put Inkatha' s warrior
tradition in uniform. In 1975 a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
request was made that the central government be asked to hand
over some power to the Bantustan. 116 Such powers incl':lded the
control of law and order enforcement, unrest, distribution of
undesirable literature, and the prevention of unauthorized entry
of a person into the areas under the jurisdiction of tribal
authorities. When powers were granted in 1978, Jeffrey Mtetwa,
113 T. Botha, P. Tandy and N. Ismail, Report on
Intergovernmental Relations in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia,
Bellville, University of Western Cape, 1992, p.57.
114 Ibid.
115 Mare and Hamilton, An Appetite for Power, pp.183-195.
116 Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993, p.88.
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the then KwaZulu Minister of Justice, said that the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly "not only aimed at taking over the police
but would also ask Pretoria to give military training to tribal
regiments. ,,117
This brought together the two most prominent aspects of
Inkatha I s organs of control, the police and the tribal regiments.
Chiefs, too, were mobilized to serve within a broad "law and
order" front. In 1974, for example, the KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly passed its own zulu Chiefs and Headmen Act, repeating
much of the detail of The Native Administration Act of 1927 and
its amendments. 118 The KwaZulu Act stipulated that a chief or
headman "shall be entitled ... to the loyalty, respect, support and
obedience of every resident of the area for which he has been
appointed" .1\9 It placed chiefs and their assistants as local
representatives of the KwaZulu government in control of law and
order enforcement, unrest, the distribution of "undesirable
literature", and the prevention of "unauthorized entry of any
person into his (a chief's) area. "120 What is of relevance to
this chapter, however, is the use made of tribal authorities in
policing the Black inhabitants of Natal.
According to Mare, after 1980, the police in many districts
came under KwaZulu Legislative Assembly control, while the
establishment of a "security section" and ·camouflaged "riot
police" were envisaged from early on. Considerable emphasis was
laid on tradition in policing Blacks in Natal. 121
117 Mare, "Tradition and Control: The Presence of the Past in
Natal", 1988, p.11.





· Both education and policing by the tribal authority
structures were part of the drive for ethnic"mobilization by
Inkatha. They intersected as well, because if education failed
in establishing "unified ideas", then the police would be there
to ensure that "traitors" did not threaten the political
existence of Inkatha.
The Relationship Between the King of the Zulus, and the
KwaZulu Government and Inkatha.
straight away in the 1970s, Buthelezi sidelined the King
of the Zulus so that he became a mere symbolic figurehead of the
Zulu nation. During the first half of the' 1970s, there were a
number of attempts by the South African government to dislodge
Buthelezi and form a more pliable leadership around the Zulu
King. ln The government reasoned that Buthelezi did not serve the
essential purpose of taking KwaZulu to "independence", and that
an alternative repository of "tradition", the King, was
available. ID The King tried to reclaim his status in Zulu ethnic
politics, and in the process of this, a row erupted between
Buthelezi and the King in September 1972. 124 Each wanted to
organize Shaka Day celebrations for 24th September, and each
wished to deprive the other from making gains from the event. 125
Shaka was a central figure in the conception of Zulu ethnic
politics. The figure of Shaka had significant popular appeal and
was a symbol around which potential political support ~ould be
aroused. The King and Buthelezi were thus rivals for this
support. Buthelezi attempted to prevent the King from organizing
the Shaka Day event on the grounds that this would constitute
political involvement and would therefore contravene the KwaZulu
constitution which specified that the King should remain aloof
In See MarA, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993,
p.96.
123 Ibid.
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from politics. 126 The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly appeared to
regard the organization of the Shaka Day celebrations as in the
King's realm, and Buthelezi was unable to prevent the K~ng and
his Council from going ahead. 127
Despite the King's success over Buthelezi on the issue of
the Shaka Day celebrations in 1972, Buthelezi managed
sUbsequently to relegate the King to a figurehead in Zulu ethnic
politics. In 1972, the KwaZulu constitution was altered to
reflect this supra-political position that Buthelezi wanted for
the King .128 Buthelezi intended to control the monarch through
patronage of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. In 1974, for
example, Buthelezitold the KwaZulu Legislative-Assembly that
King Goodwill, as the King of the Zulus, deserved expenditure of
R300 000 on a palace.l~ Perhaps Buthelezi did this intentionally
as part of building a support-base, both in the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly and from the King, in order to enhance his
power as an ethnic politician in the KwaZulu Bantustan.
Buthelezi's attempts to expand his political constituency
were given more concrete form when he formed Inkatha in 1975. He
became its leader, and the King as personifier of the unity of
the Zulu nation was appointed as its patron. Through the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly, many other of the King's traditional
positions became part of Inkatha' s political proj ects. For
instance, in the KwaZulu Bantustan, ,the King's function involved
two central elements, namely, to give symbolic coherence to the
"Zulu nation" and to issue orders in its name; and to confer
IM Republic of South Africa Government Gazette, No. 3436,
Proc R.70 of 1972, Establishment of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly,
30 March 1972.
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legitimacy on Buthelezi as the central political representative
of the ·same nation. l3O
According to MarA, the rift between Buthelezi and King
Goodwill was only really resolved in 1982 when the King was
brought to the fore to consolidate the Zulu nation against the
threat offered by the potential secession of the Ingwavuma
district to Swaziland. l3l
The speeches both of Buthelezi and the King, especially,
in the 1980 and early 1990s, vindicated this reconciliation. In
many of Buthelezi's speeches addressing Inkatha rallies in both
rural and urban areas, a strong empha~is was placed on tribalism
with reference to the humanity of the Zulu kings which symbolized
the unity of the Zulu nation. Buthelezi stressed his relationship
to the present King, Goodwill Zwelithini, through expressions
such as "my cousin the king". This allowed Buthelezi to say that
he exercised his authority on behalf of the Zulu people. Inkatha
was portrayed as a mass organization based on democratic support
derived from the workers and peasants.
The event which took place on 24 September 1991 on King
Shaka Day is one of the many examples which verifies the above
argument. Buthelezi introduced the King to the assembled KwaZulu,
consular, religious, royal and other dignitaries, and to the sons
and daughters of Africa. In his speech Buthelezi said:
Whenever I have to stand up to introduce His Majesty the
King of the Zulu on these formal cultural occasions, I burn
with. a deep sense of pride. It is when one focuses on His
Majesty representing the unity of the people in his person,
and when you focus on his Majesty summing up Zulu history
in his person, that you are confronted with an overwhelming
1~ See MarA, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993,
p.97.
131 MarA, "Tradition and Control: the Presence of the Past in
Natal," 1988, pp.15-16.
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sense of who the Zulu people actually are. What makes it so
special is that most of the Zulu Kings are forbears to both
of us. 132
The King then responded by saying that each place he visited
confirmed for him who they were. The King reiterated Buthelezi's
call that the real power of the Zulus was in their unity, in
their purpose and in their collective voice. He affirmed that
Zulus were a warrior nation, fashioned by history, and that such
warrior blood strengthens not their arms only, but also their
resolve to do good and their resolve to be gentle, and their
resolve to spread power based on discussion and consensus. ID
King Goodwill functioned primarily as a symbol, rather than
as a major political actor. This is evident in his speech on 24
September 1991, when he said:
I today want to thank my uncle, the Prince of
KwaPhindangene, Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, for what he is
doing to bring about Black unity ...My people, I know my
uncle and he and I present the indivisibility of the
nation ...Put first things first and trust the history that
first created the great Zulu nation and then went on to
create the Zulu empire and then went further on to take
that which it created and make it a force for the
establishment of a new South Africa. 134
What King Goodwill did here
exclusion and inclusion of the
Those who accepted him accepted
is to draw the boundar ies of
Zulu ethnic group very clearly.
Zuluness, for as he pointed out,
p.97.
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"History has put me where I am and all Zulu history demands that
I make the unity of my people my very first priority.,,135
The most significant aspect in the relationship between the
King and Inkatha was that King Goodwill provided Inkatha with an
alternative entity that could live on after apartheid, a Zulu
kingdom. Many speeches in the late 1980s stress a Zulu
contribution to national change, with the emphasis on cultural
and national diversity. For instance, King Goodwill told a 1990
Shaka Day gathering that "I am always very proud when I think of
the extent to which the Zulu nation has been there at every twist
and turn of history to play its role in shaping the new South
Africa. ,,136
Although the King appeared to be very influential in Zulu
ethnic politics in the 1980s, he was not allowed to be a
politically active leader with an effective and autonomous power
base. That role was only possible through his uncle and his
traditional prime minister, Chief Buthelezi. Buthelezi, like the
King, claimed the attributes that were deemed to be part of being
Zulu. But unlike the King, he was placed in an executive
leadership role. For example, in 1987 he told the Inkatha Youth
Brigade that "I come from a very long line of distinguished Zulu
'generals which goes right back to the great King Shaka
himself. ,,137 The King affirmed this view when he frequently
referred to Buthelezi either as a warrior or as located within
the line of Zulu warriors.
In the preceding discussion, there are two major points that
have emerged. The first one is that tribal authorities and their
traditional structures were used by both the KwaZulu Bantustan
and Inkatha in the mobilization of Zulu ethnicity and politics.
The second one is that the political direction to which Inkatha
135 Ibid.
l~ Mar~, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, 1993, p.98.
137 Ibid.
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leaders committed the movement depended, essentially, on the
consolidation of an ethnic and regional base.
The two points are interrelated in the sense that the
elements of Zulu tradition were purposely revived by the leaders
of the KwaZulu Bantustan, so that through the manipulation of
these traditional structures they could consolidate regional
power. This suggests that Inkatha was, in part, formed to secure
a regional base from which to launch into national politics. It
aimed to secure that base through tribal and traditional
political structures by means of the ideology of the' Zulu nation.
In the process of achieving this, it gave legitimacy to the
strategy of working through tribal structures, so necessary for
control and organization. It also bolstered the chiefs
ideologically in a situation where they had no basis of authority
other than by naked repression or by manipulating favours. At the
same time, it allowed Buthelezi and the King to offer a
supposedly disciplined constituency in KwaZulu. In so doing
Inkatha became an essential aspect of the personal legitimation
of Buthelezi and of the King.
By the late 1980s Inkatha had established itself as a very
formidable political organization in KwaZulu. This gave Buthelezi
and his supporters strategic leverage when they joined other
political organizations in the negotiating process for a post-
apartheid South Africa. The first strategy of Inkatha was to
function as a political party within a national negotiation
context. The second was to continue with Zulu mobilization in its
regional base, using tradition and the symbolic figure of the
King. The third involved the push for federalism, which
essentially entailed the continuation of the KwaZulu Bantustan
by trying to create a Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal.
To understand Why and how Inkatha pursued these strategies,
Chapter Two, therefore, examines the constitutional negotiations
that took place in South Africa prior to the formation of the
democratic government in 1994.
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CHAPTER TWO
RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES CONCERNING THE INSTITUTION OF
CHIEFTAINCY.
In Chapter One we saw that Inkatha's main objective was to
promote a Zulu ethnic consciousness which relied mainly on tribal
and traditional structures. These were the same structures which
were resuscitated by the apartheid government to serve as agents
in its policies of separate development. This implies that
I~atha's dominant 'tradition' depended on the apartheid system.
Inkatha's envisaged form of Zulu ethnic politics and Zulu nation
were to be consolidated through the King, 'under Buthelezi, and
through the KwaZulu Bantustan. To realise this, the leaders of
Inkatha committed the movement to a regional political strategy
in an attempt to consolidate a Zulu regional ethnic base. Perhaps
Inkatha's leaders followed this path, anticipating that the
KwaZulu Bantustan would disappear in future legislation for the
province, and that foundations for merging the two
administrations of KwaZulu and Natal had to be laid down in
advance.
It is in this context that the 1979 Lombard Plan, the 1980
Buthelezi Commission and the 1986 KwaNatal Indaba were set up.
These proposals involved the regionalisation of KwaZulu-Natal.
The chapter argues that, although the Lombard and the Buthelezi
commission Reports did not mention anything specifically
concerning the status of tribal authorities in their pUblished
findings, these authorities had to form the pillar of the
envisaged region.
with the advent of a new democratic dispensation, the issue
of the regionalisation of a future South Africa also erupted
during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in
the 1990s. Although most political parties at CODESA SUbscribed
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to some form of regionalism, the Inkatha Freedom Partyl and the
National Party were its strongest advocates. Coupled with this,
were issues concerning the future role of tribal authorities.
Although this became a national issue at CODESA and· at the
subsequent Multi-party Negotiation Forum at Kempton. Park, the IFP
was in the forefront in pushing, not only for the inclusion of
a delegation of tribal authorities at the negotiating table, but
also for their incorporation in the structures of the democratic
government. The chapter argues that this was so because the IFP
regarded the institution of tribal authorities in Kwazulu-Natal
as its ally in its campaign to consolidate a new Zulu ethnic
regional base.
~~ Nonetheless, as a national issue at the negotiating table,
the most perturbing feature concerning the future role of the
institution of tribal authorities in South Africa is the very
nature of the authorities themselves. Leadership is hereditary
in African tradition. It is not sUbject to the electoral process.
And the hereditary process is fundamentally male primogeniture
and excludes women. All this contradicts the principles of
democratic government. However, as we saw in Chapter One, tribal
authorities have existed in this country for almost a century.
They worked closely with different former South African
governments, including homeland governments, which recognized and
depended on them to administer the rural areas. In Kwazulu, these
authorities became an essential component of the government and
integral to the rUling party, Inkatha.
The politicization of the tribal authorities, together with
the problems emanating from their nature, have important
implications for their future role in South Africa's democratic
Inkatha was transformed in July 1990 into the non-racial
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The new name is an apt description
of two faces of the party. One the one hand, the IFP identifies
as strongly with Zulu ethno-nationalism as Inkatha did. On the
other hand, as a non-racial party it seeks to formulate non-
racial policies on a national platform. See A. Davidson and P.
Strand, The Path to Democracy: A Background to the Constitutional
Negotiations in South Africa, 1993, p.56.
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Nevertheless, Cobbett argues that to have any chance of
consideration by the central authorities, it would have to have
shown that the Natal region was in some way unique and deserving
- .
of a special solution. 6 However, Natal would at the same time
only have been a test case needing to be reproduced in a
federally-constituted South Africa.? The Lombard Plan suggested
that South Africa could be divided into a manageable number of
fairly integral and largely autonomous regional authorities. The
significance of this arrangement was that it would not have
affected the structures of KwaZulu which were mainly dominated
by the institution of tribal authorities.
Whereas the Lombard investigation had close links to the
central government, the Buthelezi Commission8 which was announced
in April 1980 just before the Lombard Plan was released, got a
brush-off from the National Party government before it had even
had its first formal meeting. Perhaps the Nationalist government
viwed such iniative as a challenge to its policies of separate
development.
In the introduction to the main report, the Buthelezi
Commission motivated its investigation in terms very similar to
those of the Lombard Commission.
It was asked to explore the possibility of finding a way,
within the framework of the Republic of South Africa, of
developing a regional consti tutional arrangement which
might provide an alternative to the programmes to which the
White political parties had become committed. Its
6 See the discussion of the spatial redefinition of economic
and political relations in South Africa in W. Cobbett, D. Glaser,
D. HUdson, and M. Swilling, "Regionalisation, Federalism and the
Reconstruction of the South African State," in The South African
Labour BUlletin, Vol. 10, No.5, 1985.
7 Ibid.
8 The Buthelezi Commission was named after Chief Mangosuthu
Buthelezi. It was set up under his initiative.
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establishment was a Black initiative ... ,
expression of hope that a regional moderate
be found which would be acceptable, at the




While recognizing the complex plurality of the South African
population, it rejected the ethnically-based federal option that
was at the heart of the Lombard Plan. 10
The core of the political solution proposed by the Buthelezi
Commission was to form a government for KwaZulu-Natal based on
the principles of consociational democracy. Lijphart defines
consociational democracy as a government by a grand coalition
cabinet in a parliamentary system. ll According to Davidson, a
democratic constitution of this type rests on the assumption that
a heterogeneous population defined by ethnic criteria cannot live
peacefully together unless they are granted proportional
representation, relative to the size of their group, in
legislative, as well as executive, state powers. 12 As each group
is sovereign in decisions concerning its own spepific interests,
they all have the right to veto majority decisions that breach
their sovereignty.13
The contribution of the Buthelezi Commission to political
reform in South Africa, however, remained of little significance
because it was set up under the initiative of a minor national
political actor, based in one of the homelands. The composition
9 The Buthelezi Commission: The requirements for Stability
and Development in KwaZulu-Natal, Vol.2, Durban: Pinetown
Printers Ltd, 1982, p.)l.
10 Ibid, pp.110-111.
11 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative
Exploration, London: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 25.
12 A. Davidson and P. Strand, The Path to Democracy: A
Background to the Constitutional Negotiations in South Africa,
Sweden: University of Uppsala, 1993, pp. 52-53.
13 Ibid.
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of the Commission itself also did not include the main political
organizations, for instance, the National Party. Furthermore, no
political settlement could have been reached without the
participation of the ANC and other liberation movements which
were in exile. Moreover, the Commission's report was rejected by
the National Party government because of its call for a universal
franchise, and its recommendation to dissolve KwaZulu into a
larger region, which was contrary to the intentions of the
government's homeland policy. 14
Despite the grandiose proposals of the Buthelezi Commission
to make KwaZulu part of a larger region, it never mentioned
anything concerning the future role that tribal authorities could
play in it. Since tribal authorities constituted a key part of
the ruling machinery in the KwaZulu Bantustan, one would have
.expected the Commission to explore this aspect. However, the
Commission did only mention the need to develop the tribal areas,
as they were home to the majority of the poorest people. 15 The
fact that the Commission never considered the status of the
tribal authorities in its recommendations seems to indicate that
its intention was not so much to debate fully constitutional
issues, but rather to propose some options which could have
served as constitutional frameworks when negotiating a future
post-apartheid government. On a positive note, however, the
Buthelezi Commission is thought to have laid the foundations for
setting up the KwaZulu and Natal Indaba talks which followed in
the mid 1980s.
To summarise, both the Lombard and Buthelezi Commission
Reports operated on the basis that there were sufficient
regionally-distinctive elements in Natal to arrive at a specific
14 A.Davidson and P. Strand, The Path to Democracy: A
Background to the Constitutional Negotiations in South Africa,
Sweden: Uppsala University, 1993, p. 52.
15 The Buthelezi Commission: The requirements for Stability
and Development in KwaZulu and Natal, Vol.II Section 4
"Redressing Inequality and Alleviating Poverty in K~aZulu-Natal :,
Durban: H + H Publications (pty) Ltd, 1982, p.171. '
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solution which could then be duplicated elsewhere. This, however,
was a contradiction in itself, because KwaZulu and Natal with its
extreme ethnic character could have not served as a model for the
whole of South Africa. Furthermore, there were fragments of
KwaZulu spread across the whole region, with the consequent
necessity to rationalise administration and provide services,
while minimizing the risk of economic and political disruption
to KwaZulu and Natal as a whole.
The KwaZulu-Natal Indaba
An analysis of the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba calls for an
understanding of its historical context which dates back to the
recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission in 1982. There were
at least two significant differences between the two initiatives.
Firstly, the large academic input of Buthelezi Commission was
missing from the Indaba. 16 What this suggests is that academics
had already done their work for the Indaba through the Buthelezi
Commission Report which was such a central influence on the
Indaba proposals. Academics served only as advisors to various
delegates to the Indaba.
The actual reasons that led to the Indaba talks are various.
The Indaba had its origins in the practicalities of regional
administration at a time when local government was deteriorating.
A notable addition in the case of the Indaba talks was the second
and third tiers of local administrators (tribal authorities),
ranging from the KwaZulu government to the urban municipalities.
Their presence signified a more interventionist approach and may
also have had something to do with the spectre of
ungovernability.17 The New RepUblic Party which turned down the
Buthelezi Commission Report, and the National Party which refused
to participate in 1980, were both present in 1986, the former as
one of the moving forces of the Indaba and the latter as
16 See L. Schlemmer, Indaba News, No.9, 1987, p.77.
17 Ibid.
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observer. 18 However, this did not mean that the National Party
had abandoned its policy of ethnic fragmentation. Probably it saw
that through the Indaba a necessarily expanded role was being
envisaged for the Bantustan. This can be seen in the comment of
Gerrit Viljoen, the then Minister of Education and Development,
who argued that,
the acceptance of the validity of the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba
was not a rejection of the idea of national states, but it
should rather be seen as an attempt to draw homelands into
South African political system on a more functional
basis .19
But perhaps Inkatha had a different perception. Probably it
felt that it had outgrown the old structures in terms of its
national aspirations, and that there was greater legitimacy in
its inclusion in national discussions as the governing party of
a federal state rather than as one of the ten discredited and
tottering Bantustan governments. Inkatha might also have been
attempting to surmount the tension between regional
distinctiveness (where its ethnic and administrative strength
lay), and the demands of national involvement (where its
political weakness lay, due to its specific ethnic background).
In its bid for greater legitimacy, as federal government and
successful reformer, Inkatha found allies in various business and
political groups in the White community. This alliance was
followed by the signing of the 1984 Ulundi Accord by the KwaZulu
cabinet and the Natal Provincial Council, in which the two bodies
proposed a plan for the KwaZulu-Natal region. 20 Aiming at a
federal government for an integrated KwaZulu-Natal, the first
18 Ibid.
19 The Natal Witness, 3/05/1986.
20 A. Davidson and P. Strand, The Path to Democracy: A
Background to the Constitutional Negotiations in South Africa,
Sweden: Uppsala University, 1993, p.53.
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phase was to increase administrative co-operation, followed by
forming a joint political authority.21 But one significant result
of the accord was the establishment of the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba,
which had its first meeting in 1986.
"At the beginning of April 1986, the KwaZulu and Natal
Indaba was set up to draw 'up a constitution for a regional
legislative body, the region being defined as the area of the
province including the bits and pieces of KwaZulu. ,,22 Its
delegation included thirty-four full members and three observers.
During the next eight months the composition of the Indaba
changed somewhat. For example, "the Trade Union council of South
Africa disbanded, and the Natal Municipal Association found that
they did not have the support of sufficient members to continue,
while a few additional groups joined as full participants (for
example, the Pinetown Municipality) or as observers, (such as the
Jewish Women's league."23
According to Sutcliffe, setting in motion the process of
establishing a regional legislature, with powers to administer
and pass laws for the people in Natal, was stage three of a
series of events. Stage one had been the deliberations between
the Natal Provincial council's Executive Committee and the
KwaZulu cabinet in 1984, which led to the establishment of bodies
to examine areas of cooperation between the two administrations.
Phase two meant the creation of a Joint Executive Authority (JEA)
for the region of Natal (including KwaZulu).~ This needed
central state approval, which was granted in 1986, and the Joint
Executive Council began functioning in April 1987. 25 Thus the
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state established White and African administrations within the
region. It also suggests that this cooperation flowed xrom the
need to counter the waste and inefficiency caused by the
duplication of facilities in Natal.
The Indaba talks agreed to set up Joint Executive
Authorities structures to take over the responsibilities for
development and service delivery in the rural areas of KwaZulu
and Natal. The KwaZulu government conferred such responsibilities
on tribal authorities, since they were the local government in
rural areas. 26 The creation of the Joint Executive Authorities
to take over such tasks marked the beginning of moving away from
using chiefs in issues concerning service delivery and
development. Even Inkatha, the pillar on which the tribal leaders
in KwaZulu leaned, agreed to this. This consensus suggests that
delegates to the Indaba noted that tribal authorities did not
have the resources to deliver services and to implement
development projects.
The Indaba, therefore, by moving into the arena of political
restructuring, can be regarded as a step more than mere
administrative cooperation, because it was intended to bring
regional legislative powers more into line with the competence
of the KwaZulu "homeland" rather than matching the limited powers
that had been enjoyed by the provincial government. 27 The
provincial government was abolished in 1987, and replaced by th~
Joint Executive Authority, which linked the Natal Provincial
26 P. Zulu, "The Rural Crisis: Authority structures and their
Role in Development," in H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (eds.), ~
Against the Fences: Poverty« Passes and Privilege in South
Africa, Cape Town: David Philip, 1985, p. 248.
v Before the Indaba, the Natal Provincial government was
responsible for service delivery and implementation of projects
in all the areas which were not under the jurisdiction of the
Kwazulu Bantustan government. The creation of the Joint services
Boards meant that Kwazulu and Natal had to be catered for equally
as a region. In other words, the JSBs had to take over all the
responsibilities for service delivery and implementation of
projects in the region as a whole.
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Administration and the KwaZulu government. 28 The establishment
of the Joint Executive Authority marked a change from the elected
provincial government to a purely nominated one.
concerning the talks, the Indaba operated through a series
of sub-committees, for example, image management, local
government, economics, constitutional planning. After a period
of eight months, the Indaba produced its recommendations, which
included a bill of rights and a draft constitution for
legislative structures for the region. It was presented as a
model that could be extended to a future federal South Africa. 29
The bill of rights was to be the criterion of justice against
which regional legislation was to be jUdged.
The constitution provided for a Governor appointed by the
state President on the advice of the provincial legislature, with
the main function of assenting to legislation and adjudicating
on the division of powers between regional and central
governments. 30 The legislature would consist of two chambers. The
first chamber would consist of 100 members elected on a
proportional representation basis by all residents over the age
of eighteen. The majority party would elect a prime minister who
would form a cabinet. 31
The second chamber would be elected by all voters, but for
this vote the electorate was to be divided ~nto five background
~ D. Irvine, "Federalism and the New Constitution," in A.
Johnston, S. Shezi and G. Bradshaw (eds) , Constitution-Making in
the New South Africa, London: Leicester university Press, 1993,
p.20.
29 D.Glaser, "The Indaba and its Proposals: A critical
Response", in workshop on Regionalism and Reconstructing in
Natal, University of Natal, Durban, January 1988, p.4.
30 The KwaZulu-Natal Indaba: Constitutional Proposals and
Memoranda, Submitted to the Minister of Constitutional
Development and Planning on 13 January 1987.




groups, namely, African, Afrikaners, Asians, English and South
African. While it appeared that voters might choose to belong to
their natural group or the "South African" one, there was no
choice to belong to any of the first four groups. criteria for
the identification of voters had, therefore, been made part of
the constitution, leaving it to the initial discretion of the
electoral officer to make a ruling on the group allocation of
such a voter. 32
The second chamber could, by simple majority, halt or delay
all legislation and, furthermore, five members of one of the
background groups could veto legislation that would materially
affect their own cultural affairs. Legislation did not depend
only on the approval of majorities in the two chambers but would
also have to go through standing committees on which the rUling
party did not have the necessary two-thirds majority. 33
compromise and consensus, in secret and among party leaders, was
therefore built into the constitution proposed by the KwaNatal
Indaba.
There were also to be cultural councilS, formed after an
application had been approved by a commission. They would
function as an additional mechanism for the protection, and
promotion, of the religious, language and cultural rights of
groups representing the principal segments of the population in
the province. 34
The constitution also provided a role for the majority of
the then incumbents of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in that a
council of chiefs would "represent the interests of the
traditional authorities" and would function as a cultural
council. This council would, however, not be restricted to a






34 KwaZulu-Natal Indaba constitution, KI, Clause 2.
58
maximum of ten members as was the case with other cultural
councils. 35
The constitution also indicated that local government would
operate through a system of local authorities, based on the then
existing structures. Accordingly, traditional authorities would
function as local authorities.
The Indaba constitution took as given the existence of
groups which were in effect ethnic and racial categories. It
entrenched these groups in two structures of regional government
(the second chamber and cultural councils). The continuation of
linking political rights to ethnic identification, even if only
in the areas of culture, remained open to criticism.
It should be pointed out, however, that not all political
parties participated in the Indaba. The non-participants included
the far right-wing Whites political parties, exiled political
organizations, progressive trade unions, and political and
community groupings. White political parties such as the
Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party did not
participate due to their strong allegiance to apartheid laws. 36
They would not take part in a process that was going to lead to
greater integration.
The exiled political organizations like the ANC could not
participate. Even so, they stood opposed to the political
framework within which the Indaba was founded. It is probably
true to argue that inviting them was done in the safe knowledge
that this would not be seriously entertained. 37
35 KwaZulu-Natal Indaba Constitution, KI clause 4.xiii.
36 See J Grest, H. Hughes, G. Mare, and J. Metelerkamp "The
Politics of Regionalism: The Natal Option," 1988, p.34. '
37 Ibid.
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Different community and political groups outside the Indaba
which represented urban constituencies were variously aligned
with the non-racial democratic or the black consciousness
movements, which rejected the Bantustan leadership as being
connected with apartheid state structures. Moreover, during the
Indaba proceedings, they were already in violent conflict with
Inkatha and the united Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA). 38
Judging from this, it is clear that the non-participants'
organizations represented a sizeable constituency in Natal.
Some of the conclusions reached by the Indaba were not
debated. For instance, the Indaba's constitutional proposals did
not discuss the future role of tribal authorities, yet provisions
were made in its recommendations that they would function as
local authorities. 39 The Indaba also proposed that local
government should operate through a system of local
authorities. 40 The problem was whether local authorities meant
tribal authorities. This lack of clarification about the role of
the tribal authorities suggested that in the envisaged new region
of KwaZulu and Natal, they would have had to have operated under
the old legislation which was passed in 1951, namely, The Bantu
Authorities Act, No 68 of 1951. One can conclude from all this
that issues concerning the future role of tribal authorities
seemed of minor importance in the Indaba talks.
More positively, however, the Indaba was a first step on the
path of negotiating the question of power-sharing in KwaZulu-
Natal. In its constitutional proposals it raised many issues that
remained important in the years ahead. These included issues such
38 The United Workers' Union of South Africa, was a trade
union aligned to the IFP which was formed with a pro-capitalist,
ant-COSATU programme. See J. Grest, H. Hughes, G. Mare, "The
Politics of Regionalism: The Natal Option," 1988, p.33.
~ The KwaZulu-Natal Indaba: constitutional Proposals and
Memoranda, Submitted to the Minister of Constitutional
Development and Planning on 13 January 1987.
40 Ibid.
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as federalism/regionalism and democratic decentralization, the
process of arriving at agreed constitutional proposals, the
rights of minorities and cultural diversity and identity. These
considerations remained crucial to Inkatha's constitutional
proposals which emerged during the national constitutional
negotiations in the 1990s for a post-apartheid society in South
Africa.
The convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I , 11)
Tentative steps to negotiate an end to the political
gridlock stemming principally from the state's apartheid policy
started when the African National Congress issued its
Constitutional Guidelines for Democratic South Africa in August
1988. 41 Furthermore, in the same year Nelson Mandela extended an
invitation to the government to negotiate a political
settlement. 42 But the real cornerstone was laid down by the then
State President F.W.de Klerk in his famous speech at the opening
of Parliament on 2 February 1990. That marked a turning point in
South African history, for he announced the government's decision
to unban the liberation movements, release political leaders from
detention, and repeal even more apartheid legislation.
The February speech was followed by a number of secret
meetings between the government and the African National
Congress. According to Ralph Lawrence, in May 1990, formal talks
between the government and the ANC produced the Groote Schuur
Minute on the freedom of political prisoners and the return of
exi les .43 In February 1991, in the secret D. F. Ma lan Accord,
Umkonto we Sizwe was exempted from restrictions on private
41 R. Lawrence, "From Soweto to Codesa" in S. Friedman and
D. Atkinson, (eds.), South African Review 7: The Small Miracle,
South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press,
1994, p.7.
42 "The Reluctant Reconcilers", in S. Friedman, (ed), The
Long Journey, 1993, p.9.
43 R. Lawrence, "From Soweto to Codesa" 1994 9, , p. .
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armies.~ All these measures were aimed at establishing
conditions for mutual trust which would later provide the basis
for political negotiation and peaceful political settlement.
It was not until September 1991 that the foundations for
multi-party (all-party) talks were laid. The vehicle was the
National Peace Accord, "a formal agreement in which political
parties and interest groups committed themselves to a joint peace
effort, agreed to submit to discipline imposed by the accord, and
to establish structures to monitor it". 45 This National Peace
Accord marked the end of the pre-negotiation phase. Further talks
then took place in a forum called the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (CODESA).
CODESA~ was inaugurated on the 20 and 21 December 1991 at
the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg. 47 But if the plenary
session seemed to herald a fresh beginning, it did not convene
without a reminder of the divided past. One key participant, the
Inkatha Freedom Party's Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was absent. In the
period before CODESA 1 (as the first plenary sessions became
known) Buthelezi and Inkatha had insisted that an Inkatha Freedom
Party delegation was not enough. 48 They had demanded that two
additional delegations, one headed by the King of the Zulus,
~ Ibid.
45 "The Reluctant Reconcilers," in S. Friedman, (ed) The
Long Journey, 1993, p.19.
46 CODESA was portrayed in the national and international
media as a forum where the parties would canvass each others'
proposals for a democratic constitution, and in the end, agree
on the terms for an election as well as on the basic principles
of a new constitution.
~ A. Johnston, "Introduction: South Africa Since February
1990" in A. Johnston, S. Shezi, and G. Bradshaw, (eds) ,
:"C;.:o,-=:n:.::s::.;t=.;l:::.'t-=::u-::t~i:.::o~n.:..--,M~a=k~i~n~g1.-....:i!:.!n~~N~e::::.w.!!...-~s~o~u~t::..!.h.!-..£.A~f!::.:r!:...:!:.i~c~a , London: Le i cester
University Press, 1993, p.1.
48 "From Breakthrough to Breakdown," in S. Friedman, (ed),
The Long Journey, 1993, p.21.
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Goodwill Zwelithini, and the other representing the KwaZulu
administration, be seated toO. 49
Buthelezi's insistence was based on the fact that the
Transkei, Venda, and ciskei administrations were represented in
CODESA, yet their leaders were military rulers who were neither
elected nor led parties. He, therefore, felt that the KwaZulu
administration and the King of its citizens who purportedly
represented all Zulus should be included, since the IFP could not
speak for all these different interests. To an Inkatha critic,
the demand that the King be seated seemed to be an attempt to
stress the importance of Zulu ethnicity, a theme which the
Inkatha Freedom Party had begun to emphasize.
But whatever the motive, the demand presented CODESA' s ~
organizers with a political and logistical nightmare. The African
National Congress, too, had been wooing traditional leaders. A
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) had
been created with its encouragement. "This was established on 23
September 1987, by chiefs of Kwandebele and Moutse. ,,50
CONTRALESA's aims and objectives were:
to oppose the independence of the homelands; campaigningt
for the abolition of the Bantustan system; the broadening
of South African system citizenship to all inhabitants in
the homelands; the education of tribal leaders with Fegard
to the freedom and their role in the struggle;
appropriation of land of their forefathers; and the
division of the land among those who worked for it. 51
49 Ibid.
W A. Greyling, and H. Kotze (eds) , Political Organizations




This meant that the Inkatha Freedom Party's demands prompted
counter-claims that the King of the Zulus was not the country's
only traditional leader, and not its only king. If he were
granted a place, all others would have to be seated as well.~
Furthermore, could the Inkatha Freedom Party's demands for
political recognition for the Zulu Royal House attract support
from chiefs who were not Zulus? To the extent that Buthelezi
managed to demand that political recognition should be given to
tribal authorities in general, and not exclusively to the Zulu
Royal House, the Inkatha Freedom Party might have become an
alternative vehicle for chiefs across the country who aspired to
political power. 9 The Inkatha Freedom Party might have become
one of the "doors" tribal leaders might have "knocked on" to get
political influence.~ All the more so if they felt that the deal
offered to them by the African National Congress did not meet
their expectations.
The Inkatha Freedom Party did attend the CODESA talks. Its
delegation was led by its national chairman, Frank Mdlalose. But
as Friedman writes, many commentators saw the decision to send
a delegation as a sign that the Inkatha Freedom Party, too, saw
no alternative to negotiation and that Buthelezi's gesture need
not have been taken too seriously.55 But as we shall see below,
the demand of the Inkatha Freedom Party for CODESA to include the
King continued, and finally led to th~ party's withdrawal from
the subsequent mUlti-party talks at Kempton Park in July 1993.
At CODESA, the management committee insisted that it was
premature to include the chiefs as a separate delegation because
52 "Anatomy of a Convention" in S. Friedman, The Long
Journey, 1993, p.22.
54 Ibid.
55 b' dI 1 , p.22.
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CODESA had a political foundation. It was felt that if the IFP's
proposal were accepted, CODESA would have broadened participation
to include ethnicity as a criterion. 56 This, however, did not
suggest that the institution of chieftaincy was thrown overboard,
but that its fate was an issue that would only be decided at a
later stage after a proper national political settlement.
At the commencement of CODESA, major political parties had
not yet announced their plans concerning the institution of
chieftaincy. All the major political parties were preoccupied
with the task of proposing issues which could facilitate the
commencement of the mUlti-party negotiations. Issues concerning ~
the future role of tribal authorities, therefore, were of minorf
importance. However, it might also be argued that perhaps the
absence of tribal leaders from the proceedings and the agenda at
CODESA was a political strategy by those opposed· to them.
~t2/
~':> According to Bekker, the National Party's plans were still
unclear except that the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik
Botha, had proposed that chiefs nominate three to four members
from each region to form a college of traditional leaders. 57 The
college could, according to the Minister, make proposals to the
multi-party conference to give effect to the role and position
of chiefs in a new constitution.~
~ The proposals, made by Minister Botha could be said to be the
continuation of the plan of the Nationalist Party concerning the
institution of chieftaincy. Bekker points out that an attempt to
rationalize and consolidate the existing laws on chieftainship
was first revealed in 1990. In this plan, the broad emphasis was
to maintain the status quo, but to clothe chiefs with extended
~ The Natal witness, 14/02/1992.
J. C. Bekker, "The Role of Chiefs in a Future South




powers of local government. 59 In other words, the plan envisaged X-
that chiefs would continue to be the custodians of their customs
and culture, but at the same time they would be included in
democratic local government structures.
~/ The African N~tional Congress also had not yet published any
proposals concerning the future role of tribal authorities at the
commencement of CODESA. The only plan available was mentioned in
clause (C) of the African National Congress's Constitutional
guidelines which stipulated that:
The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be ¥
transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole
in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in
the constitution. w
This, therefore, suggests that the refusal by the management
committee of CODESA to include chiefs was not intended to dismiss
them, but was due to the lack of a framework which could have
provided the basis for debate. CODESA concentrated on resolving
issues which needed solutions for speeding up the resumption of
the mUlti-party talks that could lead to the advent of a non-
racial society and democratic government. These included: the
ending of state of emergency legislation; the repeal of security
laws; the release of political prisoners; and lifting all
restrictions on organizations and individuals (which was
necessary to guarantee amnesty to returning exiles).61 The
parties also negotiated details about the process of electing a
59 Ibid.
W Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa:
African National Congress Proposal 1955 and 1988, Cape Town:
Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, 1989.
61 A. Johnston, "Introduction: South Africa since February
1990,~ i~ A. Jo?nst?n, S Shezi and G. Bradshaw (eds.)
Constltutl0nal-Maklng ln the New South Africa, London:Leicester
University Press, 1993, p.2.
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constituent Assembly.62 However, both CODESA I and 11 failed on
most accounts, 'especially on the issue of amending the
constitution. 63
Davidson notes that major political parties failed to agree
on constitutional issues because they sat down in a negotiating
forum with far too diverse perceptions concerning the terms of
reference, its democratic legitimacy, and its general function
in the transition at large. 64 According to Davidson, the ANC
alliance regarded CODESA as a means to reach agreement on the
nature of a fast transition to the general election of a
constituent Assembly which would write the constitution, bound
by a general Bill of Rights,65 whereas the government, (National
Party) and its loosely-tied allies, accorded much greater powers
to the convention.~ Furthermore, not only did they plan for a
transitional period of up to ten to fifteen years, but CODESA
would also have the authority to bind a future constituent
Assembly to an extensive list of general principles and
constitutional institutions which would assure protection from
majority domination.~
The MUlti-party Talks at Kempton Park
After the failure of CODESA, the National Party-led
government and the ANC embarked on a series of bilateral meetings
in which agreements such as the Record of Understanding were








signed. 68 These were intended to lead to a new round of multi-
party talks. The Inkatha Freedom Party reacted to the agreement
reached in the Record of Understanding by threatening to withdraw
from negotiations. Davidson writes that such a reaction was
caused by two considerations. The clauses in the Record of
Understanding which dealt with the hostels and traditional
weapons would have had a direct effect on the lives and customs
of people who were predominantly IFP supporters. 69 Secondly,
seeking a position in the negotiations equal to those of the ANC
and the government, the IFP refused, in principle, to go along
with agreements to which it had not been party.70
After a series of bilateral meetings'starting in November
1992, the political parties met again on 5 and 6 March 1993 in
the MUlti-party Planning Conference to hold preparatory talks on
a new negotiation forum. 71 To the nineteen participants from
CODESA were added seven more delegations, notably the Pan-African
68 A Record of Understanding was reached between Mandela and
De Klerk in September 1992 to firm up key compromises, laying the
ground for resumed negotiations. In November, the ANC's adoption
of the document "A Strategic Perspective" reciprocated earlier
National Party's concessions by meeting many of its key concerns.
See D. Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle?" in S. Friedman and D.
Atkinson (eds), South African Review 7: The Small Miracle,
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994, p. 13.
69 According to Zulu custom, Zulus carry traditional weapons
such as spears, clubs and shields, when attending (imbizos)
traditional Zulu gatherings. During the period of CODESA, amid
political tensions in South Africa, Zulus carried their
traditional weapons to all the IFP rallies. Most of them used
such weapons to provoke violence in the townships. In the Record
of Understanding, therefore, the ANC and the National Party
government agreed to forbid the carrying of traditional weapons
in pUblic. The IFP interpreted this as a conspiracy between the
National Party and the ANC, as a result of which the IFP
threatened to withdraw from the negotiation processes.
70
p.107.
A. Davidson and P. Strand, The Path to Democracy, 1993,
71 D. Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle," 1994, p.21.
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Congress and the Conservative Party. 72The IFP also sent a
delegation.
According to Davidson, in terms of agreements based on
sufficient consensus, the negotiations were fairly successful
from May until August. 73 During this period a number of issues
were settled. For instance, on 7 May there was agreement to set
the date for elections no later than April 1994, on the condition
that transitional structures were in place. u
In early June the parties decided to make 27 April 1994 the
provisional election date. This date was made permanent as part
of a major agreement reached on 2 July. 75 Additional parts of
that agreement concerned:
a time-schedule for the transi tional process; that all
parties will be represented in a Transitional Executive
Council that shall have executive powers during the
transi tion (the amount and reach of its powers was not
settled) ; that elections for central and regional
government were to be held simultaneously; that regional
boundaries should be delimite~ prior to elections; that an
independent media commission shall be established to ensure
all parties of fair terms during the election campaign;
that an independent electoral commission will be formed
which shall oversee the campaign and shall be the final
authority to jUdge the fairness of the election; that a
number of constitutional principles which will bind the
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election; and that certain actions must be taken to stop
the violence. 76
Despite these agreements, the forum still faced pressure
from the Inkatha Freedom Party to include more delegations. The
IFP's demand for the Zulu King to participate, raised at CODESA,
remained contentious; other tribal leaders also reacted by
demanding their inclusion as well. TI
Apart from insisting that the Zulu King be included in
CODESA, other IFP demands included the issue of federalism. This
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. But in brief,
in its proposal for federalism the IFP argued that the ethnic
identities of South Africa must be given political recognition,
and that this would best be achieved within a federal system. 78
If the borders of the federal states are drawn so that they
correlate with the relative dominance of particular ethnic groups
in particular parts of the country, federalism, so the argument
ran, would give sufficient recognition to political aspirations
of South Africa's different ethnic groups. 79 Countering this
argument, the ANC maintained that a division of the country into
strong federal states would result in a superficial division of
people with a common nationality. The ANC interpreted the IFP's
stance as playing to politicians who seek political prominence
by fostering ethnic nationalism. w
~ Ibid, pp.109-110.
n Chief Patekile Holomisa was quoted by The Natal witness
on 27 May "1992 as criticizing the demand of the IFP for singling
out the Zulu King to have special status at the mUlti-party
talks, arguing that the King had never asked for this because he
was aware of his many colleagues who are kings in other regions.
78 A. Davidson and P. Strand, The Path to Democracy, 1993,
p.107.




A liberal white constituency was assured that federalism
would protect their (economic) interests from the
~edistributive policies of an African National
Congress / south African communist Party-dominated central
government; to conservative Blacks, many of whom live under
the influence of traditional power ~.ierarchies in rural
areas, the message was that federalism would provide them
with political power to withstand the' influence of a
socialist central government run by Xhosa-cum- ANC. 81
strand notes that the Inkatha Freedom Party made its
arguments for federalism- by appealing to almost any constituency.
He writes that the IFP used the federal option like a deck of
cards: which card it chose to play in a certain situation, what





~\~~? The issues concerning the future role of tribal authorities
were tackled in the mUlti-party talks forum by the Negotiation
Council. Tribal leaders, who had gained a seat at the table after
the IFP had sought a place for the Zulu King, demanded more,
insisting on direct representation in the constitution-making
body, and at all levels of government. According to Doreen
Atkinson, the technical committee's first draft in July 1993 ~
granted no role to tribal leaders. 82 But when Eastern Cape Chief
Nonkonyana supported by cyril Ramaphosa83 protested, the
technical committee responded in ,part in its constitutional draft
of 20 August by listing traditional authorities and indigenous
81
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82 D. Atkinson, "Principle Born of· Pragmatism? Central
Government in the constitution," in S. Friedman and D. Atkinson
(eds.), South African Review 7: The Small Miracle; South Africa's
Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994, p.115.
83 cyril Ramaphosa was the leader of the African National
Congress's delegation at the negotiating table during the multi-
party talks at Kempton Park.
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law as one of the exclusive legislative competencies of regional
government. 84
(,'~ ~
~~~) While the negotiators applied their minds to other matters,
Nonkonyana, who ,emerged as the chief advocate of traditional
concerns, was becoming more vociferous, accusing the negotiators
of urban bias and extolling the virtues of traditional law. 85 The
Cape, Free state and Transvaal tribal leaders followed this with
a document arguing the democratic credentials of traditional
leadership and urging the necessity for councils of traditional
leaders at local, regional and central level, where a house of
traditional leaders should be established at each level. 86 In
addition, in November 1993, Nonkonyana raised the stakes, urging
that traditional leaders should be granted 30 per cent of Senate
seats and that regional houses of traditional leaders should
enjoy delaying powers over legislation fot thirty days.~ This
move was supported by the PAC which felt that traditional leaders
should be accommodated in the Senate.
Doreen Atkinson, however, writes that it was not these
demands which generated most heat, but the status of customary
law, which was now under sustained assault by the women's lobby
in the technical committee on human rights. This committee
initially proposed a "sunset clause" allowing customary law free
rein for a time. 88 According to Atkinson, some chiefs accepted
this, but a group led by Nonkonyana rejected it in such
uncompromising terms that an enraged women's lobby persuaded
negotiators to drop the compromise and insist that the
constitution's equality clause override customary law. 89
84 D. Atkinson, "Principle Born of Pragmatism?" 1994, p.115.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.







groups were very concerned by
the tribal authorities and customary
They pointed out that:
the enhanced
law in the new
customary law of inheritance denies women access to land
and property; customary law excludes women from decision
making in their homes and in their communi ties; women
married under customary law are perpetual minors; customary
law marriages do not have the same status as civil law
marriages. 90
What this implies is that enshrining customary law in the new
constitution would contradict the precepts of democratic values
and human rights which advocate a non-sexist society and equal
treatment and opportunities for all.
Another problem is that, in African customary law,
succession to status and property is premised on the idea of
perpetuating the family name. When a woman gets married, she
acquires membership of her husband's family and is unable to
carry forward her own family name. 91 This disqualifies women,
by virtue of their gender, from inheriting either traditional:
leadership positions or communal family property.92
However, Yvonne Mokgoro argues that while the concerns of
women still stand, these are unfounded in that customary law is
trumped by the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedom. 93
Significant in this respect was the creation of the Commission
on Gender Equality, and the access it could provide for women to
90 The Natal Witness, 10 November, 1993.
91 T.W. Bennet, A Source-book of African customary Law for
Southern Africa, Johannesburg: Juta, 1994, pp.410-411.
~ 92 Ibid.
'T;¥)~ 93 Y. Mokgoro, "Traditional Authority and Democracy in the
~Interim South African Constitution," in Occasional Papers
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Johannesburg, September, 1994, p.7. '
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counter the weight of recommendations by the bodies of
traditional authorities.
In November 1993, in order to placate traditional leaders
for this defeat, they were offered a role at all levels of
government, including guaranteed seats in local government, but
not parliament.~Traditional leaders' forums which would advise
law-makers, nationally and in the provinces, were provided. 95 The
negotiation team also recommended that the institution of tribal
authorities should continue to be protected by the new
constitution. The institution would be reformed to meet the
requirements of the prevailing democratic dispensation. However,
the methods and procedures of incorporating tribal authorities
in the structures of the democratic government were not provided
in the interim constitution, because of the complexities of the
institution of tribal authorities in different provinces in South
Africa.
An assessment of the issues concerning the future role of
tribal authorities appears not to be an easy task. As illustrated
in the preceding discussion, both the Buthelezi Commission .and
the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba failed significantly to give an outline
of how this institution would be included, if at all, in the
government structures of a post-apartheid society. Both the
Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba did mention that tribal
authorities shoul~_~_~rve_J_n f_ut.u:t.~__,!OQ.?11:.._9~_rD.;me.nts . CODESA as
well as the Negotiation council at Kempton Park did discuss the
future role of traditional authorities in a democratic
dispensation. The issue turned out to be problematic due to the
.......
difficulties in finding compromises bet~nstitutionof
tribal authorities and democratic principles. while provision for
the protection and continued existence of chiefly rule were
enshrined in the interim constitution, the methods of reforming




structures of democratic government were not provided. This was
partly because of the diversity of the tribal authorities
themselves, and partly because of the undemocratic nature of this
institution, such as the hereditary form of leadership, which is
also exclusively male. These characteristics are in conflict with
the Bill of Rights which the post-apartheid government in South
Africa adopted in 1994.
However, political parties at the mUlti-party talks at
Kempton Park did agree that decisions regarding the accommodation
and representation of tribal authorities in the provincial and
local government structures should be taken by each province.
What this meant in principle was that "all the decisions
regarding the future role of this institution were to be decided
by the provincial premiers acting in concurrence with mUlti-party
provincial committees on local government, which have been set
up within each of the nine provinces.,,96 In other words, tribal
authorities will be accommodated in the structures of the
provincial government in accordance with the provisions made in
the respective provincial constitutions. South Africa's national
constitution only provided for the protection and the continued
existence of traditional authorities.
It should also be pointed out, however, that the solution
reached by the Negotiation Council concerning the status of the
tribal authorities in the democratic dispensation was made in the
absence of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The IFP withdrew from the
negotiations mainly due to Inkatha's concern over the nature of
the process, namely, 'lack of sufficient consensus', and to
protest against the Negotiation Council's unwillingness to extend
a special invitation to the King of the Zulus to participate in
its deliberations; and to show its dissatisfaction about the way
the issue of federalism was handled at the Kempton Park talks.
96 A. Mclntosh, "The Rural Local Government Debate in South
Africa," Occasional Papers, Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung,
Johannesburg, september, 1994, p.13.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ZULU KING IN KWAZULU-NATAL.
The withdrawal of the IFP from the multi-party talks at
Kempton Park was prompted by two reasons, namely, the
unwillingness of the ANC and the National Party (NP) to include
the Zulu King at the negotiation table, and the lack of
enthusiasm by these major political parties to consider seriously
the issue of federalism in the democratic South Africa. This
withdrawal resulted in a number of consequences. Firstly, the IFP
entangled the issue of the King with that of federali~m, by
making the political role of the King an essential link in its
demand for federalism. The IFP used the status of the King to
spearhead its demands for federalism. The chapter argues that a
federal system would serve as the vehicle through which Buthelezi
would attempt to create the 'Indaba Natal' envisaged and so
vigorously pursued in 1986 and 1987. It also suggests that
Inkatha regarded the King of the Zulus and the issue of
federalism as important strategies in the dynamic between reform
and revolt. This is understood in the King's attempt to declare
KwaZulu-Natal a sovereign state in early 1994.
The IFP' s determination to pursue a federal option in
KwaZulu-Natal started to gain momentum in the 1980s. This reached
a crescendo after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. Confronted
by this situation, ethnic mobilization became increasingly
important in Inkatha's strategy. Probably this convinced
Buthelezi and his advisers that regional consolidation should
become an end in itself.
It is in the criticisms and counter-criticisms between the
ANC and the IFP that the significance of the Zulu King in Zulu
ethnic politics in KwaZulu-Natal can be understood. As we shall
see in the chapter, these political parties accuse each other of
monopolizing the King, whenever he appears to associate himself
with one of these parties. The King and the institution of tribal
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authorities in KwaZulu-Natal are seen by the parties as important
allies who can play a vital role in mobilizing political support
in rural areas. consequently, each attempts to monopolise and woo
them to its camp. As we have seen, however, the King and
traditional authorities, have, for a long time, been aligned with
the IFP, due to the influence this party had in the former
Bantustan government. 1
This problem has been aggravated by the political gulf which
developed between the King of the Zulus, Goodwill Zwelithini and
the IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi, soon after the installation of
the democratic government in South Africa. The King changed his
mind and declared his independence from the IFP. He renounced any
involvement in party politics, and committed himself to acting
as the unifier of the Zulu people, a move which was welcomed by
the ANC. Pr ior to the commencement of the first non-racial
democratic general elections, the King was a close ally of the
IFP and was mostly associated with the IFP leadership in their
campaign for a federalist state in south Africa.
To explore the political significance of the Zulu King, the
chapter highlights the role he played in KwaZulu-Natal a few days
before and after the commencement of the first non-racial general
election in South Africa in 1994. It also explores the issue of
federalism which was one of the IFP's key demands during the
multi-party talks for the post-apartheid government in South
According to an article in the New Nation of 30 September
19~4, of the more than 290 chiefs in the province, only 25
allgned themselves with the ANC. Pp.6-7.
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Africa. This was coupled with the demand for a kingdom/sovereign
state in KwaZulu-Natal by King Goodwill. This led many observers
to conclude that the King's call for a kingdom was made under the
influence of the IFP. In other words, the IFP was using the
King's office as a means of achieving a federal state in KwaZulu-
Natal. However, as we shall see below, the IFP argued that the
King's call was his own initiative, coming after the major
political parties refused to extend an invitation to the King to
the multi-party negotiations, both to CODESA and to the Kempton
Park talks.
A Demand for Federalism.
An assessment of the significance of the King of the Zulus
during the multi-party talks at Kempton Park and before the
commencement of the April 1994 non-racial general elections in
South Africa cannot be done without discussing the issue of
federalism in South Africa.
Federalism has been an aspiration of the IFP for a long
time, and it was not surprising to see the party insisting on it
during the multi-party talks at Kempton Park. Davidson writes
that it was the issue of federalism which finally led to a split
between Inkatha and the ANC. In a meeting which took place in
London in 1979, between Buthelezi and the ANC leadership in
exile, Buthelezi presented a list of conditions which the ANC
would have to accept if they wished to have him as their ally.2
2 Davidson, The Path to Democracy, 1993, p.52.
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These added up to a capitulation of the exiled leadership in
favour of Buthelezi, something which they refused. 3 Among other
things, Buthelezi presented to the ANC leadership the following
preferences: firstly, he advocated an ideological set-up based
on Zulu ethnic nationalism; and secondly, he indicated that he
favoured liberal socio-economic policies. 4 Davidson writes that
by so doing Buthelezi was sure to come into conflict with the ANC
on an ideological level. s
At the start of the mUlti-party talks at Kempton Park, the
IFP referred to the proposals from the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba as
a stepping-stone for negotiations. During the multi-party talks,
it was not only the IFP which was in favour of federalism. other
political parties like the National Party and the Democratic
Party also favoured it. The only difference here lay in the
arguments for it. According to Davidson, the IFP's argument was
that a country of the size and type of South Africa would get a
stronger democracy with a federal system. 6 Besides arguing for
each province to adopt its own constitution, the IFP repeatedly
advanced the notion of asywaetry,insisting that provinces could
adopt different powers and functions: it even floated as an
extreme possibility the idea that parts of the country could be







suggests that the IFP was concerned about itself and its
envisaged base, the KwaZulu-Natal region.
The IFP urged that provinces should be given autonomy.
commenting on this, Ben Ngubane of the IFP pointed out that
provinces as component parts of the South African state should
have all the residual powers. 8 "The central government should
have specific powers. ,,9 Provinces should initiate and control
their own affairs at local level while the central government
carried out its specific functions. IQ
More explicitly, the IFP insisted on a special and expedited
process for approving a constitution for the state of KwaZulu-
Natal, recognizing that the region had gone further than any
other in reorganizing its territory within the parameters of a
federal system. ll Ben Ngubane stressed this point by pointing out
that:
Federalism was the essence of the Buthelezi Commission. Its
intention was to find out an alternative organizational
framework within the South African state, that's also why
the IFP moved towards the Joint Executive Authority, a
single legislature for KwaZulu-Natal ... Other regions may
8 Ben Ngubane, Panel Discussion on Regionalism, in
Development and Democracy, Johannesburg, 5th JUly 1993, p.28.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 R. Humphries, T. Rapoo and S. Friedman, "The Shape of the
Country: Negotiating Regional Government," 1994, p. 160.
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not have embarked on such a path; they may not even be
interested in doing 50. 12
Here, Ngubane was trying to point out that the IFP's aspiration
for a federal South Africa was a long-standing one. On the
surface, the IFP wanted a territory combining KwaZulu and "White"
Natal, as had been its concern back since the Buthelezi
Commission and the Indaba talks which advocated federalism in the
1980s.
The argument of the National Party was slightly different
from that of the IFP, in that it endorsed the issue of self-
determination. The basic assumption was that the South African
population consists of a variety of groups that evolved as a
result of cultural and historical factors. 13 Because of a
diversity of interests among these groups, each should be
guaranteed sovereignty in decisions regarding issues which are
defined as "own affairs". 14 To this end, the National Party
argued that constitutional factors such as prescribed majorities,
the devolution of powers and the right to veto, all within the
framework of a federal state, must feature in the constitution
so as to give groups sufficient protection.1.S
12 R. Humphries, T. Rapoo and S. Friedman, "The Shape of the
Country: Negotiating Regional Government," in S. Friedman and
D. Atkinson, South African Review 7, The Small Miracle: South
Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994,
p.160.




The African National Congress, however, had a totally
different view. It called for a unitary state. The ANC intimated
that sovereignty, for example, should belong to the people as a
whole and should be exercised through one central legislature,
executive, jUdiciary, and administration. 16 The central state
should delegate powers to "subordinating administrative units for
purposes of more efficient administration and democratic
participation."o Institutions such hereditary chiefs should be
transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole.
According to Strand, the argument to delegate state powers was
that it would increase efficiency, and enhance democratic
participation at regional and local levels. 18 Zola Skweyiya of
the ANC emphasized this by pointing out that:
There should be regions in South Africa for purposes of
democratization and distribution, and they should have
original powers entrenched in the consti tution. However,
the central government should play quite an important role
in the running of the country and there should be some
powers that are left to the central government alone. 19
To the contrary, the IFP argued that the region was the
source of power. The IFP maintained that regions would decide
16 Strand, The Path to Democracy; 1993, p.88.
o Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Zola Skweyiya, "Panel Discussion on Regionalism," in
Development and Democracy, Johannesburg, 5th July 1993, p.l?
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what to give to the centre, and that asymmetry would be achieved
not by the central government handing out different powers to
regions, but rather by the latter delegating upwards those powers
they were prepared to give to the centre. 20
As the negotiations at Kempton Park evolved, differences on
the issue of federalism between the ANC and IFP widened. The
National Party shifted from its original stance on federalism,
a shift which had major repercussions. This also affected the
IFP's original stance on federalism. The IFP, finally, had
emphasized the economic and the ethno-nationalist arguments
equally. The IFP argued that regions should be given greater
powers to control their economies than sub-national levels of
government in a centralized state. 2\, Probably the IFP's
perception was that a likely ANC-dominated government would
pursue socialist pOlicies, hence the need for sufficient powers
for the federal provinces in order to block radical
redistributive policies. 22
From an ethno-nationalist perspective, the IFP urged that
specific ethnic identities of South Africa should be given
political recognition, and that this would be achieved within a
federal system. n The IFP anticipated that if the borders of the
20 R. Humphries, T. Rapoo and S. Friedman, "The Shape of the
Country: Negotiating Regional government", 1994, p.161.
2\ Davidson, The Path to Democracy, 1993, p.93.
22 Ibid, p. 94.
n Davidson, The Path to Democracy, 1993, p.93.
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federated regions were drawn so that they correlated with the
relative dominance of some ethnic groups in parts of the country,
sufficient recognition would be given to the political
aspirations of South Africa's different ethnic groups.24 In its
ethnic rhetoric directed particularly at its Zulu constituency
the IFP has, obviously, portrayed federalism as a constitutional
system which was necessary to give sufficient political
recognition to the Zulu nation, supposedly under the leadership
of the IFP. Hence its demands for the representation of the King
and KwaZulu Government at CODESA.
In response to the IFP's argument, anti-federalists such as
the ANC maintained that a federation would not give the party
which gains the majority of votes on a national level sufficient
power to rule. 25 This is also the view of Ralph Lawrence, who
regards federalism as a defensive measure. 26 "This· acts as a
bulwark against undiluted majority rule by transferring
uncontrovertible decision-making powers to regional
27
authorities."TI Nevertheless, Lawrence points out that for those
hostile to big government and who wanted to bring government
closer to the people, federalism offers an optimal solution. 28
24 Ibid.
~ Davidson, The Path to Democracy, 1993, p.94.
26 R. Lawrence, "Why I am not a Federalist," in Development
and Democracy, Johannesburg, 5th July 1993, p.11.
R. Lawrence, "Why I am not a Federalist," p.11.
28 Ibid.
85
The ANC held the view that only with a strong central
government could wealth be created and distributed so as to
address the socio-economic injustices which were created by
apartheid.~ According to Zola Skweyiya, the ANC's concern was
the question of development, because the development of tne
country has not been equal. 30 "There are regions which are very
underdeveloped and there are regions that are overdeveloped. The
central government should be given powers in order to equalize
that status quo. ,,31 Peter Mayende of the Pan-Africanist Congress·
(PAC) also supports the ANC's view. Mayende argues that
federalism would create a bureaucratic monstrosity which would
be a serious drain on the national economy. 32 Mayende points out
that, "it wiil replicate the present system where you have so
many departments. ,,33
While the ANC rejected federalism and decentralization as
a strategy to retain privilege, the party admitted that there was
a need to create new forms of regional governments which
addressed the problems of apartheid settlement patterns and
current uneven development across the c.ountry. 34 To this end,
29 Ibid.
30 Zola Skweyiya, "Panel Discussion on Regionalism," 5th July
1993, p.1?
31 Ibid.
32 Peter Mayende, "Panel Discussion on Regionalism," in
Development and Democracy, Johannesburg, 5th July 1993, p.31.
33 Ibid.
34 D. Irvine, "Federalism and the New Constitution," in A.
Johnston, S. Shezi and G. Bradshaw, Constitution-Making in the
New South Africa, London: Leicester University Press, 1993, p.22.
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local and regional government should be seen as potential
development agencies. "They should be able to exercise some
leverage over choices among competing priorities, although the
central government would have some control over the issues that
are vital to the conduct of national policy and. to ensure
uniformity of standards. 1l3S According to Irvine, the goal of such
policies would be:
To create the basis for the country's reunification by
incorporating the Bantustans; to promote national
reconciliation and establish the basis for a more just and
equitable allocation of resources, and rectify. the legacy
of apartheid; to foster economic growth, democratic
government and empower communities, and to develop
efficient and effective structures for planning and
catering for rapid urban growth, service delivery and
support for smaller local authorities and rural areas. 36
Given the great disparities between the different proposals,
it was striking that each of the parties claimed that its
constitutional model was based on democratic principles.
Furthermore, each party argued that its opponent's proposa1s, for
one reason or another, were not democratic in principle. Each
party's proposals gave expression to democratic rule if all
citizens were granted an equal vote in recurrent elections for
3S Ibid.
36 D. Irvine, "Federalism and the New Constitution," 1993,
p.23.
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a representative legislative assembly; if a Bill of Rights were
to guarantee respect for equal civil and political rights of all
citizens; and if there were mechanisms through which the citizens
could remove from office an elected government which breaches its
mandate. If a party's proposals contains these principles, it
cannot simply be dismissed as undemocratic by those who favour
a different type of democracy. Thus, the core of the debate on
constitutional models for South Africa was not about democratic
versus non-democratic proposals, but about the type of
constitution that can best serve the long-term interests of the
people as a whole.
Due to intense dissatisfaction with· the constitutional
debates on federalism during the mUlti-party talks at Kempton
Park, the IFP withdrew from the negotiations on 2 July 1993. 37
On 17 July Buthelezi announced that the IFP would not return. He
insisted on a new agreement on regions, granting them a degree
of independence which neither the South African government nor
the ANC would accept. 38 This was the period when the King of the
Zulus was in agreement with the IFP leadership in its campaign
for federalism. Consequently, many South Africans thought that
the King had aligned himself with the IFP in its campaign to
resist the April 1994 general election.
37 D. Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle? The MUlti-Party
Negotiation Forum," in S. Friedman and D. Atkinson, (eds) , South
African Review 7, The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated
Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994, p.31.
38 Ibid.
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The status of the King Before the April 1994 General Election.
The neutral political stance which the King of the Zulus
took after the 1994 April's general elections, is not the stance
he took before. Previously, he was a very close ally of the IFP,
and a bitter enemy of the ANC. However, the change of political
order in this country enabled him to reconsider his relationship
with the IFP. The King's present status has to be understood
ag~inst the background of the political activities that took
place in this province prior to the general elections. These
political activities have their roots in the 1970s, when the King
fought to be independent from Inkatha. This has already been
discussed in Chapter One.
Davidson writes that "Inkatha's ethno-nationalist ideology
would have been impossible without the backing of the Zulu Royal
House. ,,39 MangosuthU Buthelezi is a political advisor to the
King, a position traditionally held by the Chief of the Buthelezi
tribe. While Buthelezi, through Inkatha, claimed to represent the
Zulu people politically, the role of King Goodwill Zwelithini had
been to unite Zulus culturally, and hence to avoid involvement
in politics. 40 King Goodwill had, however, not been able to keep
an independent stance between Inkatha and its political
opponents, but tended to support the view that a loyal Zulu owed
political allegiance to Inkatha.
39 A. Davidson and P. strand, The Path to Democracy: A




Despite outward shows of unity, there was little affection
between the King and Buthelezi. Buthelezi had publicly humiliated
the King in the 1970s after he had shown worrying signs of
independence. 41 Since then, Zwelithini, mindful of the fact that
Buthelezi's IFP controlled his only source of income, had been
kept on a tight rein by KwaZulu's ruling party.42 He was a very
useful tool, since he had more sYmbolic support among the Zulu
speakers than the IFP itself or its leader. 43 Inkatha's leaders
knew that their prospects of widespread support on any issue
depended on ensuring that the monarchy was seen to back it.
The King's activities were biased toward the Zulus who
aligned themselves to Inkatha. This bias started to become
apparent in the 1980s, when political turmoil in townships across
the country started to reach considerable heights. This came as
a result of the competition between the United Democratic Front~
which formulated demands for radical changes to the political
system of this country, and the government and its collaborators,
Inkatha in particular. Inkatha was a target because of its
opposition to armed struggle. In this conflict the King aligned
41 D.. Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle? The MUlti-Party
Negotiating Forum," 1994, p.38.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
~ The United Democratic Front (UDF), formed in· 1983,
represented affiliated civic associations on a national level,
and formulated demands for radical change to the South African
political system. It was an ally of the ANC in that it was
committed to the Freedom Charter, the document in which the ANC
alliance had formulated its ideological principles in 1955.
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himself to Inkatha. In 1985, amid this conflict, Mare' quoted the
King as saying:
My people when I say to you today that we cannot tolerate
intimidation; when I command you to rout out those among
you who undermine our national unity as a Zulu people; when
I say to you enough is enough, we will not tolerate any
further inroads into our dignity by theANC Mission in
Exile, by the UDF or by COSATU .45
Partiality towards Inkatha continued up to the 1990s when
the negotiation process for the transition to democracy began.
In 1991, at the first sitting of CODESA the IFP demanded
including the King in the negotiations. Buthelezi argued that
granting a specific role to the King at CODESA entailed the
representation of the Zulu people because the IFP was a non-
racial national political party with himself as leader. 46
However, this was rejected by the ANC, as I have discussed.
After the IFP's subsequent withdrawal from the Kempton Park
negotiations, Buthelezi's rhetoric and that of the King became
more strident as the IFP mobilized in KwaZulu-Natal to resist the
forthcoming elections. Chiefs barred polling activities from
45 King Goodwill Zwelithini, address to the Zulu nation,
Nongoma, 16 June 1986, cited in G. Mare', "Last Chance Limited. ,
OptJ.ons or No Go?", New Frontiers: The KwaZulu-Natal Debates. ,
Ind1cator SA, October 1987, pp. 18-21.
46
p.100.
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their areas, and the violence increased.~ In one of the
imbizos,48 the King was quoted as saying: "there cannot be
elections before it is accepted that KwaZulu will be included in
a future South Africa under a constitution endorsed by the people
of KwaZulu-Natal. ,,49 He pointed out that the Zulus were only
interested in negotiating about a future South Africa if KwaZulu-
Natal was to be included as a specific region.~iO Furthermore, the
IFP and the King rejected the 1993 interim constitution saying
that it was just the National Party in cahoots with the ANC and
the South African Communist Party (SACP) who decided to strip
Zulus of their kingdom. 51 The problem here is that it was not
clear what the King was referring to as the Kingdom, because
there had been no kingdom in KwaZulu, except the KwaZulu
Bantustan.
At a meeting with the then State president F.W. De Klerk,
at the Union Buildings, the King rejected the proposal for a
single-ballot system which was enshrined in electoral law,
arguing that this would not allow people to have a regional voice
about the land of their ancestors as well as about what they want
at the national level. 52 Neither the King himself nor the
D. Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle?", 1994, p.38.
48 An imbizo is a traditional gathering of the ZUlus, where
tribal matters are discussed.
~ The Natal Witness, 12/07/1993.
50 Ibid.
51 The Natal Witness, 12/07/1993.
52 "Zwelithini laid his claims to De Klerk at the Union
Buildings", The Daily News, 19/01/1994.
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traditional leaders who serve under him would advise the Zulu
people to participate in the proposed April 1994 election while
the interim constitution remained, Zwelithini stated. 53
concerning violence, the King's position vacillated between
a more neutral position between the ANC and Inkatha supporters,
and one favouring 'Inkatha.~ In a united effort by high-ranking
Zulu members of the PAC, the ANC and Inkatha, a IIConcerned Group
of Zulus ll was formed with the King as the sYmbol of unity. 55
According to Davidson, in an address to Inkatha members in May
1993, the King urged: III know some of you carry weapons and are
involved in violence. Enough is enough. stop the killings.lI~
Despite such appeals, most of the King's speeches were
inflammatory, especially at most of the IFP rallies after the
party's withdrawal from the Kempton Park's negotiations. The
Weekly Mail reported that, at an Inkatha rally in mid-July 1993,
the King lashed out with thinly veiled threats of the Zulu
warriors' potential to cause war and destruction in South
Africa. 57 According to Chothia's article in The Weekly Mail, the
rally in Durban in July gathered a crowd of 60,000. The King's




A.Davidson, and P. Strand, The Path to Democracy, 1993,
55 Ibid.
~ Ibid, pp. 55-56.
57 F. Chothia, liKing wants a Kingdom" in The Weekly Mail, 9-
15 July, 1993, p.19.
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and the ANC by referring to a bellicose "African cUlture". He
called on the South African Police to go and fish for a few days
so that Inkatha and the ANC could be left alone to fight their
own war. Claiming an army of half a million, the commander was
sure Inkatha would come out of such a fight victorious. 58
"President Bush brought peace in the Middle East through war;
hence IFP and ANC must do the same. ,,59
On 14 February, at a meeting with de Klerk in Durban, the
King demanded a Kingdom/sovereign state of KwaZulu-Natal. oo This
was perceived by many South Africans to be threatening secession.
In this meeting the King stated that he was preparing to
promulgate a constitution of KwaZulu-Natal because the interim
constitution did not offer any space in which Zulus can survive
as a nation and had no legitimate right to impose itself on
them. 61 The Natal witness quoted the King as saying:
I am preparing myself to promulgate the consti tution of
Kwazulu-Natal which will establish a monarchy modelled
after the, best examples of democratic and pluralistic
monarchies in the world. 62
58 F. Chothia, "The Zulu king picks up the IFP spear" in The
Weekly Mail, 16-25 JUly, 1993, p.16.
59 I bid, P • 2 .




A number of concerned people in KwaZulu-Natal felt that the
King's call was made at the wrong time, because, everybody was
then looking forward to the first non-racial democratic elections
in South Africa. For instance, a fifty-one year old priest, Rev.
Magubuludu of Imbali was quoted by the Natal Echo as saying:
Time for that demand is long gone. Because of the time
factor, the demand is now inappropriate. This call should
have been issued when Lesotho and Swaziland became
independent. 63
The Rev. Magubuludu pointed out that the time of this demand
makes it clear that it was motivated by political forces who
wanted to derail the elections. By this he meant that the King
was acting under the orders of the IFP.
Dumisani Makhaye of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, for example,
also condemned the King for suggesting any act of secession. He
warned that by so doing the King was actually unleashing forces
that would destroy the Zulu monarchy.M He warned that by openly
siding with the IFP, the King may achieve in a matter of weeks
what the British and colonialism failed to achieve in a century,
"the demise of the Zulu kingdom". 65 The Natal witness quoted him
as saying:
~ The Natal Echo, 17/02/1994.
M D. Makhaye, "Zwelithini's Demand for a Zulu Kingdom" in
the Natal Witness, 13/04/1994. Dumisani Makhaye is the ANC's
Southern Natal Media officer.
65 Ibid.
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the recent actions and pronouncements of the King in
Pretoria, Durban and Ulundi have created conditions that
have divided the Zulu people as never before. Zulus are
today divided as they were in the last century during the
Battle of Princes, between the then Prince Cetshwayo and
Prince Mbuyezi at Ndondakusuka. Literally thousands of
Zulus were killed in that battle. The surest way to destroy
a monarch is to allow it to engage itself in party
politics. 66
Makhaye was dismissive of the King's action. He pointed out
that a king is not synonymous with a kingdom. A king only
occupies a special position in a kingdom. A kingdom also includes
princes and princesses, chiefs and headmen, and sUbjects, most
of whom have distanced themselves from what they perceive as the
IFP's manipulation of the King. Makhaye pointed out that the King
never even consulted the most important constituencies of the
Zulus, before making such a call. By making the King its virtual
spokesman and organizer, the IFP was forcing the Zulus to choose
between the King on the one hand, and their unity and freedom on
the other. 67
Makhaye made it clear that the King should be apolitical and
above party politics. The position of the King should be clearly
defined in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution which was
66 D. Makhaye, "Zwelithini's Demand for a Kingdom," The Natal
Witness, 13/04/1994.
~ The Natal Witness, 13/04/1994.
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to be drawn up by the democratically elected provincial
constituent assembly. That would ensure that the well-being of
the King does not depend on the whim of any political leader but
it would be entrenched in the constitution. 68 Makhaye pointed out
that no political party in Natal could be so naive as not to
recognize the existence of the King and the Zulu kingdom's
traditional structures as a reality. He argued that the interim
constitution, which the IFP rejects, guarantees the position of
traditional leaders.~
Not all the people in KwaZulu-Natal condemned the King's
call for a sovereign KwaZulu:-Natal. Some supported him. According
to a survey conducted by a Natal Witness phone-in, the King
received more support from White people than Blacks. Out of
forty-nine callers in two hours, twenty-one Whites opted for a
sovereign state and most said they would not like to live under
an ANC communist government. 70 Seventeen Black callers vehemently
rejected the King's call for an independent state, saying the he
was being used for political purposes by the IFP leader,
Buthelez i. 71
. 68 By this, Makhaye was referring to the incidents which took
place in the 1970s, when Inkatha singled out the King, simply
because he had decided to take a line independent from Inkatha.
The King was literally chased away from the KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly and his salary was halved. See Chapter Two for more
information.
• 69 Makhaye, "Zwelithini's Demand for Kingdom," The Natal
W1tness, 13/04/1994.
w The Natal Witness, 18/02/1994.
71 Ibid.
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The turning point came a few days before the commencement
of the first non-racial democratic general election, when the IFP
announced that it would take part. This came about supposedly as
a fruitful result of mediation by a Kenyan economist, Professor
washington Jalango Okumu, who shuttled between the ANC, the
National Party and the IFP. According to Atkinson, Okumu was not
appointed to an international team but came along to help.72 He
stayed on and brokered a settlement aided by his association with
. Buthelezi. "Less than a week before the election, Buthelezi
agreed to lead the IFP into the contest in exchange for a
concession recognizing the constitutional position of the King
of the Zulus and the Kingdom of Kwazulu, which was rushed through
Parliament the next Monday, and a commitment to pursue
international mediation after the election.~3
For more than a year, Buthelezi had rejected all attempts
to lure him into the negotiation process, raising new demands
whenever agreements seemed near. Previously, before Okumu,
mediation by Henry Kissinger and Lord Carrington had failed to
persuade the IFP to change its stance and participate in the
general election. 74 By April, it seemed either that Buthelezi
wanted far more regional powers than the ANC and the then South
African government were willing to concede, or that he would not
72 D. Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle?", 1994, p.38. See also
M. Cassidy, A witness for Ever: The Dawning of Democracy in South
Africa. stories Behind the Story, London: Holder and Stoughton




join the process unless the main parties conceded that everything
they had done from at least the Record of Understanding onwards
be cancelled. ~
Apart from international mediation which offered a remedy
for the IFP to participate in the 1994 April general election,
other separate deals were made in bilateral talks between Nelson
Mandela and the King of the ZUlus;76 and between F. W. De Klerk
and the King. n These deals are also regarded as catalysts which
helped the IFP to change its stance and to agree to participate
in the April 1994 election. As will be discussed below, the deals
provided the King with many potential privileges 1n the
democratic dispensation. The IFP regarded these as a victory,
probably because the party believed that the King belongs to the
IFP. But that perception was mistaken, because these deals marked
the beginning of the erosion of the relationship between the King
and the IFP. The privileges included a new status granted the
King by Mandela and the Ingonyama Trusteeship which F.W. De Klerk
conferred on the King. These privileges gave the King the
confidence to declare his independence from any party, including
the IFP.
~ D. Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle?", 1994, p.39.
n The Sunday Nation, 10/04/1994, p.3.
n The Natal Witness, 24/05/1994.
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The status of the Zulu Monarchy and the Ingonyama Trust.
What Mandela offered the King
Although the then South African government and the ANC down-
played the issue of federalism in the various mUlti-party talks,
they became more concerned when King Goodwill Zwelithini, under
the influence of the IFP, started demanding a kingdom of KwaZulu-
Natal, an act which was interpreted by many South Africans as a
move towards secession. Nelson Mandela, iri his capacity as the
ANC leader, took the initiative to address some of the King's
fears by offering him certain privileges as part of assuring him
of his status in the democratic dispensation. The Sunday Times
reported that in the meeting that took place in Durban between
the King and Mandela, in early April 1994, Mandela handed a
memorandum to the King, which defined his status in a post-
apartheid South Africa. According to this newspaper, the
memorandum contained eight concessions. (See the Appendix.)
The new role that Mandela offered the King in the democratic
dispensation was more dignified than the status he had in the
former KwaZulu Bantustan. As already addressed in Chapter One,
the role and the status of the King in former KwaZulu was
overshadowed by Chief Buthelezi. This proposed new status was
part of reestablishing the monarchy in the democratic
dispensation, an act which the King himself welcomed. In addition
to what Mandela offered the King, amendments were made in the
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interim constitution, providing for special recognition and
protection of the Zulu monarchy in the democratic dispensation. 7s
These concessions, however, caused an outcry among other
traditional leaders and kings in South Africa.~ They demanded
that the privileges which were extended to the King of the Zulus
be extended to them as well. Patekile Holomisa, the president of
CONTRALESA was quoted by The Natal witness as saying: "it will
be scandalous if other kings and paramount chiefs are not
extended the same constitutional role in a future governmen£."w
He pointed out that CONTRALESA had been making the same demands,
but the message was, "you must have the propensity for violence
if you want your demands to be met. "SI
n See The Interim constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1993, Act No. 200 of 1993, section 160.
79 The Natal Witness of 27/03/1993 reported that there are
ten kings in South Africa. The Transkeians have five main kings,
namely, King Buyelekaye Dalindyebo of the abaThembu; King
Mpondomini Sigcau of Eastern Pondos; Nyangilize Ndamase of
Western Pondos; Xolilizeve Sigcau of Amagcaleka; Kaiser Matanzima
rules of the Western abaThembu; the Ciskeians have King
Maxhobayakhawuleza Sandile of amKharhabe; Ndebeles have two royal
families, the Mahlangas and the Mabenas; the Pedi have one, the
Sekhukhuni Royal Family; the Swazis recognizes King Mswati of
Swaziland; the Sothos have two royal families, the Mothas for the
Abatlokwa, and the Mopeli for the Abakwana; the Vendas have one,
King Thovhele Ramabulana. The Shangane royal family had been
marginalized by the authorities in the Gazankulu homeland, but
currently, there are proposals to revive it.
W The Natal Witness, 22/04/1994.
SI Ibid.
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The Ingonyama Land Trust Act
Apart from the offers by Mandela, other privileges were
given to the King by the then state president, F.W De Klerk. Two
days before the commencement of elections on 27 April 1994, De
Klerk authorised the transfer of three million hectares of land
to the custodianship of King Goodwill Zwelithini, The KwaZulu
Ingonyama Trust Act of 1994, (Act No.3 of 1994). This Act makes
the King sole trustee over all the land in the former KwaZulu
Bantustan.~
This transfer became the centre of debate in political
circles in South Africa. Reports spread that the Ingonyama Trust
was a secret deal aimed at drawing the IFP into the general
election. But this was dismissed by the then state President De
Klerk as false. The IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi also denied these
allegations, arguing that the intention of the Ingonyama Trust
was to return the land to the tribes and communities to whom it
originally belonged before it was taken away after the Zulu
conquest. 83 Buthelezi pointed out that King Goodwill is not the
owner of the land, and that it was the Zulu tradition that all
land belongs to the King, who holds it in trust for the people.
The King cannot dispose of it in terms of the Act. M
~ The Sunday Nation, 21/05/1994.
e The Natal Witness, 21/05/1994.
M Ibid.
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One of the IFP's chief negotiators, Walter Felgate, said
that the legislation pertaining to the Ingonyama Trust was an
enabling mechanism designed to secure the position of the King. 85
In a similar vein, the IFP's Velaphi Ndlovu, who was present when
the Bill transferring the land was discussed, said the deal was
neither secret nor fraudulent. On the contrary:
This was done in broad daylight and within the framework of
the law. Former President De Klerk was acceding to the
King's demand for his land and his Kingdom. 86
Velaphi Ndlovu added that:
We did not get federalism which we wanted but because we
got something more important, including an understanding
that discussions on federalism would continue. It was the
greatest achievement we ever made. We were extremely proud
that the Bill passed by the Kwazulu government was on
returning land to his majesty and the Zulu people. 87
Despite the IFP's joy at victory, the transfer of land in
terms of The Kwazulu Ingonyama Trust Act of 1994, has created a
twin power system in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The one is
hereditary, feudal and rests on patronage. The other is modern,
democratic and depends on regular election. The problem is how
~ The Natal Witness, 21/05/1994.
M The Natal Witness, 23/05/1994.
87 Ibid.
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well the two systems can work together. While this question
remains unanswered, the Trust has been hailed by the
traditionalists, because it did preserve the KwaZulu feudal
system in which chiefs derived their power from control over land
and the King was the chief of chiefs. 88 The King could have
received no better incentive to throw in his lot with the new
order.
While the ANC hotly denied89 that it had known anything
about the Trust, the IFP insisted that it did, a claim which
seems plausible. After all, a key term of the deal which ended
Buthelezi's resistance was recognition of the status of the King.
This is what the Trust assured, and it seems reasonable to
suggest that the ANC might have been prepared to give it to rid
the transition of its most serious obstacle and to prevent the
KwaZulu-Natal election from becoming a bloodbath.
The stance of the King After the April 1994 General Election.
The installation of the Government of National Unity brought
with it winds of change in the ethnic politics of KwaZulu-Natal.
A new political order developed as the King of the Zulus declared
his independence from party politics. The King wanted to resume
his role as the unifier of all the Zulu people irrespective of
their political party affiliations. This move was welcomed by the
ANC. To achieve his new role, King Goodwill replaced his former
88 D. Atkinson, "Brokering.a Miracle?," 1994 p 40, . .
6 The Natal Witness, 26/05/1994.
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KwaZulu bodyguards with members of the South African Defence
Force.~ Probably the King did this to keep himself independent
from the IFP. The crucial point here is that the Defence Force
is neutral; they do not serve any political party, but are meant
to act in the national interest.
The Mail and Guardian reported that Zwelithini was
determined to ensure that his chiefs adopted a non-partisan role
in the ANC-IFP conflict. The newspaper recounted that the King
fired the first salvo in this direction when he attended the
inauguration ceremony of a chief in Mtunzini shortly after the
April poll and voiced concern that some chiefs were abusing their
powers. 91
The Mail and Guardian revealed that, while Zwelithini had
no plan to pUblicly denounce Buthelezi, he would strip him of his
status as a traditional prime minister of the King, by excluding
him from the Royal council that he planned to form in order to
advise him on political and other issues. 92 Because Buthelezi is
a leader of a particular political party, he cannot serve in the
royal council whose objective is to unite all Zulus irrespective
of their political party's affiliations. According to The Mail





and Guardian, a senior prince~ who had played a pivotal role in
encouraging the King to break away from Buthelezi was a strong
candidate for the post of traditional prime minister.~ As
already addressed in Chapter One, Prince Mcwayizeni was the one
who had sided with King Goodwill in a power struggle which
erupted between the Royal House and Buthelezi in the early 1970s
after the death of Zwelithini's father, King cyprian Bhekuzulu
in 1969.
The King told the ANC delegation at one of their meetings
in June 1994 that he did not want to return to the tyranny and
terror he had faced for the past twenty-four years.~ By this the
King was referring to the humiliation he had suffered at the
hands of Inkatha and Buthelezi in the 1970s, when his salary was
once halved after showing a sign of acting independently. (See
Chapter One for more details).
The IFP interpreted the King's move to have been
masterminded and initiated by the ANC so as to win him into its
camp. According to The Weekly Mail and Guardian, the IFP leader,
~ Buthelezi's arch foe in the royal house is Prince
Mcwayizeni, brother of the late King Bhekuzulu, King Zwelithini' s
father, and therefore the most senior in the royal house. The
Natal witness of 14/04/1994 reported that Prince Mcwayizeni had
always resented the power Buthelezi had over the King. The Prince
and his family fled their Nongoma home fearing for their lives
after joining the ANC few years ago. According to The Natal
Witness, the ANC sources said Prince Mcwayizeni believed that he,
not Buthelezi, should be the King's senior advisor or traditional




Chief Buthelezi, questioned the King's loyalty to the Zulu
nation.% He warned that there could be a crisis if the King and
he split:
I have already spoken publicly about the ANC's attempts to
use members of the royal house to create additional
uncertainty and political difficulties in the province of
KwaZulu/Natal. The efforts to create cleavages between his
majesty and me are naive, counter productive and will
generate divisions, tensions and crisis within the Zulu
nation, rather than fostering the spirit of
reconciliation. 97
Buthelezi added that the ANC had never been willing to give
anything in terms of autonomy for KwaZulu-Natal, nor had it been
willing to recognise the unique importance of His Majesty. 98
Anything it gave was a hard fought concession to the IFP. He also
pointed out that the ANC was not willing to concede more than
they did to protect the King's status in KwaZulu-Natal.~
Probably here Buthelezi was referring to the past, because in the
democratic dispensation the status of the Zulu King was protected
and recognized by the interim constitution. In addition, other
% Ibid.




privileges were only given to the Zulu King, and not to the other
nine kings in South Africa. lOO
In June 1994, Buthelezi seized an opportunity at an IFP
victory rally at Umlazi to reveal to the people how the former
KwaZulu government had supported the King. He stated that the
KwaZulu government had spent almost R7 million on Zwelithini's
five palaces, more than R2 million to provide him with labour,
more than R500,000 to assist him in developing his farm
undertakings, and that R4 million had been spent on securing the
King's personal position. 101 Buthelezi projected himself as being
more powerful than Zwelithini, saying that he had elevated the
monarchy to a position other Zulu kings had failed to achieve. lill
He warned that if there were a showdown between him and the King,
he really had nothing to fear because it would damage the King
more than himself. loo He also pointed out that some people were
ascribing the IFP's surprisingly good performance in the April
election to King Goodwill's perceived support for the party.l~
He vehemently dismissed such reports as untrue. 105 Buthelezi
lOO See the appendix on "What Mandela offered the Zulu King."
101 The Weekly Mail and Guardian, Vol 10, No 24, June 17 to
23, 1994, p.4.
lill Ibid.
lOO The Daily News, I June 1994.
I~ Ibid.
I~ Buthelezi was dismissing the speech made by Blade
Nzimande of the ANC who was quoted by The Daily News on 16 June
1994 as saying that the success of the IFP strategy was based on
two main pillars, the first being the support it got from the
central apartheid state that bolstered the KwaZulu Bantustan.
Coupled with this was the state's covert funding of Inkatha's
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argued that the people were voting for the IFP and not for the
King.l~ Buthelezi maintained that even if the King sacked him,
he would continue to perform his duties as the King's traditional
prime minister. loo Buthelezi claimed that he was born to inherit
the post. 108
By contrast, the ANC rallied to the defence of the King,
promising to protect him in the face of Buthelezi's insults by
ensuring his rights in the national constitution, including a
guarantee that the IFP controlled KwaZulu-Natal Provincial
Legislature would not have the power to withhold his salary.IOO
The ANC made these remarks after Buthelezi's speech at an IFP
victory rally at Umlazi on 13 June 1994, where he told IFP
supporters that the budget to maintain the King would come from
the KwaZulu-Natal legislature. llo What Buthelezi was implying was
violent activities and hit squads in KwaZulu. The IFP's second
pillar was that of sUbjugating the King to its own political
agenda by threatening him with salary cuts and the like whenever
it seemed he was developing an independent agenda. Nzimande
pointed out that, by locking the King within the IFP structure,
the IFP managed to position itself as the political custodian of
the Zulu nation, and in this way secured the vote of many Zulu
people in rural areas. Nzimande added that the verbal outpourings
of Chief Buth~lezi at recent IFP rallies about the ANC creating
divisions between Buthelez i and the King were the sharpest
expressions of the IFP's fears. The IFP realized that it now had
to act as a political force without the support of its two
pillars.
11» Ibid.




110 The Natal Witness, 14/06/1994.
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that if the King breaks away from the IFP, the IFP would withhold
his salary.
In response to Buthelezi's threats, Blade Nzimande of the
ANC stated that:
We regard this as an insult to his majesty. Each time the
King is perceived by the IFP to be acting outside of its
leadership and sectarian interests, the issue of his salary
is always thrown up. We are determined not to allow a
repeat of past humiliations of the King by the IFP. l11
The response of Dumisani Makhaye of the ANC was that
Buthelezi should understand that the days when the IFP was the
only party which had access to the King were gone forever. Proud
Zulus cannot allow a situation where the King's remuneration
depended on the whims of any political leader. 112 He therefore
demanded that the status of the King and his remuneration be
constitutionally entrenched.
The preceding discussion indicates that King Zwelithini is
now trying to achieve neutrality and attempt;.ing to distance
himself from party politics. However, it appears that the IFP is
trying everything possible to maintain its control over him.
Probably the explanation for this is that without the backing of
the King, the IFP cannot fully achieve one of its original
111 The Natal Witness, 14/06/1994.
112 Ibid.
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objectives, namely, the consolidation of Zulu ethnic
consciousness. The IFP effort to woo the King to its camp is
evident in its draft constitution proposals for KwaZulu-Natal
which were released on 3rd October 1995. In order to explore
this, and other legislation which defines the status of the
institution of t"ribal authorities in post-apartheid society,
Chapter Four takes a closer look at the role of the King of the
Zulus and his tribal chiefs in the structures of democratic
government at the provincial level.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE INCORPORATION OF TRIBAL LEADERS IN THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF KWAZULU-NATAL.
The issue of the continued recognition and protection of the
institution of tribal authorities in South Africa at large was
provided for in the interim constitution as a result of
recommendations by the constitutional assembly at the mUlti-party
talks at Kempton Park. However, nothing was proposed concerning
the method of incorporation. The constitutional assembly
recommended that the procedure for incorporating the tribal
authorities in the structures of provincial government should be
devised by the premiers in consultation with the provincial
councils which were set up in all the provinces in south Africa. 1
Each province should decide the composition of a provincial House
of Traditional Leaders, depending on the number of tribal leaders
in a province. A report of the Commission on Provincial
Government showed the national distribution of tribal leaders:
the Free State has 15, Northern Province has 194, Mpumalanga has
43, North West has 73, Eastern Cape has 179 and KwaZulu-Natal has
290. 2 Besides this, the nature and the influence of tribal
authorities over their communities also differ from province to
province. In some provinces tribal leaders are more powerful and
I A, Mclntosh, "Rural Local Government Debate in south
Africa: centrist Control or Local Development", in seminar
Report: The Role of Traditional Leaders in Local Government in
south Africa, Durban: 27-28 October 1994, p.21.




more politicized than in others. In KwaZulu-Natal, tribal leaders
are active in Zulu ethnic consciousness and party politics, as
I have discussed.
The interim constitution of the Republic made provisions to
lay down legislation to provide a common ground for starting to
incorporate tribal authorities in the structures of democratic
government at all levels of government, namely, national,
provincial and local. But since each province would determine the
composition of the House of Chiefs at the provincial level, it
would be required to provide for this in its own provincial
constitution. 3
The task of formulating such legislation in the province of
KwaZulu-Natal has been controversial. Some political parties
seized an opportunity to make this issue a mobilizing strategy
for political support and recruitment. As we shall see later in
the chapter, the ANC and the IFP, the major political parties in
this province, disagree on a number of issues concerning the
status and the powers of the tribal leaders in provincial
government, particularly on the role of the King of the Zulus.
The ANC accuses the IFP of trying to maintain its power over the
King and his tribal leaders by attempting to introduce clauses
in the planned provincial constitution which infringe and
undermine the neutrality of the King and the institution of
3 The focus in this chapter is mainly on the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa and constitutions which were
written by the IFP, and the ANC in the period between 1990 and
December 1995, in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.
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tribal chiefs, under the mask of reinforcing Zulu culture and
tradition. 4 The ANC's provincial constitutional proposals for
KwaZulu-Natal maintain that the King should be above party
politics. Ironically, while the IFP accepts this, its
constitutional suggestions state clearly that the King and the
tribal authorities would have to perform their duties in
accordance with Zulu tradition and custom as laid down by the IFP
constitution. 5
The ANC's stance on the role and the status of tribal
leaders is in line with the provisions included in the national
interim constitution. The ANC promoted The Remuneration of the
Traditional Leaders Act on 27 June 1995, which was passed in
Parliament in Cape Town, with the intention of liberating tribal
authorities from party politics. 6 The IFP, however, rejected this
Act arguing that it was unconstitutional, maintaining that it was
passed on the initiative of the ANC in order to undermine the IFP
as a ruling party in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. 7 The
explanation for this is that, the IFP is the only party, apart
from the ANC, rUling a province which has the institution of
tribal authorities. Seven out of the nine provinces have tribal
authorities, the exceptions being the Western Cape and Gauteng.
4 Jacob Zuma, the leader of the ANC in the province of
KwaZulu-Natal, was quoted by The Natal Witness on 24 October
1995, in Pietermaritzburg, when he was introducing the ANC's
constitutional proposals in the provincial Parliament.
5 The Inkatha Freedom Party's Constitution, Section 49, 3
October 1995.
6 The Natal Witness, 28 June 1995.
7 The Natal Witness, 28/06/1994, 29/06/1994, and The Natal
Mercury, 29/06/1994.
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All these disagreements, accusations and counter-accusations
point to the on-going struggle between the ANC and the IFP for
political control of KwaZulu-Natal. This affects the tribal
authorities, because of the influence they have over rural
communities. But these political parties have differed over the
status and role of the institution of tribal authorities in the
province of KwaZulu Natal. With these disagreements in mind, this
chapter goes on to examine legislation which deals with the
affairs of tribal authorities in the democratic dispensation. It
argues that the IFP attempts to maintain its influence over the
King and tribal authorities in KwaZulu-Natal through provincial
constitutional measures.
Provisions Made in the Interim constitution.
The interim constitution of the Republic of South Africa
made provisions for integrating the institution of tribal
authorities in the structures of the democratic government so as
to ensure that tribal leadership is protected by law in the
democratic order. This has been hailed by Advocate Mabiletsa
because "it is for the first time that tribal leaders are
recognized in the Constitution of this country. ,,8 Mabiletsa views
this as part of increasing and strengthening the powers of the
tribal leaders in the democratic dispensation. 9
8 An address by A. Mabiletsa to the Commission on Provincial
Government on "North West Province in Establishing the House of
Traditional Leaders," Pretoria: 20-21 April 1995, p.2.
9 Ibid.
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concerning the participation of tribal authorities in the
affairs of the country at large, Chapter 11, sections 183 and 184
of The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Act
No. 200 of 1993, provides for the creation of Provincial Houses
of Traditional Leaders, and a Council of the Traditional
Authorities which will operate at national level. 10 Essentially,
the Council and the Provincial Houses will play an advisory role
in government. The Provincial Houses will advise and make
proposals to provincial government on "matters relating to
traditional authorities, indigenous law, tradition and custom."
The Council of Traditional Leaders which will consist of "a
chairperson and nineteen representatives elected by traditional
authorities in the RepUblic, ,,11 will do the same at national
level. In addition, the state President will be advised by a
Council of Traditional Leaders. 12
The intention of such arrangements is to ensure that the
Provincial House of Traditional Leaders and the Council of
Traditional Leaders are given constitutional authority, creating
a channel through which matters concerning their customs and
traditions could be discussed. While this fulfilled part of the
negotiated deal struck at Kempton Park, it was also part of the
democratization process itself. By accommodating tribal
10 Government Gazette, No.15466, Interim Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 28 January 1994.
11 Government Gazette, No. 15466, "The Interim Constitution
of the RepUblic of South Africa," Section 184 (1) 28 January,
1994.
12 Ibid, section 184 (4)(b).
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authorities in its structures, the new government afforded them
the opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes
of governance. To deny a special place to tribal authorities
might leave them embittered with the new dispensation, which
could undermine the development of democracy.
In the province of KwaZulu-Natal, the question of the
establishment of a Provincial House of Traditional Leaders is
still a contentious issue, especially between the major political
parties, the ANC and the IFP, whose views differ, especially on
the status and the role of the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini.
The IFP's constitutional Proposals.
The IFP's first proposals for the future role of tribal
leaders in democratic KwaZulu-Natal were made in 1990 in The
KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act 9 of 1990, which was
passed by the former KwaZulu Bantustan government in Ulundi.
Despite the abolition of the KwaZulu Bantustan government after
the April 1994 election, this Act remains in force now. What is
worth noting here is the timing of the IFP in passing this Act.
The IFP knew that the process for democratizing South Africa
began in 1990, and that the Bantustans looked likely to be
abolished. Yet the IFP enacted the legislation dealing with the
status and the role of the tribal authorities. This suggests that
the Act was designed to be applied in the democratic
dispensation. This also served as a new bond between the IFP and
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tribal authorities, which could be carried over to the democratic
era.
After the formation of the Government of National Unity, most
of the clauses in The Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act were
amended and adopted in The KwaZulu-Natal Act on the House of
Traditional Leaders, No.? of 1994, which came into effect on 11
November 1994. 13 Similarly, some of the clauses from The
Iziphakanyiswa Act were adopted and incorporated in the IFP's
draft constitution for KwaZulu-Natal which was released on 3rd
October 1995. Despite these adaptations and amendments The
Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act itself remains largely in place.
Several chapters in the IFP's proposed provincial
constitution deal with the future role of tribal authorities. For
instance, Chapter 13 provides for the powers, functions and
duties of the House of the Traditional Leaders in KwaZulu-Natal.
Section 59, stipulates that:
The Provincial House will advise and make proposals to the
Provincial Legislature or cabinet, and comment and make
recommendations on any legislation or proposed executive
action which may adversely affect traditional and customary
law and its autonomy in terms of this constitution, and
1994.
13
The Provincial Gazette of Kwazulu/Natal, 15 November
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shall exercise other powers and functions as they may be
provided for by the law of the Kingdom only.14
It goes on to say that the House of Traditional Leaders
might suspend, withdraw or modify the powers of any traditional
leader by a resolution of two-thirds of its members. IS By
conferring such powers on the House of Tribal Authorities, the
IFP's mooted constitution guarantees that no decision concerning
the House can be taken without its consent. Here the House would
be granted powers to object to any action in the provincial
parliament which might seem to contradict Zulu custom and
culture. This is of great importance to the IFP in that tribal
authorities would play an important role as its watchdog, in
ensuring that the provincial government perpetuates Zulu ethnic
consciousness which theIFP promulgated in the former KwaZulu
Bantustan government.
However, one aspect which the IFP failed to take into
account in its constitutional proposal is that, although most
tribal leaders are aligned to it, their position in the
democratic dispensation is also protected by the constitution of
the Republic. Unlike in the former Bantustan, in the new
provincial parliament tribal authorities would be able to take
14 The Provincial Gazette of KwaZulu-Natal, "KwaZulu-Natal
Act on the House of Traditional Leaders," No.? of 1994, section
4 (1), Assented to on 1994/11/11. See also, Inkatha Freedom
Party « constitutional Committee of Provincial Legislation of
Natal, Chapter 13, section 59, 3 October, 1995, p.42.
15 Inkatha Freedom Party« constitutional committee of the
Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal, Chapter 13, Section 59,
3 October, 1995, p.42.
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decisions regarding their customs and traditions without the
interference of political parties.
On the protection of the institution of tribal authorities,
the IFP' s constitutional proposals state that "the area of
autonomy of traditional leaders as the administrators and primary
local government of their respective communities in terms of
indigenous and customary law shall be guaranteed and
protected. ,,16 Perhaps this protection is meant to ensure that
tribal leaders remain under the influence of the IFP's ideology.
Furthermore, one could argue that the IFP is here trying to
appease and at the same time to insulate tribal leaders from
other political parties, probably because the IFP knows that
should its opponents win the favour of the tribal chiefs in
KwaZulu-Natal, its support in this province could be seriously
weakened. In fact, rural areas are seen in particular by the ANC
and the IFP alike as pools where they could recruit and mobilize
political support, since this is where the majority of the people
live. To achieve this, the political parties need allies or
agents, effectively tribal authorities in the rural setting.
It can equally be argued that the IFP's proposals are not
totally different from the provisions which appear in the interim
constitution. Just as in the interim constitution, the IFP's
constitutional suggestions confine the duties of the tribal
authorities to issues dealing with customs, culture and




tribal authorities on the grounds that they can be useful in
supplying much needed expert advice on tribal matters. similarly,
the interim constitution determined that the House of Traditional
Leaders in the provinces should serve a merely advisory capacity
so that they could not block important decisions, but would
facilitate the democratization process in policy-making. 17
However, the IFP constitutional proposals mentioned nothing
about whether tribal leaders could take part in party politics.
Perhaps the IFP is silent on this issue because it knows that
barring tribal leaders from participating in politics could be
very problematic to the IFP itself, simply because chiefs
constitute the backbone of the party. For instance, Chief
Buthelezi, the IFP leader, is himself a tribal leader, and most
people who hold senior positions in the IFP, such as Nyanga
Ngubane, Member of Executive Council (MEC) for Traditional
Affairs in KwaZulu-Natal, to mention but one, are themselves
tribal leaders.
The Inkatha Freedom Party's constitutional plan states that
the members of the provincial House of Traditional Leaders should
consist of three representatives from each of the regional
authorities. 18 The report of the Commission on Provincial
17 The Constitution of the Republic of south Africa, 1993,
Act 200 of 1993, Chapter 11, section 184 (5) (c) (d).
Inkatha Freedom Party's Constitution, Chapter 13, 3
October, 1995, p.41. See also section 5 (1) (a) of The Amakhosi
and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990. The terms in The KwaZulu Amakhosi
and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 are similar to those in The
KwaZulu-Natal Act on the House of Traditional Leaders, No.7-of
1994. In other words, a change of name is the only difference
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Government notes that currently there are two hundred and ninety
tribal authorities in this province, which are divided into
twenty-four regional authorities. 19 In addition, there are eight
community authorities. 20 The Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of
1994 mentions that "representatives shall be elected by the
members of the regional authori ties, 1121 and that such
21
"representatives shall hold office for a period of five years and
shall be eligible for re-election. 1122 The Provincial House of the
Traditional Leaders would consist of eighty members. 23 However,
the IFP's constitutional provisions mention nothing about
representation of the monarchy in the House. According to The
Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990, the House will also include one
person nominated by the Ingonyama (the King of the Zulus) .24
The IFP's constitutional plan says nothing about where the
capital of KwaZulu-Natal should be located. The Iziphakanyiswa
Act of 1990 previously indicated that lithe House of Traditional
Leaders shall meet at Ulundi, unless the chairperson of the House
here.
19 Annexure A, "Document for the use of the Chairman of the
Commission on Provincial Government, Mr. T. Botha," October 1994,
p. 9.
~O Ibid.
Section 5 (2) (a)
n Section 5 (2) (c)
23 Inkatha Freedom Party Constitution, Chapter 13, 3 October,
1995, p.42.
~ Section 5 (1) (d).
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directs otherwis~."~ However, for the time being, the IFP has
omitted this feature from its proposals.
According to the provisions made in the Iziphakanyiswa Act,
"there shall be an ordinary meeting of the House at least once
every year during a session of the provincial parliament. "26 The
House of Traditional Leaders will have its session wherever the
provincial parliament sits, either in Pietermaritzburg or in
Ulundi. The House of Traditional Leaders will be required to sit
in parliament so as to be involved in decision-making on issues
concerning their traditions and customs. This would apparently
serve the cause of democracy.
On the role and status of King Goodwill Zwelithini of the
Zulus, the IFP has proposed establishing a constitutional
monarchy as its form of government to be modelled after
democratic and pluralistic constitutional monarchies which exist
under a rigid constitution that define and regulate the powers
of the monarch. v The King would be the leader of the province
of KwaZulu-Natal, but not the head of government. The provincial
head of government would be the premier. On this issue, the IFP's
constitutional proposals further specify that:
25 The Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act, Act 9 of 1990.
26 KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act, Act 9 of 1990.
v Inkatha Freedom Party's Constitution, "Constitution
Committee of the Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal," 3
October, 1995, p.3.
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The King of the Zulu nation shall reign but not govern,
shall be above party politics and shall perform no
executive action. As a rule the King's actions shall be
countersigned by a competent Minister who will bear the
relevant responsibility.28
Probably it is due to this clause that the ANC accuses the IFP
of trying to maintain its power over the King. with the King
always having to seek the approval of ministers, his independence
would be undermined. The question is, from which party will
these ministers come? The ANC would be unlikely to accept IFP
ministers having this power over the monarchy, nor would the IFP
tolerate this going to the ANC. Although the IFP's constitutional
plan did not specify what it meant by a competent minister, it
could even mean this to be the King's traditional prime minister,
who happens to be Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. All in all, this clause
suggests that the IFP is trying its best to maintain its power
over the King.
The IFP's constitutional proposals note that lithe King shall
exercise his powers with the assistance of the Royal Council and
of the Premier. 1129 The Royal Council would consist of twenty
members, ten appointed by the House of Traditional Leaders
including the Chairman of that House, six appointed by the King




is to advise and assist the King on all matters relating to his
functions, status and role in the province. w
Furthermore, "the King shall not participate in political
activities, or express alignment with any given political party,
nor shall support or antagonise any political issue being debated
in Parliament or in the media. "31 How the King would achieve
neutrality remains to be seen, because in the former KwaZulu he
failed to do so, despite the provisions made in the constitution
of the KwaZulu Bantustan government.
The IFP's constitutional plan stipulates that lithe King
shall recognize the Traditional Prime Minister."D However, the
issue of the traditional prime minister is problematic, because
the IFP regards Chief Buthelezi as this person, while the King
himself says that the post does not exist. 33 In the KwaZulu
Bantustan government, Buthelezi was indeed the King's traditional
prime minister, but due to developments which took place in Zulu
ethnic politics after the abolition of the Bantustans, it appears
that the King does not want Chief Buthelezi to be his traditional
30 Inkatha Freedom Party« Constitutional Committee of the
Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal, 3 October, 1995, p.4.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Prince S'fiso Zulu, the spokesman of the King, was quoted
by The Sunday Nation in June 1994 as saying that the position of
the traditional prime minister does not exist in the Zulu
monarchy. Zulu said so in response to Buthelezi's claim at the
IFP's victory rally at Umlazi on 6 June 1994 that he was born to
inherit the position of the Zulu traditional prime minister which
the Buthelezi family has always supposedly held.
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prime minister any longer. It seems, therefore, that the IFP has
included this provision to ensure that Buthelezi carries on
occupying this traditional post, so as to continue being able to
influence the King in decision-making regarding the Zulu nation.
In addition, Chief Buthelezi was elected chairperson of the House
of Traditional Leaders in the province of KwaZulu-Natal by the
majority of the IFP aligned tribal leaders. Perhaps this was done
intentionally to keep Buthelezi close to the King, who will be
the head of the House of Traditional Leaders despite the rift
which developed between the King and Buthelezi. Although he is
currently Minister of Home Affairs in the central government,
Buthelezi will continue to influence and play a prominent
political role in a province as well, in his capacity as a
traditional leader.
other specific executive powers of the King according to the
IFP's constitution proposals include: summoning and dissolving
parliament; declaring, with the approval of parliament, a state
of emergency in the Kingdom.~ The IFP constitution also
stipulates that "the King shall have the power to exercise and
perform all other functions as may be conferred upon or assigned
~ The IFP is referring the province of KwaZulu-Natal as the
Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal, probably because only the King of the
Zulus is recognized by the national constitution as the
constitutional monarchy of KwaZulu-Natal. Provisions for such
recognition were made in the interim Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, Section 160. However, apart
from this fact, the IFP is using the term 'kingdom' in line with
its ambitions for a federal state.
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to him in terms of this Constitution or law of the Kingdom
only. 1135
The IFP' s constitutional proposals seek to empower the
Member of Executive Council for Traditional Affairs, in
consultation with the provincial Cabinet, to suspend from office
any tribal leader who becomes a member of or participates in an
organization whose objectives are subversive or prejudicial to
the government of KwaZulu-Natal, or to law and order. 36 This
provision undermines the power of the King. Chiefs are installed
by the King, and in so doing they owe their allegiance to him.
Consequently, the King, not a member of a political party, is the
one who should take the responsibility for punishing or
suspending chiefs from office whenever they contravened customary
law. It is this sort of limitation which inhibits tribal leaders
in KwaZulu-Natalfrom belonging to other organizations such as
CONTRALESA for fear that they would contravene the wishes of the
IFP. This may also explain why only twenty-five tribal leaders
out of 290 in KwaZulu-Natal belong to CONTRALESA. 37 The IFP also
discourages chiefs from becoming members of the ANC.
35 Inkatha Freedom Party, Constitutional Committee of the
Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal, 3 October, 1995, pp. 4-5.
36 Inkatha Freedom Party, Constitutional Committee of the
Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal, 3 October, 1995.
n Sunday Nation, September, 1994.
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other Constitutional Proposals.
The ANC's draft constitution for KwaZulu-Natal, which was
released on 23 October 1995, allows the King to be the
traditional monarch and ceremonial functionary of the province. 38
This suggests that the King would be the ruler but not the head
of the provincial government. This provision is similar to that
of the IFP. However, the difference lies in that the ANC proposed
that the King would be allowed to appoint his own royal council,
no member of whom would occupy party political office. 39 The
monarch, as head of the traditional leader, would install all the
amakhosi in the province, and, in consultation with his council,
would be the final arbitrator of disputes of a cultural nature
among the amakhosi. 40 The monarch would preside over the House
of Traditional Leaders. 41 The ANC maintains that the King should
be beyond the reach of party politics, thus making him
independent, and allowing him to be a unifier of the Zulu
nation. 42 Judging from these provisions, it is clear that the ANC
has no intention of monopolizing the status of the King or





42 Blade Nzimande, an ANC Member of Parliament in Cape Town
and Dumisani Makhaye of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal emphasized the
importance of the independence of the King, that no political
party should interfere with his position as the unifier of the
Zulu nation. The Natal Witness, 14/04/1994. (And see the latter
part of Chapter Three.)
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maintaining its power over him. Unlike the IFP, the ANC seeks to
elevate the king above party politics.
other political parties in the province also have views
concerning the status of the King in the provincial government.
To a large extent, it appears that there is consensus among them
on a number of these issues, including the fact that the King
must be politically neutral. Speaking in the constitutional
debate in the provincial parliament in Pietermaritzburg on the
14 December 1995, Minority Front leader Rajbansi pointed out
that the King should be King of the entire area of KwaZulu-
Natal.~ Echoing this was the Pan-African Congress, Member of
Parliament in the province, Alex Mkhwanazi, who pointed out that
the King should be King of KwaZulu-Natal and not of an ethnic
group.~ However, Wessel Nel of the Democratic Party in KwaZulu-
Natal said that his party does not agree that the King should be
tied to the land. He said this could lead to political
manipulation of what is essentially a cultural role. 45
On the role aRd function of the tribal authorities at the
provincial government level, the ANC's proposals do not differ
much from those of the IFP, in that the tribal authorities would
be limited only to issues dealing with traditions, customs and
43 I gathered this information from the Constitutional
Committee discussions which took place in the provincial




culture. This role has already been specified in the interim
constitution, which the ANC played a major part in composing.
Remuneration of Tribal Authorities.
The remuneration of tribal leaders is another contentious
issue in the provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal. The interim
constitution left all matters concerning tribal leaders in the
hands of the premiers of the respective provinces. However, on
27 June 1995 a Bill was passed in Parliament in Cape Town,
allocating responsibility for remunerating tribal leaders to the
central government.% This Act. was supported by the ANC and the
National Party, while the IFP, the Democratic Party and the
Freedom Front abstained from voting. 47
The Bill was proposed at the initiative of President Nelson
Mandela, on the basis that it would enable the remuneration of
tribal authorities to be uniform in all the provinces. It would
also apparently liberate tribal authorities from exploitation,
. manipulation and abuse at the hands of some provincial
politicians who use remuneration as a means of securing loyalty
from tribal leaders for political gain. 48 Although no reference






This was the argument that the state President, Nelson
put forward to back the remuneration of the traditional
Bill. I obtained this information from Radio South
PM show, in June 1995.
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was made, the state President could have been referring to the
past experience of KwaZulu.
From the IFP' s point of view, the Act was bulldozed49
through central parliament by the ANC-Ied government, aimed at
undermining the powers of the provinces in this country. 50 The
IFP's argument is based on the fact that Chapter 11 of the
interim constitution assigned all the responsibilities concerning
tribal matters to the provincial premiers acting in consultation
with the provincial committees which were set up in each
province. The IFP, therefore, feels that responsibility for
remunerating tribal authorities should lie with the provinces,
and not with central government. The IFP challenged this Act in
the Constitutional Court. However, the Act still remains in
effect.
The validity of the IFP argument was spelt out by Koos van
der Merwe, an IFP Member of Parliament in Cape Town, who pointed
out that the interim constitution specifically stated that any
Bill which concerns tribal authorities passed in one chamber of
the central legislature should be referred to the Council of
Traditional Leaders before being approved by the other chamber. 51
o The IFP argued that the Bill was brought to Parliament
without proper consultation. This is why the party felt that the
Bill was bulldozed through Parliament by the ANC.
~ The Natal Mercury, 28/06/1995.
51 Koos van Merwe was quoted by The Natal Witness on
28/06/1995 and The Natal Mercury on 29/06/1995. His argument is
centred on provisions made in The Constitution of the Republic
of s~uth Africa, 1993, Act No.200, 1993, particularly Chapter 11,
Sect10n 184 (5) (a).
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After the approval of the Bill dealing with the remuneration of
tribal leaders on 27 June 1995, by the lower chamber, it should
have gone to the Council of Traditional Leaders before passing
into law. 52 From the legal point of view, Van der Merwe' s
argument is indeed right. Nevertheless, the problem was that
while legislation to create a Council of Traditional --Leaders is
in place, the Council itself does not exist. This explains why
the IFP pointed out that the Bill was unconstitutional and vowed
to challenge it in the Constitutional Court for the province's
right to pay and regulate tribal leaders.
The struggle for control of the institution of the tribal
authorities between the ANC and the IFP shows no sign of cooling
down. In July 1995, The Mail and Guardian reported that the IFP
launched the first legislative waves of its controversial "twenty
point autonomy bid,,53, with two provincial Bills preventing
KwaZulu-Natal tribal leaders from accepting central government
payment in terms of the Remuneration of Traditional Leaders
Act.~ These Bills were approved by the IFP-dominated provincial
cabinet amid fierce opposition from the ANC. 55 Restricting the
King from any source of pUblic allowance other than the
~
provincial government, the two Bills represent amendments to two
~ The Natal Mercury, 29/06/1995.
53 Media reports had it that the IFP has prepared a document
known as a "20 point plan", which is intended to give the
province of KwaZulu-Natal more powers than those granted by the
central government.
Mail and Guardian, July 21 to 27 1995, p.13.
55 The Mail and Guardian, July 21 and 27 1995, p. 13.
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Acts56 of the former KwaZulu government, which themselves
enshrined a system of control over traditional leaders. What this
meant is that the IFP attempted to carry over to the democratic
dispensation some of the policies it implemented in the former
KwaZulu Bantustan. This is why The Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa
Act of the former KwaZulu was adopted in the democratic KwaZulu-
Natal.
As to prohibiting the central government from paying the
King, section 48 of the IFP I s constitutional proposals which were
released on 3 October 1995, indicates that "the King and his
Royal Household shall have a budget for the maintenance of his
family and Household to be approved by a law of the Kingdom and
shall be assisted in administering such budget by an Royal
auditor appointed by Parliament. ,,57 Complementing this provision
is section 14 of the KwaZulu-Natal Act on the House of
Traditional Leaders, Act No.? of 1994, which empowers Inkosi
Nyanga Ngubane, Member of Executive Council (MEC) for Traditional
Affairs to suspend from office any tribal leader suspected of
accepting any unauthorised payment and to be fined up to R500. 58
since King Goodwill is also the chief of the Usuthu tribe, he
could face this penalty were he to transgress this law. Maybe
this explains why President Mandela proposed the Remuneration of
56 These acts are amendments of the Sections of The KwaZulu
Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act, 1990.
57 Inkatha Freedom Party, Constitutional Committee of
Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal, 3 October, 1995.
58 KwaZulu-Natal Act on the House of Traditional Leaders,
No.? of 1994. (assented to on 1994/11/11)
133
Tribal Leaders Act of 1995, so as to preserve the respect and
status of the King. It does not make sense, for an inkosi who is
a subordinate of the King, to remunerate the King himself.
When asked to comment on the issue of remuneration, Mike
stanleys, in his capacity as a Director of the Department of
Local government in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, stationed in
Pietermaritzburg, told me that his department had received
submissions from individuals as well as organizations, and that
all these had shown a significant preoccupation with the position
of the Zulu King ~ 59 According to Stanleys, some proposed that the
King should control the salaries of the traditional leaders,
whereas others favoured placing him on the central government
payroll. 6O Probably those who suggested that the King should
control the remuneration of tribal leaders, did so bearing in
mind that the king is the chief of all chiefs and that its
logical for him to take that responsibility. Worth noting here,
is that while different people and different organizations came
up with various opinions concerning the remuneration of the. King
and his tribal leaders, no one objected to the prqposal that
tribal leaders be remunerated. The disagreement is about who
should remunerate them, the central or the provincial government.
The belief that both the King and other traditional leaders
should be above party politics was widespread among those who





made submissions on the issue. 61 As to the overall role of the
King, Stanleys stated that his Department had received proposals
ranging from conferring powers on the King to advise the state
president on cultural matters, to those granting the King a role
in demarcating "tribal" boundaries, in addition to the powers he
had at present.~
From the preceding discussion, one can observe that the
intermingling of broader political issues with those concerning
tribal authorities makes the integration of this institution in
the structures of the provincial government difficult. The
legislation providing for this already exists, but political
differences between the ANC and the IFP about the institution of
chiefly rule complicate the whole incorporation process. Although
the IFP and the ANC resolved some of their differences so as to
allow the local government general elections to take place in
KwaZulu-Natal, no proper solution was reached concerning the
position of tribal authorities, particularly in the structures
of democratically elected local governments. This leaves the
tribal leaders themselves awkwardly placed. Even so, the other
problem is that the tribal leaders themselves have failed to come
up with better proposals regarding their plight, because some are
aligned with the IFP and some with the ANC.
61 Interview with Mike Stanleys, 12 December
Pietermaritzburg.
1995,
62 Interview with Mile Stanleys, 12 December 1995,
Pietermaritzburg.
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Unresolved issues such who should pay the traditional
leaders, and the specific role that tribal authorities will play
in elected local government structures, have retarded the
beginning of the implementation of the development programmes.
Moreover, it was such disagreements which prevented the first
democratic local government elections from taking place on time
in KwaZulu-Natal in November 1995.
It should also be acknowledged that proposing that tribal
leaders be non-aligned will continue to be.problematic, because
the leadership of the IFP is dominated by the tribal leaders
themselves. It is, therefore, pointless to continue pressing this
issue. Probably it should be dropped altogether. Moreover, each
of the. major parties does enjoy the support of some tribal
leaders in KwaZulu-Natal.
While these problems still remain, the interim constitution
did stipulate some mechanisms for integrating the institution
of chieftaincy in the structures of new local government. Other
legislation '·Jas also passed dealing with this matter. It is,
thus, proper that Chapter Five moves on to examine the role and
status of tribal authorities at the local level.
136
CHAPTER FIVE
THE ROLE OF TRIBAL AUTHORITIES IN THE NEW SYSTEM OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT.
During the mUlti-party negotiations at Kempton Park, delegates
agreed that the institution of tribal authorities would be
incorporated in all levels of the democratic government,
national, provincial and local. But a major problem existed at
the local level. During the era of apartheid, the former KwaZulu
Bantustan government conferred the function of local government
on tribal authorities. But this hung in the balance after the
abolition of the Bantustan government and its inclusion in a
democratic, unified South Africa. Nevertheless, the structures
of tribal local authorities continued to operate.
Provisions were included in the interim constitution to~.
recognise and protect the tribal authorities in South Africa. But
there is no specification of what role tribal authorities should
play at the local level, except by making reference to other
applicable laws. For instance, Section 182 of the interim
constitution indicates that "the tribal leader of a community
observing a system of indigenous law and residing on land within
the area of jurisdiction of an elected local government, shall
ex-officio be entitled to be a member of that local government,
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and shall be eligible to be elected to any office of such local
government. ,,1
. /7
The failure of the interim constitution to?~arify the role ~
of tribal authorities in a democratically elected local
government begs the question as to how well these different *
existing forms of local authorities will work together. Does it
mean that we shall have two types of local government structures
running concurrently, with tribal local authorities under chiefs
serving as ex-officio members in the democratically elected local.
government, while at the same time continuing to run their tribal
local authorities? Or are we going to have two distinct types of
local governments in rural areas, each with its own
responsibilities, for example, a democratically elected local
government delivering services, and traditional and customary
matters left to tribal local authorities?
To assess these questions, the first section of this chapter
begins by examining legislation dealing with the new local
government.- The second investigates the structures of the new
local government. It also examines the role of chiefs in these
particularly with regard to sensitive issues such as land
allocation" and management. The final section takes a closer look
at the role of the tribal authorities in local administration,
focusing especially on the implementation of development
programmes in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal.
1 Government Gazette, No. 15466, The Constitution of the
Repu~lic of South Africa, 1993, Act No. 200, 1993, Chapter 11,
Sectlon 182, 28 January, 1994.
Legislation Dealing with the New Local Government.
One of the pieces of major legislation which was designed/
to provide guidance for restructuring local government was The
Local Government Transition Act, Act No. 209 of 1993. This was
promulgated to provide rules for restructuring in the interim
dispensation until a final system Qf local government is
devised. 2 The Act came about as a result of the deliberations of
the Local Government Negotiation Forum (LGNF) that took place
against the backdrop of the national multi-party negotiations at
Kempton Park. 3
The Act was intended to deal in a phased manner with ,~-
restructuring local government throughout South Africa. The
reason for the restructuring was that the previous system was
based on the practice of apartheid rule. 4 To correct past
imbalances, the new South African government moved towards
implementing a system where communities would be governed at a
local level on a democratically elected and non-racial basis,
aiming at an equitable sharing of municipal resources, and the
2 Government Gazette, No.15468, l.ocal Government Transition
Act, 1993, Act No. 209, 1993, assented to on 2 February 1994.
3 M. Francis, "Document 4," "Legal Situation," in M.
Francis, D. Irvine, and C. Seethal, Investigation into
Metropolitan/non-Metropolitan Forms of Local Government for the
Greater Pietermaritzburg Area, Resource Document, 15 July 1994.
4 Government Gazette, No.15468, Local Government Transition
Act, 1993, Act No.209, 1993.
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development of integrated communities, both economically and
socially.5
The principles underlying the Local Government Transition
Act are entrenched in The constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993). The Act extends the
provisions made in the interim constitution, in that it deals
primarily with the transformation of the third tier of
government, while the constitution concentrates mainly on central
and provincial government. Among other things, section 8 of the
Local Government Transition Act provides for the demarcation of
the area of jurisdiction of various transitional councils. The
Act envisages that the boundaries will be considered by a
Demarcation Board, which will make recommendations to the Member
of Executive Council (MEC) responsible for local government. 6
These recommendations are, however, not final, as the Act further
provides that the affected transitional council can also appeal
to the MEC. 7 And any action taken by the MEC must be with the
agreement of the Provincial committee for Local Government (the
PCLG) 8.
The main problem with this Act, however, is that it does not
make any specific distinction between urban and rural areas. Its
provisions provide sufficient evidence that it was designed for
5 Ibid.
6 Local Government Transition Act, 1993, Act No.209, 1993.
7 Section 8(2) read with section 11 of the Act.
8 Section 3 and 4.
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urban areas and that it cannot work if applied to rural areas. 9
Many rural areas do not have local authority structures or non-
statutory bodies, both of which are key elements in the
transitional phase.
When asked to comment on the exclusion of the tribal areas \ //
in the Act, the Director of the Department of Local Government
in KwaZulu-Natal, Mike Stanleys, maintained that tribal
authorities are not local governments per se, and that when the
Act was passed, the central government had not declared these
authorities to be local government bodies. IQ Stanleys pointed out
that "this is why, until now, tribal authorities and tribal land
do not form part of the area of jurisdiction of mUltiple local
government. ,,11 Stanleys acknowledged frankly that the issue of
incorporating tribal authorities is proving to be a delicate one.
since the restructuring of local government was only in an
interim phase,12 his department noted that it was not necessary,
or advisable, to force the issue of incorporating any tribal area
9 Local Government Transition Act, 1993, Schedule 7,




interview, 12 December 1995,
12 The process of restructuring local government was divided
between three phases, the pre-interim, interim phases, and the
period after the new constitution come into effect. The pre-
interim phase was the time between the period when The Local
Government Transition Act, 1993, was passed until when the first
general local elections took place in 1994. The interim phase is
the period from the end of 1994 until when the new constitution
comes into effect, in 1996.
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against its wishes. 13 Worth noting here is that in the democratic '"
dispensation, tribal authorities are not regarded as organs of
local government, but they will be included in the structures of
the democratically elected structures of local government in an
ex-officio capacity.
The Establishment of the New Local Government.
Mike Stanleys identif ied three current types of local;<
government in the province of KwaZulu-Natal: namely, a
metropolitan local government (urban areas); village/municipal
councils (townships, for example, greater Edendale, Sobantu and
KwaMevana); and traditional authorities (rural areas) .14 However,
village or municipal councils and traditional authorities are not
local governments in the true sense. In the former KwaZulu areas,
the amakhosi were appointed by the KwaZulu government, and the
tribal authorities and regional authorities had very limited
capacity to implement their development and administrative
decisions. 15 These powers lay with the departments of the KwaZulu
government. In settlement (townships) areas such as Edendale and
Sobantu, the Natal Provincial Administration had been the









fully operational local governments in these areas would,
therefore, be a new experience. J7
In 1993 a report of the Transition Executive Council SUb-~
committee on Regional and Local Government and Traditional
Authorities stated that the establishment of local governments
would begin with the establishment of district councils in
different rural areas. 18 These councils are meant to consolidate
a wide range of different rural local authorities from areas such
as commercial farms, rural settlements, communal lands, and small
rural towns .19 The objective of the district councils would be
to bring together the poorest local areas with wealthier ones.
It would also allow for better planning and provision of
services, and could ensure that people in areas with no effective
local government get basic services such as water and
education. 20
Below the district council would be a wide range of local
authorities, from large municipalities to small local
authorities. In areas where there are no viable local authority
J7 Ibid.
18 Rural Local Government In South Africa« policy Proposals
for the Structures and Functioning of Rural Local Government
During the Transition and Final Phase of Local Government




structures, the report indicates that village committees21 or
management boards would be established. Village committees would
provide for formal representation of local interests but would
not be expected to provide services. Instead, management boards
would take on more service delivery and over time become fully
fledged local governments. n




the newly established district councils will utilize local
government structures that are already operating, namely, the
Regional Service Councils (RSCs) and the Joint Service Boards
(JSBS).n The reason here is that these structures are
21 On issues concerning village committees, my interview
with the chiefs of Vulindlela district revealed that these
committees were ordinarily established to pursue some common
interest. They were established at regional authority level, at
tribal authority level and at ward level by an inkosi or induna.
The establishment of a committee required the approval of the
tribal authorities. Village committees normally had a specific
focus, for instance, education, water, etc. Nominations for such
committees were normally made by members of the community who
also had the opportunity to reject nominations. Village
committees were ordinarily led by a chair approved by the inkosi
or induna and were given the role of advising on policy as well
as carrying out certain tasks. In large part, these committees
were autonomous enough to carry out functions by themselves with
a degree of reporting back to the traditional authorities at
various times. In essence they make proposals to the inkosi or
induna who must in consultation with councillors ratify or reject
the committee's proposal. Interview with Chiefs, N. Zondi, S.
Zondi and V.A Ngcobo of Vulindlela district, 14 August 1994,
Pietermaritzburg.
n "Interim Local Government," Proposal One, NRDF
Information Park on Rural Local Government, December, 1993, p.3.
23 RSCs and JSBs are the structures through which services
have been channelled to rural local governments. Both RSCs and
JSBs impose levies and provide services in demarcated areas
across the country. The difference between them is that JSBs are
specific to Natal, although they serve the same purpose as the
RSC~. T~e R~Cs and th7 JSBS are effectively money gathering and
red1str1but1ng agenc1es. The RSCs were constituted by The
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considerably experienced in local government duties, and they
will provide the starting point in delivering services. The
Regional Service councils will be democratized and serve as
interim district level councils. 24 The proposal to transform
Regional Service Councils and the Joint service Boards into
interim local government structures at district level gained
support from a wide range of actors, including the Transition
Executive Council Working Group on Rural Local Government and the
Management committee.of the Local Government Negotiating Forum. 25
Mike Stanleys, Director of the Department of Local Government
in the province of KwaZulu-Natal appears to share the same view.
Transitional Local Councils (hereafter TLCs) have been created.
Reaional Services councils Act (No. 109 of 1985). The JSBs were
created as part of the agreement reached by the Kwazulu/Natal
Indaba in 1986.
~ The reason for adopting these structures is that RSCs and
JSBs provide a ready-made pool of resources and expertise. Where
RSCs and JSBs do not exist (such as in former homeland
territories) district councils could be set up along similar
lines. This arrangement (the Sub-Committee of the Sub-Council
believes) will provide for a fair distribution of wealth as
opposed to the random establishment of new Service councils in
those areas where there is not a great pool of resources. This
option (it is believed) can also serve to allay the fears of
employees and even accommodate employees from elsewhere, (ie,
former self-governing territories and Transkei, Bophuthatswana,
Venda, and Ciskei), provide continuity and could even avoid
disruption which might ensue in attempting to enact new
legislation in a short period of time. Annexure A, "Discussion
Document on Rural Local Government." October, 1994, p.5.
25 "Restructuring RSCs and JSBs Into Interim District
councils", Proposal Two, NRDF Information Pack on Rural Local
Government, December, 1993, p.4.
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These bring together urban areas with underdeveloped areas. 26 one.( /
good example of this is Pietermaritzburg-Msunduzi Transitional
Local Council, which brought together the Pietermaritzburg City
council, Vulindlela district and some areas of Mpumalanga
district. The objective of the Transition Local Council (TLC) is
to enable the rich and developed areas to assist in uplifting
poor and underdeveloped rural parts.
Legal opinion suggests that including tribal authorities in
a TLC is possible. According to The Local Government Transition
Act, provision was made specifically for the incorporation of
such authorities. v In terms of the South African interim
constitution, the following two key points emerge regarding
traditional authorities in local government bodies, namely that:
Amakhosi will have ex-officio positions on the ,--local ,-
authori ty. 28
The traditional authorities will retain their traditional
functions and powers unless they are amended by a
"competent authority" .29
Although the exact nature of the powers and functions of the 't----?)
...>-)
amakhosi and the tribal authorities was not specified in the
1995,December12interview,U Mike Stanleys,
Pietermaritzburg.
27 The Local Government Transition Act, Section 8 (i) (a) .
28 Clause 182 of the Constitution.
29 Section 181 of Interim Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa.
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constitution or the Act, Stanleys suggested that it might be
1995.
possible to draw reference from The Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa
Act. 30 Besides this, he emphasized that the implications from a
legal as well as an administrative perspective of including
tribal authorities in a TLC need to be explored more fully.31
Experience shows that when attempting to integrate a modern ~
/7
urban system of local government with a rural traditional based
system, many complex unresolved issues emerge. Central among
these is control of settlement and development. Traditional
functions associated with the Inkosi and the tribal authorities
are land allocation and land management. Any significant erosion
of these powers would undermine one of the key bases of authority
of the Amakhosi. By contrast, settlement and development are ~
controlled in urban areas by a town planning scheme and by-
laws. 32 Therefore, Francis argues that the introduction of this
formal system to traditional society would be inappropriate and
could only be implemented with substantial adaption. In his view,
it is possible to envisage land-use plans being prepared for
tribal areas, but a key question is how the legal and traditional
responsibilities would be allocated between the traditional
30 Ibid.
31 Mike Stanleys, interview, Pietermaritzburg, 12 December,
32 M Francis, "status Quo of Local Government in the Greater
Pietermaritzburg," in M. Francis, D. Irvine and C Seethal,
Investigation into Metropolitan/Non-Metropolitan Forms of Local
G~vernmen~ for the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area,
Pletermarltzburg: Integrated Planning Services, 15 July 1994,
p.27.
authority and the TLC. 33 Then there would in effect be two
recognized authorities operating in the same area at the same
level controlling settlement. consequently, difficulties would
no doubt arise.~
Another issue which could cause great concern is rating.X~-
According to Francis, an absence of individual registered land
tenure in rural areas and a lack of experience in paying rates
or any form of similar taxation35 would mean that it would be
impossible to introduce a formal urban rating system in rural
tribal areas. 36 Any new taxation system which is not linked
directly to the consumption of services or to payment of a tribal
levy would probably face strong resistance from tribal
authorities
sensitively.37
unless carefully structured and introduced
JUdging from this, one could see that the problem of rating
would be unique to the transitional councils in KwaZulu-Natal,
as this is the only province in which the land of all the tribes
is vested in a trust, the Ingonyama Trust. 38 As Chapter Three
33 Ibid, p. 27.
~ Ibid.
35 A tribal levy is payable in tribal areas.
36 M. Francis, "status Quo of Local Government in the Greater
Pietermaritzburg Area," in M. Francis, D. Irvine and C. Seethal
Investigation into Metropolitan/Non-Metropolitan Forms of Local
Government for the Greater Pietermaritzburg, 15 July 1994, p.28.
37 Ibid.
B Ingonyama Trust Act, Act No.) of 1994.
148
indicated, 93 per cent of the tribal land is controlled by the
Trust. The beneficiaries of the Trust are the relevant"tribe or
community ,39 and the only trustee is the King of the Zulus. 40
~This suggests that the land cannot be leased or alienated in any
way without the prior written consent of the affected traditional
authority.41 As none of the tribal land is privately owned, the
rating of the communally owned land will be problematic in a
metropolitan context. Should the community pay the rates, or is
it the responsibility of the trust? The rendering of, and payment
for, services is a further complication. This will be so because
"none of the affected tribal areas has been subdivided. ,,42
Therefore, no individual sites have been demarcated. 43
One suggestion is that rural local governments which will~
not be included in the TLCs could take the form of a two-tier
system, comprising the Service councils (RSCsjJSCs) on the one
level, and rural local authorities and traditional authorities
on the other.~ Concerning the first tier of rural local
government, it is envisaged that within a province this division
of local government would be constituted as follows:
39 Ingonyama Trust Act, Act No.3 of 1994, Section 2(2).
40 section 2 (3) .




interview, 12 December 1995,
~ Annexure A, Discussion Document on Rural Local Government,
October, 1994, p.3.
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The whole area of the Service Council would be covered by
a local government structure which would incorporate
traditional leaders, and should comprise indirectly-elected
members representing the various local government
structures or traditional authorities in the area. 45
The indirectly elected members would be rotated on a regular
basis to enable as many members as possible to be exposed to the
political and administrative functions of the Service council.
Local government or traditional authority structures should
comprise directly and indirectly-elected members. The
directly-elected members would be elected by means of a
ward system in those areas situated outside the areas of
jurisdiction of existing local authority areas and
tradi tional authori ty areas. 46
According to these recommendations, the number of directly-
elected members would be restricted to a percentage of the total
number of representatives in a Service Cou.ncil area.
The second tier of rural local government would comprise the
existing democratically elected rural local government structures
and traditional authorities. 47 Community authorities48 would,
45 Annexure A, "Discussion Document Rural Localon
government, " OctOber, 1994, p.4.
46 Ibid, p.4.
47 Annexure A, "Discussion Document Ruralon Local
Government, " OctOber, 1994, p. 7.
150
however, be established on the same basis as other rural local
government structures. But since tribal authorities are more
dominant in some rural areas than civic structures, the Sub-
committee on Provincial committees for Local Government thought
that it was of cardinal importance that the difference between
these bodies should be taken into account. Consequently, civic
associations within the areas of jurisdiction of the tribal
authority should work together with the traditional leaders on
matters of mutual concern. 49 Nonetheless, . this is hardly a
solution, because these structures have different perceptions.
For instance, in some areas civic associations 'believe that th~---' -- -_._---- --- - ------- -._-._. --- .,. -- -. _. - - _._--- ---- -~- -_._------_.- -_.-
na~_~-~n~el.ectiQ!1-.p.resages- th.e imminent disso.lytJon.of
chieftaincy, wh~g§.,._ i1l......-2th.~~__ .places , traditional leade.r.s._
~--------. .~~---.--.....- - -------
believe that their role will not change. 50 Besides this, the
---........-_-......:----_.- -------_ ... -.-- -_. -- - . _. - ~
tribal leaders' major concern is whether and to what extent the
new provincial governments will become sUbstitutes for the former
homelands governments.
The issue of democratically elected representatives in local
government was also posed to Mike Stanleys. He pointed out that
the interim constitution expressly provided for a three-tier
48 In Kwazulu-Natal there are three types of rural
settle~ents: farm or forest settlements; communal settlements;
and tr1bal settlements. Communal settlements are governed not by
the ch.ief but by a group of people who are elected by the
commun1ty: these are called community authorities as opposed to
the tribal authorities which govern the communities under a
tribal leader.
49 Annexure A, Discussion Document on Rural Local Government,
October, 1994, p. 7.
m McIntosh, The Rural Government Debate in South Africa,
1994, p.25.
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structure of government, namely, local, provincial and national,
which can only be democratic if they are all elected by the
people themselves. SI This suggests that rural communities cannot
be excluded from electing local governments. Moreover, the rights
of all citizens to elect a government is guaranteed by the
interim constitution. ll This, therefore, means that local
government elections should be held in the rural areas too.
The view of Induna David Ntombela, who is both a traditional
leader as well as the parliamentary whip of the IFP in KwaZulu-
Natal, is that tribal authorities in KwaZulu-Natal are not
opposed to local government elections in rural areas. When asked
how tribal authorities could be combined with elected
representatives, Ntombela's response was that the councillors
elected should be the councillors of a traditional authority
which would be chaired by a traditional leader. S3 The head of
each traditional authority should perform his duties in
consultation with the democratica~y elected councillors.~
Ntombela pointed out that the loc£i government elections now
scheduled for June 1996 in KwaZulu-Natal will be dominated by




interview, 12 December 1995,
S3 David Ntombela, interview, Pietermaritzburg Provincial
Assembly House, 14 December 1995.
54 Ibid.
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election of their candidates. ss Would it be proper in rural
areas, said Ntombela, for their system of governance, especially
through the people's assemblies like 'Imbizos', to maintain the
unity of their people by, for instance, nominating committees
without referring to the political affiliation of their members?
He then expressed concern that it was possible for any political
party which might be opposed in principle to tribal authorities
to win local elections and then introduce policies designed to
destroy the institution of chief ly rule. S6 Ntombela' s opinion
underestimates the provisions made in the interim constitution
that chiefs will serve in the democratically structures of local
government in an ex-officio capacity.
According to Ntombela, tribal leaders in KwaZulu-Natal
themselves believe that new legislation is needed to clarify
their status. S7 This should specify the relationship between
democratically elected councillors and tribal authorities. Such
legislation could only be passed after it has been referred to
the House of Traditional Leaders in terms of the interim
constitution. S8 He added that the other option which could be
explored is a District Council model of local government which
was provided for in the Interim Constitution. s9 Significantly,
's David Ntombela, interview,. Pietermaritzburg Provincial






Ntombela's opinions here are non-partisan, even though he is
aligned to the IFP. He spoke as a concerned tribal leader, not
as a member of the IFP.
The Role of Tribal Authorities in the New Local
Government.
The specification of a service delivery role for elected
local government suggests that traditional leaders will have no
powers pertaining to this, except in an .ex-officio capacity.
However, Patekile Holomisa, as chairperson of Congress of
Traditional Leaders of South Africa(::fc;;;;~~~sA»argues that the
-~-- ~ ...-.---
ex-offi9io .Et~tus which the interim_ c9ns.titution gave_ th~m~_do.e~
~... -~- -~- --- -- - - - ~ .
little to address the role of tribal authorities in the new
~ --~- ----......,..-~ .--.,.,.~. -...- - ~.;. ---- --"-" ------ - ~ . ..;.. - - - .
~X:.~~lJ.L-Q_t..._l.Qcal.-gQv:ernmen.t...!...6O Perhaps his conclusion is drawn
from comparing the provisions made in the interim constitution
with existing legislation, promulgated by the former homeland
governments, which governs the operation of tribal authorities.
But Holomisa' s view fails to recognize new local government
arrangements in the democratic dispensation. Tribal authorities \.
cannot be the local government in rural areas, because they don't
have the resources for implementing development projects and
delivering services.
Mclntosh notes that the threat tribal leaders pose to
establishing a strong local government system derives more from
60 P. Holomisa, "The Role of Traditional Leaders in Local
Government," in Seminar Report, Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung, 27-28
October, 1994, p.38.
154
their current insecurities than from a principled objection to
an elected rural local government system. 61 Mclntosh holds that
an elected system would serve the interests of the people,
including those of the tribal authorities. Apart from the
problems created by the inefficiency of the chieftaincy during
'the apartheid period, tribal leaders have been compromised by
their inability to orchestrate the delivery of development
resources in their localities, due to the centralized and poorly
co-ordinated delivery of services. 62 Perhaps new local government
arrangements in the democratic dispensation would free tribal
authorities from any accusation about the underdevelopment of the
former homelands if elected local governments would take
responsibility for delivering services and implementing
development projects in rural areas.
But contrary to Mclntosh's opinion, Mike Stanleys told me
that his department had received reports from some tribal
authorities which had expressed concern that the elected
structures of local government would undermine their status in
rural areas.~ This is the point that Ntombela made. Other tribal
authorities even went beyond this, arguing that if elected local
government structures become fused with the tribal authorities,
then rural development would be neglected. M These tribal
61 Mclntosh, The Rural Local Government Debate in South
Africa, 1994, p.25.




interview, Pietermaritzburg, 12 December
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authorities are opposed to the idea that their areas of
jurisdiction be included in other systems of local government,
for example Transitional Local Councils. They argue that these
systems of administration are different. Because of this, rural
areas would be neglected in favour of urban development. 65 Their~~
argument is based on the allegation that some of the urban
councils are bankrupt and their services have collapsed, and so
rural bodies do not want to find themselves having to pay these
debts. 66
Tribal leaders know that were local decisions on development
to be placed in the hands of an independent elected body, their
influence would inevitably be undermined. Competition and
conflict could follow between chiefs and local government,
possibly with the consequent weakening of the one by the other.
Therefore, there is no doubt that tribal leaders are suspicious
that the promotion of democratic local government would lead to
the eventual demise of tribal authorities.
This view is sim.-i..l.<!r.t...Q... tha.t_..Q{..Tshabalala, who f~els that
chieftainship is outmoped a-nd-in-ef·fee-e-ive in the development
context.~ He suggested that young educated men should be allowed
65 Mike Stanleys, interview, Pietermaritzburg, 12 december,
1995.
66 Ibid.
67 Interview with Vusi Tshabalala of Mafunze, 14 December
1995, Pietermaritzburg. Although Tshabalala is a member of the
PAC, he was speaking as a concerned resident of the Mafunze
Tribal Authority. His views are taken into consideration in this
chapter, because they reflect the views of a certain section of
the people in the area.
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a share in leadership. Tribalism was destined to disappear in the
near future and consequently local government must build ~ new
foundation on which development might proceed. 68 'Therefore,
democratic principles of self-governmentr' devoid of- the
constraints and inertia of the tribal system, should be
inculcated instead. 69
Tshabalala maintains that chiefs should not be accommodated
in the democratically elected local government structures because
to return the chief as- a member of a council served merely to
undermine his true position as traditional head of the jUdicial
and spiritual system. W Chiefs should be retained and
strengthened in, their jUdiciary capacity,· and this should be
divorced from legislative and executive functions. A clearcut
policy of demarcation between the duties of chieftainship and the
local government council should be instituted. 71
But Abdul Aweta,72 a local member of the IFP who stays at
Imbali, disagrees with Vusi Tshabalala. Aweta maintains that both
preserving chieftainship and pur-suing representative local
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
W Interview with vusi Tshabalala, 14 December 1995,
Pietermaritzburg.
71 Ibid.
72 Interview with Abdul Aweta, 14 December 1995, at
Pietermaritzburg's parliament buildings. Abdul Aweta was part of
a delegation of tribal leaders who came for an interview. His
view represents those who cherish the institution of tribal
authorities.
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government are necessary. Customarily, nothing should be allowed
to take place in a tribal area without the authority of the
chief. The chief's action in lending support to the local
authority might considerably enhance its prestige and standing
in the area. 73 In rural areag-;-··pE:!"ople look to the chief for
general guidance and this applied equally to his approval for all_.-----..--~-_ ... '''.
activities which take place in ~he tribal areas.~ The tribal
organization was still "the only complete and functioning
organization and it reaches every layer of the rural
population."~ Therefore, any scheme for more progressive
government "should start on solid foundations, a safe, known,
workable basis, ,,76 by, for example, accommodating tribal
authorities. Aweta's argument fails to recognise that, according
to the interim constitution, tribal leaders would be responsible
for all matters regarding their traditions and customs, whereas
they would be included only in an ex-officio capacity in the
structures of new local government.
It is against this backdrop that McIntosh argues that, in
rural areas, elected structures which could be responsible for
delivering services could distance traditional leaders from these
immediate pressures. A devolved, rationalized local government
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.




system would be very effective in delivering services. n Under
these conditions, tribal leaders, in their ex-officio capacity
on elected local councils, could conceivably have much greater
influence over local affairs, in spite of the fact that their de
jure powers might be more limited. 78
McIntosh's view is similar to the report by the Commission
on Provincial Government, which suggests that traditional leaders
could fulfil judicial duties, settle minor disputes in their
communities, and carry out ceremonial functions and arbitration
roles they presently perform in addition to the cultural and
religious roles peculiar to their communities. 79 This
interpretation, the report suggests, would concur with the
necessity to distance traditional leaders from party political
matters, enabling them to play a unifying role. 8o However, in my
view, this can only be achieved in theory, due to the fact that
tribal leaders, especially in the province of KwaZulu-Natal are
themselves politicians and political party leaders. The IFP
stands as a classic example.
Concerning land issues, the Commission on Provincial
Government advised that since the allocation and administration
n A. Mclntosh, "The Rural Local Government Debate in South
Africa: Centrist co.ntrol or Local Development? in seminar Report,
Konrad-Adenauer-St1ftung, 27-28 October 1994, p.26.
78 Ibid.
79 A Document for the use of the Chairman of the Commission
on Provincial Government, Mr T Botha, October 1994, p.9.
80 Ibid.
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of land impinges directly on development, service delivery and
planning, this should become the responsibility of an elected
body, under the joint supervision of elected and traditional
authorities. 81 This proposal fits in well with the
recommendations of the National Land committee that community
land trusts, under private law, or land boards should be
established. 82 These could be composed of elected or user
representatives, as well as planning and development officials
from the local and/or district council, with chiefs and izinduna
on an ex-off icio basis. 83 Tribal leaders and their izinduna would
serve on such boards in an ex-officio capacity, enabling broader
decision-making over land allocation and management, while
allowing traditional leaders to retain their role as custodians
of customs and tradition.
However, the separation of functions as suggested by the
National Land committee is complicated because land allocation
and management powers presently vested in traditional leaders
have been central to the authority of tribal authorities. As the
custodians of land, tribal leaders can grant or refuse land under
their jurisdiction to people wishing to move into a particular
area, and they have the power to force people off the land. M
This was one means through which loyalty to tribal leaders of the
81 Ibid.




" I ngonyama Land Trust," ..:oT~h:.::e=--.:.:N:.:::a~t~a~l:!:....-..!CW!..:!i~t::.!n~e""s~s ,
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rural communities was maintained. There is the possibility,
therefore, that tribal leaders would resist implementing a new
form of land administration in rural areas if it would entail
cutting off one of the main sources of their authority. But the
advantage of this new arrangement is that it would enforce
accountability in dealings with land in the rural areas. This is
important because this issue frequently proved controversial in
the former KwaZulu, where allegations of corruption had been
levelled against traditional authorities.~
In resisting the new local government arrangements, about
260 amakhosi of KwaZulu-Natal, under the banner of the IFP,
agreed upon five resolutions at a conference which took place in
Ulundi on 14 October 1994. Firstly, the amakhosi of KwaZulu
should remain the primary administrators of traditional
communities, exer~ising the powers of local government by means
of traditional councils. u
85 In his research in KwaZulu, Zulu observed that nine out
of every ten respondents who required a site on which to build
a house had to make some monetary payment either to the chief or
to the local headman (induna). In addition, 35 per cent of those
interviewed stated that they had to pay annually either for their
sites or for their fields, or even for both. Zulu notes that in
one area in particular, inhabitants were charged an annual levy
of R2 for the use of a field, and if that was not paid, they
forfeited their rights to plough or plant for that particular
year. Although not all tribal authorities in KwaZulu-Natal are
corrupt, this gives an indication as to what is going on. See
P.M. Zulu, "The Rural Crisis: Authority Structures and their
Role," in H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (eds), Up Against the
Fences: Poverty, Passes and privileges in South Africa, Cape
Town: David Philip, 1985, p.243.
86 Inkosi Nyanga Ngubane, liThe Role of Traditional Leaders
in Local Government", a paper presented at a conference hosted
by the Chairman of the Commission on Provincial Government, Mr.
T. Botha, on the role of chiefs in local government, in Durban
on the 27-28 October 1994.
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Secondly, traditional councils should be part of overarching
local government structures, namely, Regional Councils, which
should also include District Councils encompassing rural areas
and Municipal Councils for all municipalities which cannot stand
alone as metropolitan authorities. 87
Thirdly, the amakhosi agreed that Regional Councils should
be elected by proportional representation to ensure the proper
representation of the people living in traditional communities .
. These councils should have all powers of' economic and social
development necessary to promote the well-being of traditional
communities. 88 Fourthly, traditional communities should gear up
to participate in elections for Regional Councils. 89
Fifthly, the amakhosi and their traditional communities
should participate in establishing local government structures,
Regional Councils and related electoral processes only once the
overall framework for the establishment, preservation and
restoration of the Kingdom of KwaZulu has been established. 90
This should include: the adoption of a Provincial Rural Local
Government Act; a constitution for the province of KwaZulu-Natal,
establishing it as the Kingdom of KwaZulu; and an overall




90 Nyanga Ngubane, "The Role of Traditional Leaders in Local
Government" p.40.
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would provide the Kingdom of KwaZulu with the required autonomy
and self-determination within a unified South Africa. 91
JUdging from these resolutions, one can see that they are
tantamount to rejecting the provisions made in the interim
constitution. Besides this, they reflect the stance of the IFP
on issues such as self-determination and federalism. They also
reflect the continuation of the relationship between the IFP and
many tribal leaders which started in the 1970s soon after the
formation of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe. Chief Nyanga Ngubane,
who presented these resolutions at the conference in Durban, is
a provincial cabinet minister as well as a senior member of the
IFP. This explains why these resolutions go beyond issues
concerning the role of tribal authorities in democratic
government in that they are linked to the questions of self-
determination and the establishment of a Kingdom of KwaZulu-
Natal. 92 These are also precisely the matters on which the IFP
has been pressing for international mediation.~
The Role of Tribal Authorities in Development Programmes.
Despite whatever demands the IFP chiefs make, the interim
constitution has stated clearly that their role in the democratic
dispensation would be neither that of local government nor that
91 Ibid.
92 This probably also explains why the IFP's Constitutional
proposals insulate tribal leaders from other political parties.
93 For more details, see Chapters Two and Three.
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of service delivery, but instead would be limited to assisting
in making decisions about implementing development projects in
rural areas. This is because of the experience the chiefs have
in their communities.
A report of the Commission on Provincial Government states
that tribal authorities in South Africa control approximately
seventeen million hectares of land.~ They rule underdeveloped
areas with a high population density. The basic needs such as
water, employment, shelter, sources of energy and food are
therefore, considerable. The areas of jurisdiction of the tribal
authorities are, consequently, prominent among those for which
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 95 is intended.
It is important for the implementation of the RDP in these rural
areas to be carried out in consultation with the tribal
authorities, who should be involved from the outset.
Most tribal leaders have the capacity to influence their
communities to act in a certain manner. This offers an.---------
opportunity for local government to utilize the experiences of
the chiefs in executing development projects in rural areas.
The successful implementation of development programmes will
~ Annexure A, Document for the use of the Chairman of the
Commission on Provincial Government, Mr T. Botha, October 1994.
95· The Reconstruction and Development Programme has been set
up by the Government of National Unity to rebuild, reconstruct,
and develop the areas which were neglected during the apartheid
era. Prominent here are the former homelands where basic needs
such water, electricity, housing are in desperately short supply.
For more details see T. Botha, "The Future Role of Traditional
Leaders," a paper presented at the workshop in Durban, on 28
October, 1994.
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depend on cooperation between local government and the tribal
authorities and rural communities. It was this lack of
cooperation which crippled the duties of local government in the
rural areas of the KwaZulu Bantustan. My own research in
Vulindlela district,% in August 1994, substantiates this.
In Vulindlela,the task of investigating development
projects in the areas of the tribal authorities was given to the
Community Development committee. 97 This committee was
responsible for facilitating local coordination services and
raising funds from non-government sources. 98 To a large extent
these committees were autonomous enough to carry out functions
by themselves, although they have to report back to the tribal
authorities at various times. In essence, they make proposals to
% In this research I chose Vulindlela as a case study,
hoping that what is going on in the tribal areas of this district
would give me a rough indication as to the problems of rural
KwaZulu-Natal.
97 community Development committees are ordinarily
established to pursue some common interest. They might be
established at regiotial authority or at tribal authority level,
or at ward level by an inkosi or an induna. They may also be
established by community members themselves, or with the
assistance of an outside agency, for example, by government or
non-governmental organizations. committees established in this
way would still require the official approval of the tribal
authority. They normally have a specific focus, for example,
education, water, etc. They might be established as temporary
committees which would disband once their aims were achieved, or .
they were no longer useful.
Nominations for these committees are normally made by
members of the community who also have the opportunity to reject
them. They are ordinarily led by a chairperson approved by the
inkosi or induna. The committee are given the role of advising
on policy as well as carrying out certain tasks.
98 This information was gathered in an interview I held with
Mr Ncube the Magistrate of Vulindlela district, based at
Edendale, on 14 August 1995.
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the inkosi or induna who must, in consultation with the
councillors,~ ratify or reject the committees' proposals.
When asked why these functions could not be undertaken by
the existing office-bearers within, tribal authorities, replies
included:
* chiefs and izinduna do not always have the time to get
involved in other activities;
* some chiefs and izinduna have no direct interest in various
activities;
* and educated people who are not members of the Tribal
Authori ty need to be employed. 100
These are some of the problems the tribal authorities in
Vulindlela were facing in 1994. Since there was no cooperation
between the communities and the izinduna or amakhosi, the
implementation of development projects and the delivery of
services was not successful. Mainly this was so because community
development depended on self-help projects which used to depend
on voluntary social groups wh~ch supported them.
Another crucial issue which complicated the functions and
the effectiveness of tribal authorities was the election of
Community Development committees. Chiefs who had some experience
99 Councillors are a small group of people who are elected
to be the advisors to the chief. They are drawn from the ranks
of headmen, sub-headmen and prominent members of the community
who are acknowledged for their skills and leadership qualities.
100 Interview, Mr Ncube, Magistrate of Vulindlela district,
14 August 1994.
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with the committees regarded the election of office bearers at
mass meetings as counter-productive. lm This was so because the
people elected had no interest in many of the activities
discussed. Most development committees established in this way
were known to have disintegrated. As a result, a pragmatic
solution had been adopted in many areas of Vulindlela district,
where a chief appointed individuals to the development committees
whom he considered skilled and had an interest in different
aspects of development. loo But the problem was that such
committees lacked accountability in the eyes of some sections of
the community, so much so that they were even regarded as the
puppets of the tribal leaders.
On this issue, concern was expressed by Mr Ncube, magistrate
of Vulindlela district, regarding the significance of elections
for community authorities. He conceded that elections do not
necessarily help in fostering accountability. He cited an
example. One community authority had done a lot of good work in
getting the Umgeni Water Board to deliver reticulated water and
charges were made for the purchase of water. However, members
were thrown out through the (dishonest) electioneering of an
opposing group who thought that the community was being
overcharged for water. since then the community has been split
, 101 Interview with Magistrate Ncube of Vulindlela district,
Edendale, 14 August 1994.
lOO Interview with Chiefs, V.A. Ngcobo of Mafunze, N.W. Zondi
of Mpumuza, S.G. Zondi of Inadi, 14 August 1994.
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in two. And this had also contributed to the escalation of
violence in the area .103
This suggests fundamental constraints on upgrading local
authorities in rural areas the problem of generating
accountable structures. It is a problem that will have to be
addressed by the new local government structures, as part of
their task of delivering services in rural areas.
The fact that the Black rural population is organizationally
and economically disadvantaged in lobbying for national
development or welfare resources has to be recognized. Expecting
a mUltiplicity of organized interest groups to lay the foundation
for representative development committees could well be
misconceived. This point was well expressed by Chief Zondi, one
of the more prominent chiefs in the area. Zondi stated that
people were used to having committees appointed for them by the
chief. This was consistent with the way izinduna and councillors
were selected and appointed. Consequently, democratization would
be a slow process because of the absence of a democratic culture
and because people were used to having chiefs do things for
them. 104 Even so, chiefs claimed that it was not in their
interest to appoint development committees on behalf of the
lill Interview with Ncube, Magistrate of Vulindlela district
based at Edendale, 14 August 1994.
104 Interview with Chief S. Zondi of Inadi Tribal~uthority,
Vulindlela District, 14 August 1994.
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people.l~ This only happened because people look upon the chiefs
as leaders who could be trusted to choose what is best for their
communities. 106
The establishment of a new form of local government could
relieve tribal authorities from the pressure they face from their
communities to deliver services. The new system could help
tribal leaders to regain part of the respect they lost due to
their failure to operate as local government structures in the
former KwaZulu Bantustan. For instance, in the Vulindlela
district, the relationship between tribal leaders and some
sections of their communities was not at all good. They viewed
one another with suspicion. The chiefs interviewed can be easily
be divided into progressive chiefs, prepared to work and to
attract influential people (such as teachers, nurses, etc) to
become active in local affairs; and conservative chiefs less
willing to delegate authority.
On this, Chiefs S. Zondi, N. Zondi and V. Ngcobo revealed
that educated people and those who have business sites used to
pursue matters on their own without taking other people's
feelings into account. For instance, if a chief called a mass
meeting in the tribal areas, people did not bother to attend.
Some of them even said, 'look at those poor people, they are
1~ Interview with Chiefs from Vulindlela district, N. Zondi,
S. Zondi and V.A. Ngcobo, 14 August 1994.
106 Ibid.
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having a meeting there.,lm Likewise Chief V.A. Ngcobo of Mafunze
complained that whenever members of the community came to see
chiefs who were not well dressed, who did not own motor vehicles
. and who were illiterate, they were looked down upon. IOM
While my feeling is that elected structures will alleviate
the burden of tribal authorities from duties such as delivering
services and implementing development projects, how far this will
be successful remains an open question. Where low levels of
education and lack of knowledge about procedures limit the
capacity of chiefs to exercise fully limited de jure powers, it
is understandable that democratically elected local government
bodies like development committees, which have some independent
decision-making powers, would be seen by some chiefs as a
potential threat. For instance, Chief N. Zondi of Inadi admitted
that some chiefs and councillors did not favour development
committees because often the people who were elected,
particularly the educated ones, were against the institution of
. chieftainship. Because of this, the chiefs felt threatened. 109
Here one sees the resistance that could occur in incorporating
tribal authorities in the structures of the democratically
elected local government.
Im Interview, Chief N. Zondi of Inadi and Chief S. Zondi of
Mpumuza, 14 August 1994.
I~ Interview with Chief V.A. Ngcobo of Mafunze, 14 August
1994.
109 Interview, Chief N. Zondi of Inadi, 14 August 1994.
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The extent to which existing traditional leaders would be
prepared to tolerate elected local government being accorded the
sole responsibility for delivering services is crucial to the
future of democratic rule in the rural areas. It is, therefore,
important to redefine the role of tribal authorities in local
government in terms of possible different forms of participation.
The failure of tribal authorities to carry out development duties
in the rural areas of the former homelands arose due to their
own weaknesses. Tribal authorities proved unwilling to delegate
authority, and they also limited the possibilities of meaningful
participation. Elected local government structures could be a
remedy to the problems that rural communities have been
experiencing. Democratic local government may well serve the
interests of these rural communities who would elect them to
office. For, quite apart from the problems created by chieftaincy
being politicized during the apartheid period, tribal authorities
have been compromised by their inability to oversee the
development of their communities.
However, the necessary steps to resolve these difficulties
must be undertaken with the support of the existing tribal
leaders, and the traditional channels for consultation and
communication must be utilized. This process could take place as
provided for in the interim constitution, in that chiefs should
be included in elected bodies of local government in an ex-
officio capacity.1l0 In this way a chief could continue to make
110 section 181 of Interim Constitution of the Republic of
South Afr~ca. The int~rim constitution does, however, provide
that a chlef has the rlght to stand for the election if he so
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his voice heard, while also lending his prestige and his
influence to the elected local councils.
In a democratic dispensation, elected local government
structures would be responsible for implementing development
projects and delivering services to the communities in rural
areas. This would relieve tribal leaders of these
responsibilities. Under these conditions, tribal leaders, in
their ex-officio capacities on elected local councils, could have
a much greater influence over local affairs. While this might
provide a short-term solution to the future role of the tribal
authorities in local government, the success of this arrangement
will be jUdged by how effectively they improve people's material




Although the institution of tribal authorities is
characterized by ethnicity, it does not mean that it cannot be
incorporated in the structures of democratic government in the
post-apartheid South Africa. Ethnicity as a concept in not an
enemy of democracy. On the contrary, ethnicity nurtures democracy
in that it becomes a social identity that shapes people's
behaviour through the way they interpret the world. It also
becomes a vehicle through which people can express cultural
variety within a large commonality.
since tribal authorities are part of the reality of South
African politics, they cannot simply be ignored. Their role in
a democratic order requires analysis. This can serve as a means
of trying to ascertain how traditional authorities can make a
constructive contribution to South Africa's new democracy.
In the opening chapter of this thesis, we saw that the
institution of tribal . authorities was utilized in the
administration of rural areas by different governments that came
to power in South Africa during the period of colonization in the
early 19th century. This suggests that the institution of tribal
authorities is neither useless nor stagnant, but rather it is
flexible, so much so that it can easily adapt to any political
environment. Perhaps this indicates that the present government
in South Africa, like the previous governments, can a+so utilize
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tribal authorities, if proper ways to restructure them can be
formulated to suit the prevailing democratic dispensation.
Nevertheless, the question is why should the institution of
tribal authorities be incorporated at all in structures of
democratic government. There are many reasons, but the major one
is that its incorporation will serve the cause of democracy.
Regimes or governments can be said to be democratic if they are
acceptable to their communities, and if they include all relevant
groups in society. Democracy is a matter of'degree, depending on
the extent of popular influence in decision making. This degree
is measurable by the extent to which all groups (traditional lll
and modern, rural and urban) can play a role in communal
decision-making, by the extent to which government decisions are
sUbject to popular control, and by the extent to which ordinary
people are involved in the running of the community, in pUblic
administration in the widest sense. To this end democracy entails
accommodation and compromise.
.Secondly, including tribal authorities in democratic
government will allow expression for an underlying assertion of
African nationalism in a political system known for its
suppression, its manipulation and exploitation of African
national symbols. Excluding the institution of tribal authorities
111 Traditional authorities are regarded as the custodians of
the traditions and customs of the traditional groups. This being
the case, the inclusion of tribal authorities in the structures
of the democratic government would entail the representation of
the traditional groups.
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from any form of accommodation in the structures of democratic
government would imply another form of segregation.
Before we take a closer look at what role tribal authorities
can play in the structures of South Africa's democratically
elected government, the question is how to accommodate them. In
order to have a rough idea of how tribal leaders could work at
national, provincial and local levels, an examination of the
experiences of other countries could be useful. The British
system of government is a case in point.
The British have managed to work out a marriage between
their traditions and the demands of modernity. From tradition,
they have maintained a monarchy and the House of Lords; the House
of Commons emerged out of the needs of modernity. Together, the
House of Commons and the House of Lords form Parliament. \ Even
though the requirements of modernity and democracy have led to
a vast reduction in the power of the House of Lords, in favour
of the House of Commons, the former has not been consigned to the
dustbin of history. A recent study has concluded that the
"Lords does still occasionally delay legislation; mainly,
however, it serves as a debating society, and as a locus at which
the government can accept amendments to its proposals that it
would be less willing to accept in the more politicized House of
Commons. "2 The House of Lords serves a useful function in British
H. J. Laski, Par1 iamerttary Government in England: A
Commentary, New York: The Viking Press pUblishers, 1939, p.40.
2 M. Donald Hancock, et al., Politics in Western Europe,
London, 1993, p.32.
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policy making despite its diminished role, as many crucial
modifications to parliamentary legislation result from the
attention of the Lords. 3
Besides this, the British have combined the elective and
non-elective principle in the composition of Parliament. Members
of the House of Lords are not elected: some have seats through
hereditary membership; others are life lords appointed by the
monarch, but only for the life of the. appointee. 4 The non-
elective principle can enable a fair number of members to view
pUblic matters with greater objectivity than those who get into
Parliament through election. 5 It is not surprising, therefore,
to find out that important alterations to British legislation
result from the intervention of the House of Lords. 6
In my view, I think that South Africa could learn a lesson
from the manner in which the British model of Parliament has
tried to work out a synthesis between tradition and modernity.
As provided for in South Africa's interim constitution, there
should be a component of traditional· leaders included in all
3 A. Todd, Parliamentary Government in England: Its origin.
Development. and Practical Operation, London: Sampson Low,
Marston & Company, 1960, p. 3.
4 M. Donald Hannock, et ale Politics in Western Europe,
London, 1993, p. 32. See also A. Todd, Parliamentary Government
in England, pp. 5-7.
5 Ibid.
6 According to Todd, the task of the House of the Lords is
to control, revise, and amend the projects of legislation which
emanate from the House of Commons. See A. Todd, Parliamentary
Government in England, p.7.
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three tiers of government, local, provincial, and national. It
does not matter whether these traditional elements of legislative
bodies will be restricted to dealing only with traditional and
customary matters. What is important is that they should be given
the right to discuss, propose, and the opportunity to review
legislation that directly affects their tribal communities. As
a result of their historical responsibilities, traditional
leaders could exert a definite influence on the legislation of
provincial legislatures in particular, because this is the level
where the decisions concerning the welfare of their communities
will be taken. However, tribal leaders serving their House at
national or provincial levels should direct their political
aspirations and demands towards the betterment of their own
communities.
While lessons from other countries could be drawn to help
us define the role of tribal authorities at national and
provincial levels, a problem lies at the local level. There are
many varied views about the role of tribal authorities in local
government in South Africa. Most political parties are in
agreement over the need to include the institution of tribal
leaders in local government. But there is no unanimity as to how
this might be achieved. Nevertheless, the interim constitution
offered some hints. Section 182 of the interim constitution, for
instance, states that tribal leaders were to be made ex-officio
members of any elected council in their areas.? The implication
7 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No.
200 of 1993.
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here is that, in the democratic dispensation, local governments
will be made up of democratically elected ~tructures, and that
tribal authorities will be accommodated in an ex-officio
capacity. In my view, this provision is intended to honour the
position of tribal leaders, whilst at the same time preserving
the elective and representative character of democratic local
government. Besides this, in democratic countries local
government is perceived as the democratisation of decision-making
at the grassroots. The participation of tribal authorities will
be particularly important for rural communities which are often
neglected in decision-making in national government.
The question which has remained unanswered, though, is
whether tribal leaders should serve in local government only in
an ex-officio capacity, or whether they should also be allowed
to stand for election in a ward. Or should they qualify to do
both in a dual system? The interim constitution provided that
tribal leaders are eligible to be elected to any office of local
government. 8 Similarly, a report of the constitutional Assembly
Theme Committee 2 acknowledged the right of traditional leaders
to stand for election; and insisted that when elected they should
take seats as ordinary citizens. 9 The report also states that
where traditional leaders enjoy ex-officio status on elected
8 Section 182 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1993.
9 Constitutional Assemblv. Theme Committee 2 Structure of
Government: Core Group Meeting, 21 August 1995, p.18.
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structures, this arrangement should be sUbject to periodic
review. 10
A related issue is whether tribal leaders who seek elective
off ice should relinquish their status as traditional leaders. And
if they should, whether this should be permanent or temporary.
CONTRALESA favours individuals being reinstated as traditional
leaders by the community if it so wishes, when a leader has
completed a term of off ice. 11
The provision made in the interim constitution delegating
elected officials to provide services is advantageous to the
institution of tribal authorities, in that this would distance
traditional leaders from immediate pressures in their
communities. As already discussed in the previous chapter, in
many rural areas traditional leaders have lost their dignity and
are blamed for the underdevelopment of their localities, due to
the inefficient and poorly co-ordinated delivery of services
dur ing the apartheid era. A devolved and rationalised local
government system would facilitate a .locally accountable and
responsive service delivery. Moreover, under these conditions,
traditional leaders, in their ex officio capacities on elected
local councils, could have much greater influence over local
affairs, in spite of the fact that their de jure powers might be
more limited. This could also be beneficial to tribal leaders,
10 Ibid.
11 Constitutional Assemblv. Theme Committee 2 structuring of
Government Core Group meeting, 21 August 1995, p.5.
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because, unlike elected local councils, they could be expected
to continue to exercise the jUdicial and arbitration roles they
presently perform, in addition to the cultural or religious roles
peculiar to their communities.
The most problematic issue at local government level is
land. Ninety-three per cent of tribal land in Kwazulu-Natal is
vested in the Ingonyama Trust. The beneficiaries of the Trust are
the relevant tribe or community.12 The only trustee is the King
of the Zulus. 13 And land cannot be leased or'alienated in any way
without the prior written consent of the affected traditional
authority.
since the power over land is vested in tribal authorities,
this probably will affect the duties of elected local government.
The difficulty here is that the terms of The Ingonyama Trust Act
could undercut the activities of elected local authorities in
rural areas. It could also limit the options open to rural local
government development, since dealings about land must happen
through the traditional authorities. Secondly, as none of the
tribal land is privately owned, the rating of the communally
owned land will be problematic in a metropolitan context. Should
the community pay the rates, or is it the responsibility of the
Trust? Thirdly, the rendering of, and payment for, services is
a further complication. This is even further exacerbated by the
12 Section 2 (2) of The Ingonyama Trust Act (Act No. 3 of
1994) •
13 Ibid, section 2(3).
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fact that none of the affected tribal areas has been subdivided.
consequently, no individual sites have been demarcated. 14
As I discussed previously, no-one has come up with a
satisfactory solution to the practicality of including communally
owned tribal land in a democratic local authority. My suggestion
is that, since the allocation and administration of land impinges
directly on development, service delivery and planning, this
might ultimately have to become the responsibility of an elected
body, perhaps under the joint supervision of the elected and
traditional authorities. Possibly a land board could be formed,
constituted by elected or user representatives, as well as
planning and development officials from the local and/or district
council, with the chiefs and headmen on an ex officio basis. ls
since to a large extent the current role of traditional
leaders and their izinduna pertaining to land allocation tends
to be that of vetting agreements that have already been struck
between existing and aspirant landholders, land boards would
simply provide a mechanism for broadening representation and for
ensuring that such transfers occur in a manner that is consistent
with legal and planning requirements. 16 such a structure would
14 The information that no individual sites have been
demarcated in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, was provided to me
by Mike Stanleys, Director of the Department of Local Government,
in the interview, on 12 December 1995, Pietermaritzburg.
15 A. Mclntosh, "The Rural Local Government Debate in South
Africa: centrist Control or Local Development," in seminar
Report, Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung, 27-28 October 1994, p.29.
16 liThe Ingonyama Trust to Remain" in Association For Rural
Advancement News, (AFRA) June/July 1994, p.10.
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also enable traditional leaders to retain their custodianship
role over land. 17
My proposals would not be possible in the short-term, given
the present insecurity of traditional leaders. Negotiations on
establishing local government structures in communal areas would
need to take place after, or in conjunction with, the creation
of new mechanisms for supporting, enlightening and upgrading the
activities of traditional leaders. This would be in line with
literature on community development which generally states that
"you should start where you are and with what you have. Ill~ In
other words, it is essential to work in harmony with the
pervading values, customs and institutions of the people.
One controversial issue which has arisen in the democratic
dispensation is the remuneration of tribal leaders. The
Government of National Unity proposed that tribal authorities
should be remunerated by the central government. 19 The IFP
objected, arguing that paying chiefs is the responsibility of
provincial government. While this might be true, it may be best
if tribal leaders were remunerated by central government. Then
equity in the stipends of tribal leaders in all the provinces
will then be maintained. Before the remuneration of tribal
17 Ibid.
I~ G. C. Passmore, Theoretical Aspects of Local Government and
Community Action, Salisbury: A. W. Bardwell & Co. (Pvt) Ltd.,
1971, p.34.
19 The Government of National Unity made such a proposal
through the Remuneration of Tribal leaders Bill which was passed
in Parliament in Cape Town on 27 June 1995.
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authorities bill was proposed in 1995, it came to the attention
of state President Nelson Mandela that while the status of
tribal leaders all over the country is the same, some leaders in
some provinces do not get remuneration at all, and some get paid
more than others in the same province. 20 Remuneration is used by
politicians as a means of obtaining the loyalty of tribal leaders
for political gain. Therefore, to bring to an end such
unacceptable practices, the President suggested that chiefs' pay
should be the responsibility of the central government.
The observation of President Mandela is similar to what has
already been addressed in the opening chapter of this thesis
about what was happening in the former KwaZulu Bantustan.
According to Tandy and Botha's report on local government in the
former KwaZulu, the selection of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
members occurred through the Inkatha Central Committee. For
chiefs, loyalty to KwaZulu and Inkatha was essential so that they
could gain access to both political power and financial
remuneration. 21 This was a signif icant incentive for KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly members not to compromise their position,
since disloyalty to Inkatha was likely to result in chiefs losing
political favour, with a sUbsequent loss of earnings. 22
20 See The Natal Witness, 28/06/1995, 29/06/1995.
21 T. Botha, P. Tandy, and N. Ismail, Report on
Intergovernmental Relations in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia,
University of Western Cape, November 1992, p.57.
n See A. Mclntosh, Option for Rural Local Government, 1992,
p.140.
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But why should tribal leaders be remunerated at all? They
should indeed be because they perform official duties in rural
areas which should qualify them for government salaries. For
example, my own research discovered that tribal authorities
process pension forms, register births and deaths in rural areas,
pursue development projects, distribute land, settle minor
disputes, welcome visitors to tripal areas, report outbreaks of
disease both for humans and domestic animals, impound stray
animals, control illegal immigration in rural areas, and organize
labour for self-help projects. Indeed, with the advent of the
democratic dispensation, the delivery of services and the
implementation of development projects will be in the hands of
elected local government structures. Land allocation will also
be administered jointly by the elected structures of local
government and tribal leaders. Tribal authorities will continue
to carry out some duties such as settling minor disputes, and the
magistrates' court will only act as courts of appeal. Similarly,
the current tasks that tribal authorities perform, the ones I
have just listed, will continue to remain in their hands. These
duties are not the responsibility of elected local government.
Since magistrates are paid for settling disputes and members of
parliament are paid for representing their areas or
constituencies, then tribal leaders should also be remunerated
because they are performing duties for their communities on
behalf of both the South African and KwaZulu-Natal governments.
Another highly problematic issue concerns traditional
leaders and the Bill of Rights. Always a controversial sUbject,
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the matter of traditional leadership under a bill of fundamental
rights is a focus of widely differing views. Yet, there is enough
language in the interim constitution to subject the institution
of tribal leaders to the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional
Assembly Theme committee 2 points out that the key difficulty
might well lie in the view expressed, for instance, by the Zulu
King's council (and heard frequently at the Public Hearing on
Traditional Leaders) that the Bill of Rights in its pure Western
form may not be suitable for South African conditions and that
it may have to be adapted to absorb certain positive aspects of
the traditional way of life. D
Comments on the negative aspects of traditional leadership
in a human rights context revolve around women, equality and
hereditary rule. The argument is that granting institutions of
traditional authorities an enhanced constitutional status is
contradicting in a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist
constitution, where tribal leadership is by definition hereditary
and patriarchal. 24 However, in terms of the current socio-
political climate of political transition in South Africa, this
special protection of tribal authorities is necessary.
Nevertheless, should the hereditary and undemocratic
character and functions of tribal authorities be left intact, it
23 Constitutional Assembly Theme committee 2 Structure of
Government: Core Group Meeting, 21 August 1995, p.19.
24 Y. Mokgoro, "Traditional Authority and Democracy in the
Interim South African Constitution," in Seminar Report, The Role
of Traditional Leaders in Local Government in South Africa, 27-28
October, 1994, p.17.
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will frustrate the very ideals of a new democracy. Although the
hereditary nature of traditional leadership may be acceptable,
its exclusively male character should change. The gender
imbalances of traditional leadership structures' should be
redressed by including women at all levels of traditional
authority. Currently, there is only one female chief in the whole
province of KwaZulu-Natal. If the exclusion of women in the
tribal structures is not addressed, it follows that the newly
created Provincial Houses and the Council of Traditional Leaders
will be virtually all male. "If women are elected to local
traditional government structures, the electoral process could
place them on regional and national traditional structures even
before their inclusion in the line of succession. ,,25 This would
inject these structures with an element of representivity and
enable them to find common ground on views and recommendations
to be submitted to legislatures. Mokgoro goes on to argue that
"the institution of traditional authorities should not of
necessity be characterized by the loyalty of its functionaries
but by the traditional character of its functions. Government
within traditional communities 9hould be established through the
electoral process. ,,26
According to Mokgoro, at local level the electoral process
should draw from the broader community, which would necessarily
include women. The local chief or chiefs and other hereditary




process. 27 These local structures should then become the sources
for- elected representatives on regional structures, where the
latter would in turn feed into national traditional structures. 28
Mokgoro adds, "if royalty participates in decision-making, it
should be because they have been placed in that position by a
broad community mandate. "29
My overall assessment, therefore, is that the incorporation
of the institution of tribal authorities in a democratic South
Africa cannot be achieved by legislation without the commitment
of either the tribal authorities themselves, or the major
political parties, especially, the ANC and the IFP. In KwaZulu-
Natal, the incorporation process relies on the extent to which
there is cooperation between the ANC and the IFP. At the moment
this appears to be a chimera. Primarily this is so because issues
concerning tribal authorities have become intertwined with
political struggles, disagreements and tension between the ANC
and the IFP.
Ethnicity is an important factor here because for some
politicians, it is a mobilizing strategy of considerable
strength. Ethnicity as a social identity needs to be separated
from political mobilization and the manipulation of ethnic
sentiments. I am aware that in KwaZulu-Natal politicised
27 Ibid.
28 Y. Mokgoro, "Traditional Authority and Democracy in the
Interim South African Constitution," 1994, p.17.
29 Ibid.
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ethnicity arises, in large part, out of frustrated economic and
political goals. To resolve conflict where ethnicity motivates
immediate behaviour, it will have to be sensitive and self-
consciously depoliticised and separated from the arena of
competition for resources,privilege, power and rights in the
democratic dispensation.
If tribal leaders can rise above party politics, ethnicity
in Black communities will meet the real needs of security, in
that it will de-emphasize group consciousness in the political
arena. Nevertheless, such a de-emphasis need not entail the
denial of cultural variety, ethnic consciousness, or the
desirability of a range of social identities. It should, however,
make these integral to democratic practice within society.
What remains unanswered is the question as to what the most
satisfactory solution to the problem of the institution of tribal
leaders is in rapidly modernizing states. My entire discussion
shows how complex this issue is. Bearing in mind that these
issues are intertwined with those of party politics, my main line
of argument would not entirely satisfy traditional leaders. This
is because some political parties encourage tribal leaders to
resist change which could be conducive for democracy, by warning
.-
them that if they respond to the new order, they will lose their
current powers. This might well be true, but as long as
politicians continue interfering with the affairs of tribal
authorities, the institution of chiefly rule will remain an
unresolved problem in South Africa's fledgling democracy.
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However, precisely because tribal leaders are an integral part
of African culture, doing away with the institution of tribal
authority would be socially unacceptable and politically
irresponsible. still, this does not absolve traditional
authorities from changing circumstances. Tribal authorities must
evolve into appropriate repositories of African culture which can
coexis~ with a rising democratic culture in South Africa in
general, and in KwaZulu-Natal in particular.
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APPENDIX
1. The King will be recognized as King with constitutional
powers, prerogatives, rights and obligations which will extend
throughout the province of KwaZulu-Natal.
2. He will have and exercise directly or indirectly both
ceremonial and traditional powers and prerogatives which will be
specified in a constitution of KwaZulu-Natal.
3. The King will have the right to establish a royal court.
4. The King will open the proceedings of the KwaZulu-Natal
provincial parliament every year.
5. He will be advised by a Royal Council comprising the premier
of the province, members of the Royal House of the Kwazulu, a
specified number of members of provincial parliament and a number
of traditional leaders in the province.
6. The King will be empowered to designate a member of the Royal
House as his adviser and assistant on all traditional and
customary matters.
7. The King will install all tribal chiefs.
8. Finally, the King will have a budget allocation that will be
approved annually by the provincial legislature. l
"What Mandela Offered the Zulu King" The Sunday Nation,
10 April 1994, p.3.
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